Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor
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alls the treatise admirable (βανμ.α<ηος) · and it certainly contains some interesting par¬ ticulars relative to the mystic wisdom of the Egjrptians, which were doubtless derived from very ancient sources, and are no where else to be found*
I
ON THE VIRTUES/
X. Since evils are here, and revolve from necessity about this [terrestrial] place, but the soul wishes to flv from evils, it is requisite to fly from hence. What therefore is the flight? To become similar, sa)s Plato, to God. But this will be effected, if we become just and holy, in conjunc¬ tion with [intellectual] prudence, and in short if we are [truly] virtuous. If therefore we are assi¬ milated through virtue, is it to one who possesses virtue? But to whom are we assimilated?1 To divinity. Are we then assimilated to that nature which appears to possess the virtues in a more
* eminent degree, and also to the soul of the world, and to the intellect which is the leader in it, in which there is an admirable wisdom ? For it is reasonable to suppose that while we are here, we are assimilated to this intellect. Or is it not in
1 See the additional notes at the end of this Volume, for a copious account of the political, cathartic and theoretic virtues, the subject of the present treatise of Plotinus.
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the first place dubious, whether all the virtues are present with this intellect, such as temperance and fortitude, since there is nothing which can be dreadful to it? For nothing externally happens to it, nor does any thing pleasing approach to it, which when not present it may become desirous of possessing, or apprehending. But if it also has an appetite directed to the intelligibles, after which our souls aspire, it is evident that ornament and the virtues are from thence derived to us. Has therefore this intellect these virtues ? Or may we not say, it is not reasonable to suppose, that it possesses what are called the political virtues, viz. prudence indeed, about the part that deliberates and consults ; fortitude about the irascible part ; temperance, in the agreement and concord of the part that desires, with the reasoning power ; and justice, in each of these parts performing its proper office, with respect to governing and being govern¬ ed. Shall we say therefore, that we are not assimi¬ lated to divinity according to the political virtues, but according to greater virtues which employ the same appellation ? But if according to others, are we not at all assimilated according to the political virtues ? Or is it not absurd that we should notp. 3 in any respect be assimilated he political virtues, but according to greater virtues which employ the same appellation ? But if according to others, are we not at all assimilated according to the political virtues ? Or is it not absurd that we should notp. 3 in any respect be assimilated according to these? For rumor also says, that these are divine. We must say, therefore, that we are after a manner assimilated by them ; but that the assimilation is according to the greater virtues. In either way, however, it happens that divinity has virtues, though not such as the political.
If, therefore, some one should grant, that though it is not possible to be assimilated according to such virtues as these, since we subsist differently with reference to other virtues, yet nothing hinders but that we by our virtues may be assimilated to that which does not possess virtue. But after what manner ? Thus, if any thing is heated by the pre¬ sence of heat, it is necessary that also should be hot from whence the heat is derived. And if any thing is hot by the presence of fire, it is necessary that fire itself also should be hot by the presence of heat/ To the first of these assertions, however, it may be said, that there is heat in fire, but a connascent heat, so that it will follow from analogy, that virtue is indeed adventitious to the soul, but connascent with that nature from whence it is de«
1 For irvpos θερμού here, I read θερμοτητοε.
p. 4
rived by imitation* And with respect to the argu¬ ment from fire, it may be said that divinity pos¬ sesses virtue, but that virtue in him is in reality greater than virtue [because it subsists causally.] But if that virtue indeed, of which the soul parti¬ cipates, was the same with that from which it is derived, it would be necessary to speak in this manner* Now, however, the one is different from the other. For neither is the sensible the same with the intelligible house [or with that which is the object of intellectual conception] though it is similar to it. And the sensible house participates of order and ornament ; though there is neither order, nor ornament, nor symmetry, in the productive principle of it in the mind. Thus, therefore, we participate from thence [i. e. from divinity] of ornament, order and consent, and these things per¬ tain to virtue, but there consent, ornament and order, are not wanted, and therefore divinity has no need of virtue. We are, however, nevertheless assimilated to what he possesses, through the pre¬ sence of virtue.
nament, order and consent, and these things per¬ tain to virtue, but there consent, ornament and order, are not wanted, and therefore divinity has no need of virtue. We are, however, nevertheless assimilated to what he possesses, through the pre¬ sence of virtue. And thus much for the purpose of showing, that it is not necessary virtue should be there, though we are assimilated to divinity by virtue. But it is also necessary to introduce perp. 5suasion to what has been said, and not to be satis» tied with compulsion alone.
II. In the first place, therefore, the virtues must be assumed, according to which we say that we are assimilated [to divinity,] in order that we may discover the same thing. For that which is virtue with us, being an imitation, is there an archetype as it were, and not virtue. By which we signify that there is a twofold similitude, one of which re¬ quires a sameness in the things that are similar, these being such as are equally assimilated from the same thing ; but the other being that in which one thing is assimilated to another, but the latter ranks as first, and is not converted to the other, nor is said to be similar to it. Here, therefore, the similitude must be assumed after another man¬ ner ; since we do not require the same, but rather another form, the assimilation being effected after a different manner. What, therefore, is virtue, both that which is universal, and that which is par¬ ticular t The discussion, however, will be more manifest by directing our attention to each of the virtues ; for thus that which is common, according to which all of them are virtues, will be easily app. 6parent. The political virtues, therefore, of which we have spoken above, truly adorn and render us better, bounding and moderating the desires, and in short the passions, and taking away false opi¬ nions from a more excellent nature, by limiting and placing the soul beyond the immoderate and inde¬ finite, and by themselves receiving measure and bound. Perhaps, too, these measures are in soul as in matter, are assimilated to the measure which is in divinity, and possess a vestigie of the best which is there. For that which is in every respect deprived of measure, being matter, is entirely dis¬ similar [to divinity.] But so far as it receives form, so far it is assimilated to him who is without form. But things which are nearer to divinity, participate of him in a greater degree.