Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

ality is stability of life, and eternity is stability of being.

different from what it was before ; nor has it one intelligence after another, in order that it may abide in another, or that it may remember another intellection which it formerly possessed. But what prevents it from knowing the mutations of other things, without being changed itself, such as the periods of the world ? Shall we say it is because it intellectually perceives one thing as prior, but ano¬ ther as posterior which is consequent to the muta¬ tions of that which is convolved ? Besides, remem¬ brance is different from intellectual perception : and it must not be said that the intellection of it¬ self is recollection. For it does not proceed in its energy for the purpose of detaining it, lest it should depart ; for thus it might fear lest the essence of itself should depart from itself. Neither, there¬ fore, must it be said that soul remembers after the same manner, as we say it recollects those things which it innately possesses. But having descended hither, it possesses these innate conceptions, yet does not [always] energize according to them, and especially when it has profoundly descended into body. The ancients, however, appear to have considered memory and reminiscence to be the same thing as for the soul to energize according top. 381 those things which it now possesses ; so that this is another species of memory. Hence, time is not present with memory thus denominated. Perhaps, however, these things are considered by us lightly, and not accurately. For perhaps it may be doubted, whether memory and reminiscence belong to such a soul as this [which we are now considering] or whether they do not rather pertain to another more obscure soul, or to this animal which is a compo¬ site of soul and body. And if they belong to another soul, it may also be doubted when and how it received what it recollects ; and a similar doubt will arise if they are said to pertain to the composite of soul and body. Hence, that must be investigated which was the subject of our inquiry from the first, what that is which possesses in us the power of remembering. And if, indeed, it is the soul which remembers, it must be considered what part or power of the soul it is ; but if it is the sentient power, as to some it has appeared to be, what the mode is of its subsistence must be investigated, and what ought to be called the animaL And again, whether it is proper to admit that the same thing apprehends both sensibles andp. 382 intelligibles, or that one thing perceives the former* but 3be, what the mode is of its subsistence must be investigated, and what ought to be called the animaL And again, whether it is proper to admit that the same thing apprehends both sensibles andp. 382 intelligibles, or that one thing perceives the former* but another the latter of these.

XXYI. If, therefore, the animal is both at one and the same time in the senses according to energy, it is also necessary that sensible perception should be a thing of this kind. Hence* likewise* it is said to be common, in the same manner as to bore with an auger and to weave ; in order that soul may subsist conformably to the artificer, in * sensible perception, but the body according to the instrument ; the body indeed suffering and being ministrant, but the soul receiving the impression of the body* or that which is effected through the body. Or the soul must receive the judgment arising from the passion of the body ; where, in¬ deed, sense may thus be said to be the common work, but memory will not be compelled to pertain to that which is common, the soul now receiving the impression, and either preserving or ejecting it ; unless some one should infer that remembrance also is something common, because we acquire a good memory, and likewise beeome forgetful from the temperaments of the body. It may also bep. 383 said, that the body either impedes or does not im¬ pede reminiscence, but that remembrance will nevertheless be the province of the soul. And with respect to disciplines, how will the remem¬ brance of these pertain to that which is common [or to the animal which is the composite of soul and body], and not rather belong to the soul ? But if the animal is both at once in such a way that another thing is produced from both, in the first place indeed, it will be absurd to say that the animal is neither body nor soul. For both being changed, the animal will not be something different from both ; nor again, both being mingled, will the soul be in the animal in capacity only ; though even in this case, remembrance will nevertheless belong to the soul. Just as in the mixture of honey with wine, if there is still something of sweetness in it, this will be derived from the honey. What then, if it should be said that the soul indeed herself remember^, yet in consequence of being in the body, and therefore not being pure, but as it were affected with quality, she is able to impress in the body the types of sensibles, and to establish as it were a seat in it, for the purpose of receiving forms, and preventing them from gliding away?