Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

from which habits proceed. The rational virtues also have habits, and what are now as peculiarities, which they derive from thence. And the other virtues, indeed, have their reasonings in pecu¬ liar passions and actions ; but prudence is a certain

*

1 i. c. By intuition, so as to come into immediate contact with the objects of its knowledge. It does this, however, so far as its energy is purely intellectual.

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ratiocination, and is conversant with that which is

* more universal. For it considers whether it is pro¬ per now to abstain or hereafter, or in short, whether another thing is better. Dialectic, however, and wisdom, introduce ail things to the use of prudence, universally and immaterially* But whether is it possible to know 18 inferior concerns without dia¬ lectic and wisdom ? Or may they be known in a different and defective way ? It is possible, however, for a man to be thus wise and skilled in dialectic without a knowledge of these. Or this will not be the case, but they will coalesce, either previously, or together. And perhaps some one may have certain physical virtues, from which, when wisdom is possessed, the perfect virtues will be obtained. Wisdom, therefore, is posterior to the physical virtues, but afterwards it perfects the manners ; or rather, the physical virtues existing, both are co-increased, and mutually perfected. Or, one of them being previously assumed, the one will perfect the other. For, in short, physical virtue has an imperfect eye, and imperfect man¬ ners ; and the principles of both are, for the most part, derived from those things which we possess.

1 For tiva i here, it is necessary to read eihcvai.

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p. 9

ON MATTER#

I. All those who have spoken concerning what is called matter, and who have arrived at a concep¬ tion of its nature, unanimously assert, that it is a certain subject and receptacle of forms. They dissent, however, from each other, in investigating what this subject nature is ; and after what man¬ ner, and of what things, it is a recipient. And those, indeed, who alone admit bodies to be beings, and who contend that essence is in these, say, that there is one matter, which is spread under the ele¬ ments, and that it is essence ; but that all other things are, as it were, the passions of matter, and are matter subsisting in a certain w?ay, and thus also are the elements. They, likewise, dare to extend matter as far as to the Gods. And, lastly,p. 30 they make even their highest ‘ God to be this mat¬ ter, subsisting in a certain way.

ions of matter, and are matter subsisting in a certain w?ay, and thus also are the elements. They, likewise, dare to extend matter as far as to the Gods. And, lastly,p. 30 they make even their highest ‘ God to be this mat¬ ter, subsisting in a certain way. They, likewise, give a body to matter, calling it, body mid of qua¬ lity ; and attribute to it magnitude. But others say, that matter is incorporeal ; and some of these do not admit that there is only this one matter, but assert that this is the subject of bodies, and that there is another matter prior to this in intelligibles, which is spread under the forms that are there, and under incorporeal essences»

IL Hence we must enquire concerning this in¬ telligible matter, whether it is, what it is, and after what manner it subsists» If, therefore, it is neces¬ sary that matter should be something indefinite and formless, but in intelligibles as being the most ex¬ cellent £ natures, there is nothing indefinite and without form, matter will not be there. If, also, every thing in the intelligible world is simple, it will not be in want of matter, in order that from it

1 From the version of Ficinus, It appears, that instead of αντον αυτών τον Oeor, we should read, ακροτατον αυτών τον θεόν* For his version is, “ sumraum ipsorum deum.w a For a opiffTots here, it is necessary to read αριστοι$.

p. 31

/ and something else, that which is a composite may be produced. To generated natures, indeed, and to such as make some things from others, matter is necessary, in which also the matter of sensibles is conceived to subsist ; but it is not necessary to things which are not generated. Whence, also, does matter proceed, and how does it subsist among intelligibles ? For if it was generated, it was generated by something ; but if it is eternal, there are many principles ; and first natures will have a casual subsistence. If, likewise, form should ac¬ cede, the composite will be a body, so that body will be there.

III. In the first place, therefore, it must bep. 0 said, that the indefinite is not every where to be despised, nor that which in the conception of it is formless, if it applies itself to things prior to itself, and to the most excellent natures. For thus soul is naturally adapted to apply itself to intellect and reason, being formed by these, and brought to pos¬ sess a more excellent nature.

onception of it is formless, if it applies itself to things prior to itself, and to the most excellent natures. For thus soul is naturally adapted to apply itself to intellect and reason, being formed by these, and brought to pos¬ sess a more excellent nature. In intelligibles, how¬ ever, that which is a composite subsists after a dif¬ ferent manner, and not like bodies ; since reasons, also, [or productive principles] are composites, andp. 32 produce a composite in energy, through nature which has an energy directed to form. But if energy is directed to something different from itself, it is derived from something else, and this in a greater degree. The matter, however, of gene¬ rated natures, always possesses another and another form ; but the matter of eternal natures always possesses the same form. Perhaps, also, the matter which is in sensibles subsists in a way contrary to that which is in intelligibles. For the former is alternately all things, and is always some different thing. Hence, nothing in it ever remains, one thing conti¬ nually expelling another ; and on this account, nothing is ever the same. But in the latter, matter is all things at once, and hence there is not any thing into which it can be changed. Matter, therefore, in intelligibles, is never formless, since neither is the matter in sensibles ever without form ; but each of these subsists after a different manner. Whether matter, however, is eternal or generated, will be manifest when we have shown what it is.

IV. At present, however, it is supposed by us that there are forms or ideas, for this we have demonstrated elsewhere ; and this being admitted we shall proceed in our discussion. If, therefore, there are many forms, it is necessary, indeed, that there should be something common in them ; and also that there should be something peculiar by which one is distinguished from another. This something peculiar, therefore, and separating diffe¬ rence, are the appropriate form. But if there is form, there is also that which is formed, about which difference subsists. Hence, there is matter [in intelligibles,] which receives the form, and is always the subject of it. Farther still, if the intel¬ ligible world is there, but this our world is the imitation of that, and this is a composite, and con¬ sists of matter [and form,] it is necessary that there also there should be matter.