Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

Since if it becomes in energy casually, it is possible that it may not proceed into energy. Hence, it is neces¬ sary that first natures should be established in energy, and that they should be unindigent and perfect. But imperfect natures are posterior to them. The progeny also of imperfect, are per¬ fected by first natures, who after the manner of fathers give perfection to what posterior natures generated imperfect from the beginning. That, likewise, which is generated, has at first the relation -of matter to the maker of it, but is afterwards ren¬ dered perfect by the participation of form. But if it is necessary that soul should be connected with passion, and if it is likewise necessary that there should be something impassive, or all things would perish in time ; it is necessary that there should be something prior to souh And, if soul is in the world, but it is necessary there should be something beyond the world, on this account also it is necessary that there should be something prior to souh For if that which is in the world, is in body and matter, nothing would remain the same [if that which is mundane only existed]. So that man.

w * and all productive principles, would not be perpe¬ tual, nor always the same. Hence, that it is neces¬ sary intellect should be prior to soul, may be sur¬ veyed from these and many other arguments.

V. It is necessary, however, to consider intel¬ lect truly so called, neither as intellect in capacity, nor as proceeding from the privation to the posses¬ sion of intellect. For if we do not, we must again investigate another intellect prior to this. But we must assume intellect in energy, and which isp. 292 always intellect If such an intellect, however, has not an adventitious intellection, whatever it intellectually perceives, it perceives from itself. And whatever it possesses, it possesses from itself. But if it perceives intellectually by and from itself, it is itself that which it perceives. For if the essence of it was one thing, but the objects of its perception different from it, its very essence would be destitute of intellection ; and again, it would be intellect in capacity, but not in energy. Neither of these, therefore, must be separated from the other. With us, however, it is usual, from the things with which we are conversant, to separate in our conceptions intellect, and the objects of its perception.

be intellect in capacity, but not in energy. Neither of these, therefore, must be separated from the other. With us, however, it is usual, from the things with which we are conversant, to separate in our conceptions intellect, and the objects of its perception. What therefore is its energy, and what does it intellectually perceive, in order that we may admit it to be those things which it perceives ? Is it not evident, that being intellect, it intellectually perceives in reality, and gives subsistence to be¬ ings ? Hence it is itself beings. For it either intellectually perceives them existing elsewhere, or it perceives them in itself as being itself. It is impossible, therefore, that it can perceive them existing elsewhere. For in what other place can they exist ? Hence it intellectually sees itself, andp. 293 perceives them in itself. For it does not perceive these, as some fancy, in sensibles. For each of the things which have a primary subsistence, is not a sensible object. For the form which is in sen¬ sibles is in matter, and is truly an image. Every form, also, which is in another thing, is derived from another thing, proceeds to it, and is the image of it. If, likewise, it is necessary that intellect should be the maker of this universe, it will not intellectually perceive things in that which does not yet exist, in order that it may produce it. Hence, it is necessary that these things should be prior to the world, not as impressions from other things, but as archetypes, and primary natures, and the essence of intellect. If, however, some should say that [seminal] productive principles are sufficient, it is evident that these must be perpetual. But if they are perpetual and impassive, it is necessary that they should subsist in intellect, and in such an intellect as is prior to habit, and nature and soul· For these are in capacity. Intellect, therefore, is truly beings, not intellectually perceiving such things as are situated out of itself. For the objects

* of its perception are not external to itself. But it is as it were the first legislator, or rather the lawp. 294 itself of existence. Hence it is rightly said, that it is the same thing to perceive intellectually and to be, and that the science of things without matter, is the same with the things themselves. I have also investigated myself as one among the number

/ of beings. And the same thing is testified by re¬ miniscence. For no one of [real] beings subsists out of intellect, nor is in place ; but they always abide in themselves, neither receiving mutation nor corruption.

investigated myself as one among the number

/ of beings. And the same thing is testified by re¬ miniscence. For no one of [real] beings subsists out of intellect, nor is in place ; but they always abide in themselves, neither receiving mutation nor corruption. Hence, also, they are truly beings ; since if they were generated and corrupted, they would have an adventitious existence ; and they would no longer be [real] beings, but that which is adventitious to them wTould be being. Sensibles, therefore, are indeed by participation that which they are said to be, the subject nature [i. e. matter] receiving form externally derived ; as for instance, brass receiving form from the art of the statuary, and wood from the tectonic art ; in consequence of art proceeding into these materials through an image. Art itself, however, abides in sameness, external to matter, and possesses in itself the true statue, and the true bed. Thus also in bodies, this universe which participates of images, evinces that real beings are different from bodies ; since thep. 295 former are immutable, but the latter mutable. The former, likewise, are established in themselves, and are not in want of place. For they are not mag» nitudes, but have an hypostasis intellectual, and sufficient to themselves. For the nature of bodies is indebted to something else for its preservation. But intellect, since it sustains through an admirable nature things which are of themselves in a perish¬ able condition, does not seek where it may be itself established.

VI. Let, therefore, intellect be [real] beings, and possess all things in itself, not as in place but as itself, and as being one with them. But all things there subsist collectively at once, and yet nevertheless they are separated from each other ; since the soul also which has many sciences in itself simultaneous, possesses them without any confu» sion. Each also, when it is requisite, performs what pertains to it, without the co-operation of the rest. And each conception energizes with a purity unmingled with the other inward conceptions. Thus, therefore, and in a still greater degree, intellect is at once all things ; and again, not at once, be^ cause each is a peculiar power. Every intellect,p. 296 however, comprehends all things,1 in the same manner as genus comprehends species, and as whole comprehends parts. The powers of seeds, likewise, bring with them an image of what we have said. For in the whole seed, all things are without separa¬ tion, and the reasons [or productive principles] are as it were in one centre.