Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

itself, and will wish to verge to and be co-sentient of itself. Where, however, will that

\ which is entirely one proceed to itself? And where will it be in want of co-sensation? For this same thing is more excellent than all co-sensation and intellection. For intellectual perception is not the

/ first of things, either with respect to existence, or dignity of nature ; but it is the second thing, andp. 464 generated posterior to the subsistence of the good . As soon as generated, also, it moved itself towards the good . But being moved towards, it also knew it. And intellectual perception is this , viz. a mo¬ tion towards the good , and an aspiration after it . For desire generated intelligence, and is consubsistent with it. For sight is the desire of seeing. The good , therefore, is not at all in want of intel¬ lectual perception. For there is not any thing else beside itself which is the good of it ; since when that also which is different from the good intellec¬ tually perceives it, it does this in consequence of being boniform, and possessing a similitude to the good . It likewise intellectually perceives that which it sees, as good and desirable to itself ; and in consequence of receiving as it were the imagina¬ tion of good. And if it is always thus affected, it is always this [i. e. it is always boniform]. For again, in the intellection of itself, it accidentally perceives the good. For looking to the good, it intellectually sees it, and also sees itself energizing. But the energy of all things is directed to the good ,

VI. If, therefore, these things are rightly asserted, intelligence will have no place whateverp. 465 in the good. For the good which is present with an intellective1 nature is different from the good itself. Hence the good is unenergetic. For why is it necessary that energy should energize ? For in short, no energy whatever has again energy. But if to other energies 'which are directed to ano¬ ther thing, we attribute something else, it is how¬ ever necessary, that the first energy from which other energies are suspended, should be that very thing which it is, and that nothing else should be added to it. An energy, therefore, of this kind is not intellectual perception. For it does not possess that which it intellectually perceives ; since it is i the first energy. In the next place, neither does intelligence intellectually perceive, but that which possesses intelligence. Again, therefore, two things take place in that which perceives intellectually. But that which is first is by no means two.

ince it is i the first energy. In the next place, neither does intelligence intellectually perceive, but that which possesses intelligence. Again, therefore, two things take place in that which perceives intellectually. But that which is first is by no means two. Far¬ ther still, the truth of this may be seen in a still greater degree by him who considers how this two¬ fold nature subsists in every thing which is more clearly intellective. For we say, indeed, that be-

2 instead of to row n in this place, it is necessary to read ?{t) roovvn .

Plot. 2 G

p. 466

irigs as beings, that each thing itself [by itself,] and truly existing beings, are in the intelligible place ; and this not merely because some things abide in¬ variably the same in essence, but others, and these are such as are in the sensible region, continually flow and are not permanent.1 For perhaps there are some things in sensibles of a permanent nature. But we assert this of intelligibles, because they possess the perfection of existence. For it is ne¬ cessary that the essence which is primarily so call¬ ed, should not be the shadow’ of existence, but should have the fulness of being. Existence, how¬ ever, is then full, when it receives the form of intel¬ lectual perception, and of life. Hence, in [real] being, to perceive intellectually, to live, and to exist, are consubsistent. If, therefore, it is being, it is also intellect, and if it is intellect it is being. And intellectual perception is simultaneous with existence. Hence, to perceive intellectually is many things, and not one thing. It is necessary, therefore, that with the nature w hich is not a thing of this kind, there should not be intellectual per¬ ception. Hence, among the several forms con-

V

tained in true beings, there are man, and the intel- 1 Instead of ov yevei here, it is necessary to read ου /ue^et.

p. 467

lectual perception1 of man ; horse, and the intel¬ lectual perception of horse ; the just, and the intel¬ lection of the just. Hence too, all things there are double, and the one is two. And again, two passes into one. But that which is the first of things is not either of these ; nor does it consist of all the things which are two; nor is it, in short, two. It has been, however, elsewhere shown by us, how two derives its subsistence from the one . But since the one is beyond essence, it is also be¬ yond intellectual perception. There will be no absurdity therefore, in asserting that the one does not know itself. For being one it does not possess with itself that which it may learn.

tence from the one . But since the one is beyond essence, it is also be¬ yond intellectual perception. There will be no absurdity therefore, in asserting that the one does not know itself. For being one it does not possess with itself that which it may learn. But neither is it necessary that it should know other things. For it imparts to them something better and greater than the knowledge of them ; and this is the good of other things. But it rather imparts to them the ability, as much as possible, of coming into con¬ tact with it in the same thing.

1 It is requisite here, to supply tli£ words ανύρωπον νοησ is

και»

p. 468

ON THE GOOD* OR THE ONE·

I. All beings are beings through the one , both Such as are primarily beings, and such as in any respect whatever are said to be classed in the order of beings. For what would they be, if they were not one? For if deprived of unity, they are no longer that which they were said to be. For neither would an army, or a choir exist [as such], unless each of them was one. Nor would a herd exist, if it were not one. But neither would a house or a ship have an existence, unless they pos¬ sessed the one ; since a house is one thing, and also a ship, which one if they lose, the house will no longer be a house, nor the ship a ship. Con¬ tinued magnitudes, therefore, unless the one is pre¬ sent with them, will not have an existence. Hence, when they are divided, so far as they lose the one ,p. 469 they change their existence. The bodies, also, of plants and animals, each of which is one, if they fly from the one , in consequence of being broken into multitude, lose the essence which they before pos¬ sessed, no longer being that which they were, but becoming instead of it other things, and continuing to be these so long as they are one. Health, like¬ wise, then has a subsistence, when the body is congregated into one [i. e. when it possesses sym¬ metry], and beauty then flourishes when the nature of the one coniines 'the parts of the body. Virtue also exists in the soul when the soul tends to unity, and is united in one concord. Since, therefore, the soul conducts all things to one, by fabricating, fashioning, forming and co-arranging them, is it necessary to assert when we have arrived as far as to soul, that she supplies the one , and that she is the one itself? Or must we not say, that as when she imparts other things to bodies, such as morphe and form, it is not herself which she imparts, but things different from herself, thus also it is requisite to think if she imparts the one,