Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

rough its hope, it accedes as far as it is possible for it to accede, and running in conjunction with that which is not able to leave it, it causes that to be great w hich is not great, yet not so as to appear to he the magnitude which is seen in bulk. At the same time, however, matter pre¬ serves its own nature, using this magnitude as a vestment, through which it ran together with it, when magnitude running became its leader. But if at any time it should divest itself of magnitude, it would again remain the same as it w as before in itself ; or would be as great as form when present caused it to be. And soul, indeed, possessing the forms of beings, since she is also herself a form, contains all things at once. Since, likewise, eachp. 173 form is at once wholly contained in her, hence per¬ ceiving the forms of sensibles as it were converted o and acceding to her, she cannot endure to receive them with multitude, but sees them divested of bulk. For she cannot become any thing else than what she is.

Matter, however, having nothing repercussive ; for it has no energy ; but being a shadow, stays to suffer whatever the producing cause may effect in it. That also which proceeds from the reason that is in soul, has now a vestige of the thing which is about to be effected ; just as in the iconic nature of the phantasy, reason which is moved, or the motion from reason, is a division into parts ; since if it was one and the same, it would not be moved, but be permanent. Matter, however, is not able to intro¬ duce at once all things into itself, for if it were able, it would be some one of all things. But since it is necessary that it should receive all things, yet not impartibly, it is requisite that existing as the place of all things, it should proceed to all things, meet with them, and be sufficient for every interval, because it is not itself comprehended by interval, but is exposed to the reception of it. How does it happen, therefore, that one thing entering intop. 174 matter, does not impede other things ? It is because all things cannot enter together at the same time ; for if they could, there would not be any thing which is first. But if there is, it is the form of the universe ; so that all things are indeed simulta¬ neous, but each has a partial existence. For the matter of the animal nature is distributed in con¬ junction with the division of the animal into parts. For if this were not the case, nothing would have been produced besides reason.

XIX.

gs are indeed simulta¬ neous, but each has a partial existence. For the matter of the animal nature is distributed in con¬ junction with the division of the animal into parts. For if this were not the case, nothing would have been produced besides reason.

XIX. The things, therefore, which enter into matter as a mother, neither injure it, nor benefit it. For the impulses of these do not pertain to matter, but to each other, because the powers of these also pertain to contraries, but not to subjects, unless the subjects are considered in conjunction with the im¬ pulses. For heat destroys cold, and the black the white; or if they are mingled together, another quality is produced from the mixture. Hence, things which are mingled suffer ; but with them, to suffer, is not to be that which they were before. In animated natures, also, the passions indeed, are about the bodies, the change in quality taking place according to the inherent qualities and powers.

p. 175

But when their state of existence is dissolved, or congregated, or transposed preternatu rally, then, the passions indeed are in the bodies, but know¬ ledge is in the souls that perceive the more vehe¬ ment passions. If, however, they do not perceive them, they have no knowledge of them, but matter still remains. For matter suffers nothing, when cold departs, and heat accedes ; since neither of these is either friendly or foreign to it. Hence, the appellations of a receptacle and nurse are more appropriate to it [than any other names.] But *vhy is it called a mother ? For it does not generate. Those, however, appear to have denominated it a mother, who think that a mother has the relation of matter towards her offspring, as alone receiving, but imparting nothing to the things begotten ; since whatever of body there is in the offspring, is de¬ rived from the nutriment. But if the mother im¬ parts any thing to her progeny, it is not so far as she has the relation of matter, but because she is also form. For form alone is prolific, but the other nature is barren. Whence , also , I think the ancient wise men obscurely signifying this in their mysteries , represent the ancient Hermes always possessing the organ of generation erects thusp. 176 manifesting that it is intelligible reason which generates in the sensible universe . But they in - dicated the unproliflc nature of matter which al¬ ways remains the same , by the barren substances which were placed about it .

gan of generation erects thusp. 176 manifesting that it is intelligible reason which generates in the sensible universe . But they in - dicated the unproliflc nature of matter which al¬ ways remains the same , by the barren substances which were placed about it . For they introduce the mother of all things, which they thus proclaim, receiving the principle according to the subject, and they give her this appellation in order to render their meaning manifest, wishing to indicate to those who are desirous of more accurately compre¬ hending the nature of matter, and who do not investigate it superficially, that it is not entirely similar to a mother. By this, indeed, they demon¬ strate remotely, but at the same time as much as they are able, that matter is unprolific, and not perfectly feminine ; but that it is of a female nature so far as it receives, but not so far as pertains to a generative power. For that which has proceeded into matter, is neither feminine, nor able to gene¬ rate, but is separated from all generative power, which is alone inherent in that which continues to be of a masculine nature.

p. 177

Ο Ν ETERNITY AND TIME

I. With respect to eternity and time, we say that each of these is different from the other, and that one of them indeed is conversant with a per¬ petual nature, but the other about that which is generated. We also think that we have a certain clear perception of these in our souls spontaneously, and, as it were, from the more collected projections of intellectual conception ; always and every where calling these by the same appellations. When, however, we endeavour to accede to the inspection of these, and to approach as it were nearer to them, again we are involved in doubt, admitting some of the decisions of the ancients about these, and re¬ jecting others, and perhaps receiving differently the same decisions. Resting also in these, and think- Plot. * Mp. 178 mg it sufficient if when interrogated we are able to relate the opinion of the ancients concerning time and eternity, we are liberated from any farther investigation about them. It is necessary, there¬ fore, to think that some of the ancient and blessed philosophers have discovered the truth ; but it is fit to consider who those are that have obtained it, and after what manner we also may acquire the same knowledge on these subjects. In the first place, however, it is requisite to investigate what those conceive eternity to be, who admit that it is different from time.