Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

therefore not being pure, but as it were affected with quality, she is able to impress in the body the types of sensibles, and to establish as it were a seat in it, for the purpose of receiving forms, and preventing them from gliding away?

p. 384

To this we reply, in the first place indeed, these types are not magnitudes ; nor in the second place, are they like impressions from a seal, or resistances, or figurations, because neither is there any impul¬ sion there, nor does the same thing take place as in wax ; but the mode even in sensibles resembles that of intellection. In intellection, however, what resistance can there be ? Or what need is there of body, or corporeal quality in intellectual energy ? Moreover, it is necessary that soul should remem¬ ber its own motions, such as its tendencies to the objects of its desire, and to things which it has not obtained, and which have not arrived at the body. For how could the body speak of things which have not arrived to it ? Or how can the soul recol¬ lect in conjunction with body, that which the body is not at all naturally adapted to know? But it must be said, indeed, that some things end in the soul ; and these are such as enter through the body ; but that others pertain to the soul alone, if it is necessary that the soul should be something,

Λ and that there is a certain nature and work of it If, however, this he the case, and it desires, and remembers its desire, it will also remember the attainment, or non-attainment of the object of itsp. 385 desire, since its nature does not rank among things of a flowing condition. For if this is not admitted, we must neither grant that it has a co~ sensation, nor a power of following the conceptions of intel¬ lect, nor a certain conspiration, and as it were con¬ sciousness of itself. For unless the soul naturally possessed these things, it would not obtain them through its union with the body ; but it would in¬ deed have certain energies, the works of which wmuld require the assistance of corporeal organs ; and of some things it would bring with itself the powers ; but of others it wmuld also bring the ener¬ gies. With respect to memory, however, the body is an impediment to it ; since even now also oblL vion is produced from the addition of certain things ; but through ablation and purification, memory fre¬ quently emerges. When the soul, therefore, is alone, it is necessary that the moveable and flowing nature of the body, should be the cause of oblivion and not of memory. Hence, also, body may he understood to be the river of Lethe.

nd purification, memory fre¬ quently emerges. When the soul, therefore, is alone, it is necessary that the moveable and flowing nature of the body, should be the cause of oblivion and not of memory. Hence, also, body may he understood to be the river of Lethe. Let, there¬ fore, this passion [i. e. memory] belong to the soul.

XXV II. To what soul, however, does memory
pertain ? Does it belong to that more divine sou!
Plot . £ B

p. 386

according to which we subsist, or to the other which we derive from the universe ? May wre not say, that memory pertains to each of these ; but that one kind of memory is peculiar, and another common ? and that when they are conjoined, all the species of memory subsist at once ; but that when they are separated, if both should exist and remain, each soul will preserve for a long time the remembrance of things pertaining to itself, but for a short time the recollection of things foreign to its nature ? The image, therefore, of Hercules, is in Hades.1 For it appears to me requisite to think, that this image has a recollection of every thing that has been transacted in life. lor to this imagep. 4 life especially pertained. Other souls, however, being both these together, have nothing more to say than what pertains to this life, and in consequence of being the composite of soul and body, know the concerns of the present state of existence, or besides this, something belonging to justice. But we have not yet shown what Hercules himself, who is with¬ out the image, will say. What, therefore, will the other soul say that is liberated and alone ? For thep. 387 soul, indeed, which is attracted by body, will recol¬ lect every thing which the man did or suffered [in the present life]. In the course of time, however, after death, the recollection of other things also from former lives will arise, so that some of these will be dismissed and despised. For the soul be¬ coming in a greater degree purified from the body, will recollect those things, the remembrance of which she had lost in the present life. But wrhen she becomes situated in another body, she will then indeed departing [from an intellectual] speak of the concerns of an external life. She will, likewise, speak of the things w'hich she has just left, and also of many things pertaining to a superior life. But as many adventitious circumstances will arise in the course of time, she will always be oppressed with oblivion.

1 i. e. The irrational, which is the image of the rational soul, is in the obscurity of the sensible life.

s of an external life. She will, likewise, speak of the things w'hich she has just left, and also of many things pertaining to a superior life. But as many adventitious circumstances will arise in the course of time, she will always be oppressed with oblivion. What, however, will the soul which becomes alone remember ? Or should we not first consider to what power of the soul remembrance belongs ?

XXVIII. Do we, therefore, remember through the powers by wdiich we perceive sensibly and learn ? Or do we remember the objects of desire through the powTer by which we desire, and the objects of anger through the irascible power? For it may be said, that it is not one thing which en¬ joys, and another which remembers what that thing enjoyed. The epithymetic power, therefore, is again moved through memory to the objects which it once enjoyed, when they present themselves to its view. For why is it not moved by another object, or not after the same manner ? What hin¬ ders us, therefore, from granting to it a sensation of things of this kind? And why may we not, therefore, attribute desire to the sensitive power, and this in every respect, so that every thing may be named according to that which predominates ? Or shall we say, that we ascribe sense to each thing in a different manner ? Thus, for instance, it is sight indeed that perceives, and not the power which desires. But the power which desires is moved by sense, as it were in succession ; yet not in such a way as that sense can tell what the quality is of the desire, but so as to suffer without perceiving what it is. Thus also with respect to anger, sight sees the author of the injury, but anger rises in opposition to the injurer ; just as when a shepherd sees a wolf among his flock, the dog, though lie does not himself see the wolf, yet is

SS9

\ excited by impulse, or by the noise [which this cir¬ cumstance produces]. For the power, indeed, which desires, possesses in itself a vestige of what it formerly enjoyed, not as memory, but as a dis¬ position and passion. But it is another thing which perceives the enjoyment, and possesses in itself the remembrance of what has been done. That it is so, however, this is an argument, that memory frequently does not know what the things are of which desire participates, though they still reside in it.

XXIX.