Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

[all other things.] For being void of magnitude, what advantage would it derive from place, if it neither contributes to form and quality, nor to interval and magnitude ? the two latter of which appear to be derived to bodies from matter, wherever it may be. In short, as actions and productions, times and motions, though they have no substratum of matter in them, yet rank among beings ; thus, also, neither is it necessary that the first bodies should have a matter [which isp. 49 without magnitude], but that, each of them should be wholly that which it is, being more various by the mixture with things that have their composition from many forms. So that this matter which is without magnitude, is a vain name. In the first place, therefore, it is not necessary that whatever receives any thing should have bulk, if magnitude is not now present with it ; since soul, likewise, which receives all things, has all things at once· But if it happened to have magnitude, it would possess every thing that it contains, in magnitude. Matter, however, on this account, receives the things which it receives, in interval, because it is the recipient of interval ; just as animals and plants, while they are extended with magnitude, receive at the same time the production of quality ; and quantity being contracted, quality also is contracted. If, however, because a certain magnitude pre-exists in things of this kind, as a subject to the formator, some one should also require this in matter, he will not conceive rightly. For in the formation of these, not matter simply considered, is employed, but matter of a certain kind. But it is necessary that matter simply considered, should possess mag¬ nitude from something else. Hence, it is not Plot. Dp. 50 necessary that the recipient of form should be bulk, but that at the same time it becomes bulk, it should receive another quality ; and that it should have indeed the phantasm of bulk, because, as being the first matter, it is an aptitude to the reception of it. It is, however, a void bulk ; and hence some assert that matter and a vacuum are the same. For the soul having nothing which it can bound, when it associates with matter, diffuses itself into the inde¬ finite, neither circumscribing it, nor being able to arrive at any fixed point [of survey ;] since other¬ wise it would define it. Hence, neither is it to be separately called great, nor again small ; but it must be denominated both small and great. And thus it is bulk, and thus is without magnitude, be¬ cause it is the matter of bulk.

of survey ;] since other¬ wise it would define it. Hence, neither is it to be separately called great, nor again small ; but it must be denominated both small and great. And thus it is bulk, and thus is without magnitude, be¬ cause it is the matter of bulk. Being also con¬ tracted from the great to the small, and extended from the small to the great, it runs as it were through bulk. The indefiniteness of it, likewise, is a bulk of this kind, being the receptacle of magni¬ tude in itself ; but in imagination in the way before explained. For with respect to such other things without magnitude as are forms, each of them is definite ; so that they bring with them no cofiception whatever of bulk. But matter being indefinite,p. 51 and never at rest 1 with itself, and being borne along to every form, in every direction, and easily led every where, becomes multitudinous by its generation and transition to all things. And after o o this manner it possesses the nature of bulk.

XII. Magnitude, therefore, contributes some¬ thing to bodies ; for the forms of bodies, are in dimensions. These forms, however, are not gene¬ rated about magnitude, but about that which is amplified. For if they were generated about mag¬ nitude, and not about matter, they would be simi¬ larly void of magnitude and without subsistence, or would be productive principles alone. But forms are conversant with soul, and therefore are not bodies. Hence, it is necessary that here, many things should subsist about one thing ; but this is distended with magnitude. And this [which is thus amplified,] is different from magnitude ; since now also such things as are mingled, in consequence of having matter, pass into a sameness of condition,

1 Instead of μη πω πασα παρ' αντης , it is necessary to read μη π ore παυσασα παρ αυτη$ , agreeably to the version of Fi« cinus.

p. 52

and do not require any thing else about which they may subsist, because each of the things that are mingled brings with it its own matter. At the same time, however, a certain recipient is neces¬ sary, viz. either a vessel, or place. But place is posterior to matter, and to bodies ; so that bodies prior to this will be indigent of matter. Nor does it follow that because productive energies and actions are immaterial, on this account bodies also are without matter. For the latter are composites, but this is not the case w ith actions. Matter also imparts a subject to agents when they act, abiding in them, but not giving itself to act ; for this is not investigated by material agents.

count bodies also are without matter. For the latter are composites, but this is not the case w ith actions. Matter also imparts a subject to agents when they act, abiding in them, but not giving itself to act ; for this is not investigated by material agents. Nor is one action changed into another, in order that matter may be in them ; but the agent passes from one action to another, so that he has the relation of matter to the actions themselves. Matter, therefore, is necessary both to quality and magnitude, so that it is also necessary to bodies. Nor is it a vain name, but it is a certain subject, though it is invisible, and with¬ out magnitude. For if this is not granted, neither must we say that there are qualities ; and for the same reason we must deny the existence of magni¬ tude. For each of these, if assumed by itself alotie,p. 53 must be said to be nothing. But if these have a subsistence, though each of them obscurely exists, much more will matter have an existence, though it does not clearly subsist, and is apprehended, though not by the senses. For it is not perceived by the eyes, since it is without colour. Nor by the hearing ; for it has no sound. Nor by the smell, or the taste ; for it has neither moisture, nor vapour. Is it, therefore, perceived by the touch ? Or is not this impossible, because neither is it a body P For the touch pertains to body,, because it pertains either to the dense, or the rare, the soft, or the hard, the moist, or the dry. None of these, however, subsist about matter ; so that it is per¬ ceptible by reasoning, but not by sense ; and by a reasoning not derived from, but void of intellect, on which account, as we have before observed, this reasoning is spurious. But neither is corporeity about matter. For if corporeity is a productive principle, it is different from matter. But if it is a thing now made, and as it were mingled, it will evidently be body, and not matter only.

XIII. If, however, the subject of things is a certain quality, being something common in eachp. 54 of the elements, in the first place indeed, it must be shown what it is. And, in the next place., how quality can be a subject must be explained. How, likewise, can a thing which has quality be surveyed in that which is without magnitude, and without matter? Likewise, if the quality is defined, how can it be matter? But if it is something indefinite, it is not quality, but a subject, and matter which we are now investigating.