Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

at which is bounded, loses its own nature. Hence, the infinite is not an accident to matter. Matter, therefore, is the infinite ; since in intelligibles alsox matter is the infinite which is there.1

1 “ Power,0 says Proclus, (in Theol. Plat. lib. iii. cap. p.) Sl is every where the cause of prolific progressions, and of all multitude; occult power, indeed, being the cause of occult multitude ; but the power which exists in energy, and which unfolds itself into light, being the cause of all-perfect multi¬ tude. Through this cause, therefore, I think that every being, and every essence, has connascent powers. For it participates of infinity, and derives its hyparxis indeed from bound, but its power from infinity. And being is nothing else than a monad of many powers, and a multiplied hyparxis, and on this ac¬ count being is one many. — It appears to me also, that Plotinus and his followers, frequently indicating these things, produce being from form and intelligible matter, arranging form as ana-

p. 60

And there, indeed, it is generated from the infinity or power of the one , or from the ever, infinity not being in the one , but proceeding from it. How, therefore, is the infinite there, and also here ? Or is not the infinite twofold ? And in what do they differ ? They differ in the same manner as arche¬ type and image. Is the latter, therefore, in a less degree infinite ? Perhaps it is more infinite. For so far as the image flies from the reality of exist¬ ence, so far it is in a greater degree infinite. For infinity is in a greater degree in that which is less bounded. For that which is less in good is more in evil. Hence the infinite which is in intelligible^, in consequence of having more of being, is but as an image [with respect to the infinity of matter.] But the infinite which is here, as having less of being, so far as it flies from existence and truth, and is drawn down to the nature of an image, is a logous to the one , and to hyparxis, but power as analogous to matter. And if, indeed, they say this, they speak rightly. But if they ascribe a certain formless and indefinite nature to an intelligible essence, they appear to me to wander from the conceptions of Plato on this subject. For the infinite is not the matter of bound, but the power of it, nor is bound the form of the infinite, but the hyparxis of it.” See tny transla¬ tion of this work of Proclus, vol. i. p. 173.

6 i more true infinite.

ceptions of Plato on this subject. For the infinite is not the matter of bound, but the power of it, nor is bound the form of the infinite, but the hyparxis of it.” See tny transla¬ tion of this work of Proclus, vol. i. p. 173.

6 i more true infinite. Is, therefore, the infinite the same thing as to be infinite ? Perhaps where there are that which has a productive and forming power, and matter, each of these is different ; but where there is matter alone, they must either be said to be the same, or in short, and which also is better, to be infinite is not here. For it would be reason in order that it might be infinite [i. e. would have a productive and forming power,] which is not in the infinite. Hence matter must be said to be of itself infinite, through having an arrangement opposite to reason. For as reason not being any thing else is reason, thus also it must be said, that matter being opposed to reason according to infinity, is infinite in such a way as not to be any thing else*

XVI. Is, therefore, matter the same with dif¬ ference, or is it not the same ? Perhaps it is not the same with difference simply considered,1 but with a part of difference which is opposed to beings properly so called, and which are productive prinp. 62ciples. Hence, also, non-being is thus a certain being, and the same with privation, if privation is an opposition to the things which subsist in reason. Will, therefore, privation be corrupted by the ac¬ cession of that of which it is the privation ? By no means* For the receptacle of habit, is not habit, but privation. The receptacle, likewise, of bound, is not that which is terminated, nor bound, but the infinite, and this so far as it is infinite. How is it possible, therefore, that bound approaching should not destroy the nature of the infinite, especially since this infinite has not an accidental subsistence ? Or may we not say that if this infinite was infinite in quantity, it would perish? Now, however, this is not the case, but on the contrary its being is pre¬ served by bound. For bound brings that which the infinite is naturally adapted to be, into energy and perfection ; just as that which is not yet sown [is brought to perfection] when it is sown, and as the female [when impregnated] by the male.

1 it appears from the version of Ficinus, that the words η ον tclvtqv €Τ€ροτηπ απ\ω$> are wanting in this place in the original.

being is pre¬ served by bound. For bound brings that which the infinite is naturally adapted to be, into energy and perfection ; just as that which is not yet sown [is brought to perfection] when it is sown, and as the female [when impregnated] by the male. For then the female nature is not destroyed, but pos¬ sesses the female characteristic in a greater degree ; since then it becomes more eminently that which it is. Is, therefore, matter evil when it partakes of good ? Or shall we say it is evil on this accountp. 63 because it was in want of good ? For it did not pos¬ sess it. For that which is in want of any thing, and obtains what it wants, will perhaps become a medium between good and evil, if it is equally dis* posed towards both. But that which possesses nothing, as being in poverty, or rather being poverty itself, is necessarily evil. For this is not the want o of wealth or of strength, but it is the want of wis¬ dom, and the want of virtue, of beauty, strength, morphe, form, and quality. How, therefore, is it possible it should not be deformed ? How is it pos¬ sible it should not be perfectly base ? How is it possible it should not be perfectly evil ? The mat¬ ter, however, which is in intelligibles is [real] being. For that which is prior to it is beyond being. But here [in the sensible region,] that which is prior to, matter is being. Hence the matter which is here is not being, since it is different from it when com¬ pared with the beauty of being.

AGAINST THE GNOSTICS/

I. Since it has appeared to us that the nature of the good is simple and the first ; for every thing

1 “ At the time in which Plotinus lived/’ (says Porphyry in his life of our philosopher,) " there were many Christians and others, who departing from the ancient philosophy, be¬ came heretics, [with respect to it;] viz. the followers of Adelphius and Acylinus, who being in possession of many of the writings of Alexander, Philocomus, Demostratus, and Lydus, and exhibiting the revelations of Zoroaster, Zostrianus, Nicotheus, Allogenes, Meses, and certain others, deceived many, and were themselves deceived. For they asserted, that Plato had not penetrated the depth of an intelligible essence. Hence Plotinus in his conferences adduced many arguments against them, and also wrote a book which we have inscribed ‘Against the Gnostics/ leaving the rest to our judgment.”

After this testimony of Porphyry, it is singular, as Fabricius observes, that Plotinus should not even once use the word Gnostics, in any part of his treatise against them.