Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

self forward by intelligence would have a vacuum, unless it received and com¬ prehended in itself the intelligible which it intellec¬ tually perceives. For it is not intellective without the intelligible. Hence it is then perfect when it possesses the intelligible. It is necessary, how¬ ever, prior to its perceiving intellectually, that it should have with itself a perfect essence. Hence, that with which the perfect is essentially 1 present, will be perfect prior to intellectual perception. To this, therefore, nothing of intellectual perception is

1 There is an omission in the original here of κατ ονσιαν , but both the sense and the version of Ficinus require it should be inserted.

p. 459

necessary. For prior to this it is sufficient to itself. Hence it does not perceive intellectually. There is, therefore, that which is not intellective ; there is also that which is primarily intellective ; and there is that which is intellective in a secondary degree. Farther still, if that which is first perceives intellectually, something is present with it. Hence it is not the first, but that which is second. It is also not one, but is now' 1 many ; and is all such things as it intellectually perceives. For if it only intellectually perceived itself, it would be many.*

III. If, however, it should be said, that nothing hinders this same thing which is the first from being

1 For εώη here, it is necessary to read ηδη, r The intelligible is prior to intelligence; for the former is characterized by essence , but the latter by intellect . And be¬ ing is prior to intellect. The intelligible, however, contains in itself intellect causally. Hence it has a knowledge which is beyond intellect. Much more, therefore, is the ineffable prin¬ ciple of things, who is beyond the intelligible, above the pos¬ session of intellectual perception. For his knowledge like his nature is more impartible than every centre, and more ineffa¬ ble than all silence. For it is, if it be lawful so to speak, a darkness which transcends all gnostic illumination. Hence by energizing about it, knowledge is refunded into ignorance.

p. 460

many, we reply that in these many there will be a subject. For it is not possible for the many to subsist, unless the one exists, from which, or in which they subsist ; or in short, unless there is a one which is prior to other things that are num¬ bered among themselves, and which it is necessary to receive itself in itself alone.

ssible for the many to subsist, unless the one exists, from which, or in which they subsist ; or in short, unless there is a one which is prior to other things that are num¬ bered among themselves, and which it is necessary to receive itself in itself alone. But if it subsists in conjunction with other things, it is necessary having received this wdth other things, but wThich at the same time is different from them, that we should suffer it to be with other things, but that we should also investigate this subject, no longer in conjunc¬ tion with other things of which it is the subject, but itself by itself. For that which is the same in other things, will indeed be similar to this , but will not be this.' It is necessary, however, that it should be alone, if it is to be seen in other things, unless it should be said that the being of it has its hypo¬ stasis in conjunction with other things. Hence, there will not be that which is itself simple ; nor will there be that which is composed of many a For the imparticipable or exempt one, is not consubsistent with any thing, but the participable one is consubsistent cither with being, or life, or intellect, or soul, or body. See nty translation of Proclus’ Elements of Theology.

46 1 things. For since that which is simple has no subsistence, neither will that which is a composite of many things subsist. For because each simple thing is unable to exist, no one certain simple thing subsisting from itself, hence since that which is multitudinous is not able to have an hypostasis by itself, nor to impart itself to another thing, because

/ it has no existence, how7 can there be that which is composed of all things, when it must consist of non¬ entities, which are not merely negations of a cer¬ tain thing, but have no subsistence whatever? If, therefore, a certain thing is multitude, it is necessary there should be one prior to the many . Hence, if that which is intellective is a certain multitude, it is necessary that there should not be intellectual perception in that which is not 1 multitude. This, however, is the first [principle of things]. In the natures, therefore, posterior to it, there will be intellectual perception and intellect.

IV. Farther still, if it is necessary that the good should be simple and iinindigent, it will not be in want of intellectual perception. But that which is

1 μη is omitted in the original.

4 62 not necessary to it, will not be present with it; since, in short, nothing is present with it.

ry that the good should be simple and iinindigent, it will not be in want of intellectual perception. But that which is

1 μη is omitted in the original.

4 62 not necessary to it, will not be present with it; since, in short, nothing is present with it. Intellec¬ tual perception, therefore, will not be inherent in it, because neither will any thing else. Besides, intellect is something different from the good. For it becomes b on i form by the intellectual perception of the good . Again, as in two things wfoere there is one and another thing, it is not possible for this one which subsists in conjunction with something else to be the one itself ’ but it is necessary that the one which is one by itself, should be prior to that which is with another ; thus also it is necessary, that where a certain one which is in a certain re¬ spect simple subsists in conjunction with another thing, there should prior to it be the one which is perfectly simple, and which has nothing in itself of the things contained in that which subsists in con¬ junction with others. For wdience could one thing be in another, unless prior to these that had a separate subsistence, from which the thing that is another is derived ? For that which is simple, can¬ not be derived from another. But that which is multitudinous or two, must necessarily be suspend¬ ed from another thing. Hence, that which is first may be assimilated to light ; that which is next top. 463 it, to the sun ; but that which is the third, to the moon, deriving light from the sun. For soul, in¬ deed, has an adventitious intellect, which, as soul is of an intellectual nature, colours it [with a light derived from the good]. Intellect, however, con¬ tains in itself an appropriate light of its own ; for it is not light alone, but that which is illuminated essentially. But that which imparts this light, since it is not any thing else, is a simple light, affording to intellect the power of existing that which it is. Why, therefore, should this simple light be in want of any thing? For it is not the same with that which is in another ; since that which is in another is different from that which subsists itself by itself.

V. Farther still, that which is multitudinous will seek itself, and will wish to verge to and be co-sentient of itself. Where, however, will that

\ which is entirely one proceed to itself? And where will it be in want of co-sensation? For this same thing is more excellent than all co-sensation and intellection.