Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

ed, yet though it gives itself to the whole, it does not depart from the unity of its nature. Yet it is not one in the same manner as body. For body is one by continuity, bpt one part of it is different from another, and is situated in a different place. Nor again is it one, in the same manner as one quality. The nature, however, which is at once partible and impartible, and which we say is soul, is not one like that which is continued, having another and another part ; but it is partible indeed, because it is in all the parts of that in which it subsists ; and impartible, be¬ cause the whole of it is in all the parts, and like¬ wise in each of the parts. He, therefore, who per¬ ceives this, and beholds the power of it, will know what a divine and admirable thing soul is, and that it possesses a supernatural essence; not indeedp. 314 having magnitude, but being present with all mag¬ nitude, and existing in this place, and again not existing in it, and this not by a different, but the same nature. So that it is divided into parts, and again not divided ; or rather, it is neither divided, nor generated divisible. For it remains with itself a whole. But it is divided about bodies, because bodies in consequence of their proper partibility, are not able to receive it impartibly. So that the distribution into parts, is the passion of bodies, and not of soul.

II. That it is necessary, however, that the nature of soul should be a thing of this kind, and that it is not possible for soul to be any tiling besides this, being neither alone impartible, nor alone partible, but that it is necessarily after this manner both these, is manifest from the following considerations. For if it was like bodies having another and another part, when one part suffered, another part would not be sensible of the suffering, but that soul for instance, which is in the finger, would have a sen¬ sation of the passion, as being different, and sub¬ sisting in itself. And, in short, there would be many souls, governing each of us. One soul, likep. 315wise, would not govern this universe, but an infi¬ nite number of souls separate from each other* For with respect to what is said about continuity, unless it contributes to unity, it is introduced in vain. For that which is asserted by some who deceive themselves, is not to be admitted, viz. that the senses gradually arrive at the ruling part, by a continued succession.1 In the first place, there¬ fore, to say that the senses arrive at the ruling part of the soul, is said without examination.

ome who deceive themselves, is not to be admitted, viz. that the senses gradually arrive at the ruling part, by a continued succession.1 In the first place, there¬ fore, to say that the senses arrive at the ruling part of the soul, is said without examination. For how do they divide, and assert this to be one thing, but that another, and the ruling part something else ? By how much quantity, also, do they divide each of these ; or by what difference, the quality being one, and the bulk continued ? Whether, likewise, is the ruling part alone sentient, or have the other parts also a sensible perception ? And if this is the case with the ruling part alone, it will then per¬ ceive, when the sensible passion falls on this part established in a certain place ; but if it falls on another part of the soul, which is not naturally adapted to be sentient, this part will not deliver

* For &ι.αΒοσει here, it is necessary to read, conformably to the version of Ficinus, δια £οχ[/»

p. 316

the same passion to the ruling part, nor, in short, will there be sensation. If, also, the sensible pas¬ sion falls on the ruling part, it will either fall on a part of it, and this being sentient, the remaining parts will no longer be sensitive ; for it would be in vain ; or there will be many and infinite sensible perceptions, and all of them will be dissimilar. Hence, one sensible perception will say, I prima¬ rily suffer, but another will say, I perceive the passion of another sense. Each sensation, like¬ wise, except the first, will be ignorant where the passion was generated. Or each part of the soul will be deceived, fancying that the passion was there generated, w here it is. If, however, not only the ruling part, but any other part has a sensible perception, why will this part be the leader, but another part not ? Or why is it necessary that sen-

$ sation should arrive at the ruling part ? How, like¬ wise, will the sensations arising from many senses, such as the ears and eyes, know one particular thing ? But again, if the soul is entirely one, so as to be perfectly impartible, and one in itself ; and if it entirely flies from the nature of multitude and partibility, no body which may participate of thep. 317 soul, will be wholly animated ; but the soul esta¬ blishing itself as it were about the centre of each, will leave all the bulk of the animal without anima¬ tion.

flies from the nature of multitude and partibility, no body which may participate of thep. 317 soul, will be wholly animated ; but the soul esta¬ blishing itself as it were about the centre of each, will leave all the bulk of the animal without anima¬ tion. Hence it is necessary that soul should be thus one and many, partible and at the same time impartible : and we ought not to disbelieve that it is impossible for one and the same thing to be in many places at once. For if we do not admit this, there will not be a nature which connects and governs all things ; and which at once comprehends all things, and conducts them by wisdom. And this nature is indeed multitude, because beings are many ; but it is also one, in order that the nature which comprehends may be one. By its multitu¬ dinous one, therefore, it supplies all the parts of body with life ; but by its impartible one it con¬ ducts all things wisely. In those things, however, which are deprived of wisdom, that which is the leading one imitates this one of the soul. Hence, this is the meaning of what is divinely though ob¬ scurely asserted by Plato, viz. that from an essence impartible and always subsisting according to same¬ ness, and from an essence divisible about bodies, the Demiurgus mingled a third species of essencep. 318 from both.1 Soul, therefore, is after this manner .one and many ; but the forms in bodies are many and one ; bodies are many only ; and that which is supreme is one alone.

1 See my Introduction to, and translation of, the Timaeus of Plato.

p. 319

A

DISCUSSION OF DOUBTS

RELATIVE TO

THE SOUL.

1. Is it necessary to consider such doubts as pertain to the soul as sufficiently solved ; or shall we say that the doubts themselves are accompanied with this gain, that to know the difficulty with which they are attended, will be a right discussion of the affair ? For what can any one reasonably more abundantly consider and discuss than this ; both on many other accounts, and also because it contributes to the knowledge of those things of which it is the principle, and of those from which it is derived ? By so doing, likewise, we shall com¬ ply with the mandate of the God who calls upon us to know ourselves. And since we wish to in¬ vestigate and discover other things, it is but just top. 320 enquire what this is which investigates, especially since we desire to apprehend that which is lovely in the objects of contemplation.