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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1And the result is the development of a whole multitude of philosophical sects, following the lead of those thinkers, and all professing to * See, as to this, Colebrooke's Essays, vol. i, Pp 328 (Madras). 8 BHAGAVADGITA. draw their doctrine from the Gita or the Upanishads, yet cach differing remarkably from the other!.’ Since this was written, Professor Max Miiller’s Hibbert Lectures have been published. And I am happy to find, that as regards the Upanishads, his view coincides exactly with that which I have expressed in the words now quoted. Professor Max Miller says: ‘There is not what may be called a philosophical system in these Upanishads. They are in the true sense of the word guesses at truth, frequently contradicting each other, yet all tending in one dircction 2.’ Further corroboration for the same view is also forthcoming. Professor Fitz-Edward Hall, in a passage which I had not noticed before, says*: ‘In the Upanishads, the Bhagavadgita, and other ancient Hindu books, we encounter, in combination, the doctrines which, after having been subjected to modifications that rendered them as wholes irreconcileable, were distinguished, at an uncertain period, into what have for many ages been styled the Sankhya and the Vedanta.’ We have thus very weighty authority for adhering to the view already expressed on this important topic. But as Professor Weber appears to have expressed an opinion * intended perhaps to throw some doubt on the correctness of that view, it is desirable to go a little more into detail to fortify it by actual reference to the contents of the Gita. the more especially as we can thus clucidate the true character of that work. Before doing so, however, it may be pointed out, that the proposition we have laid down is one, the test of which lies more in a comprehensive review of the whole of the Gita, than in the investigation of small details on which there is necessarily much room for difference of opinion. And first, Ilct us compare that indisputably systematized work, the current Yoga-sdtras*, with the Bhagavadgita on * See the Introductory Essay to my Bhayavadgita, translated into English blank verse, p. Ixvii. See also Goldstucher’s Remains, I, 48, 773 II, 10. * P. 317; cf. also p. 338. * Preface to Sankhya Sara, p. 7 (Bibl. Indic. ed.) * History of Indian Literature, p. 28. ® Are we to infer from the circumstance mentioned in Weber's History of INTRODUCTION. 9
2Ixvii. See also Goldstucher’s Remains, I, 48, 773 II, 10. * P. 317; cf. also p. 338. * Preface to Sankhya Sara, p. 7 (Bibl. Indic. ed.) * History of Indian Literature, p. 28. ® Are we to infer from the circumstance mentioned in Weber's History of INTRODUCTION. 9 one or two topics, where they both travel over common ground. In the Gita, chapter VI, stanzas 33, 34 (p. 71), we have Arguna putting what is, in substance, a question to Krishna, as to how the mind, which is admittedly ‘fickle, boisterous, strong, and obstinate, is to be brought under coatrol—such control having been declared by Krishna to be necessary for attaining devotion (yoga)? Krishza answers by saying that the mind may be restrained by ‘practice (abhydsa) and indifference to worldly objects (vaira4gya).’ He then goes on to say, that devotion cannot be attained without self-restraint, but that one who has self-restraint, and works to achieve devotion, may succeed in acquiring it. Here the subject drops. There is no further explanation of ‘ practice’ or ‘ indifference to worldly objects,’ no exposition of the mode in which they work, and so forth. Contrast now the Yoga-sitras. The topic is there discussed at the very outset of the work. As usual the author begins with ‘Now therefore the Yoga is to be taught... He then explains Yoga by the well-known definition ‘Yoga is the restraint of the movements of the mind.’ And then after pointing out what the movements of the mind are, he proceeds: ‘ Their restraint is by means of practice and indifference to worldly objects 1,—the very terms, be it remarked in passing, which are used in the Bhagavadgita. But having come thus far, the author of the Sdtras does not drop the subject as the author of the Gita does. Ile goes on in this wise: ‘ Practice is the effort for keeping it steady.’ ‘And that becomes firmly grounded when resorted to for a long time, without interruption, and with correct conduct.’ So far we have a discussion of the first requisite specified, namely, practice. Pataggali then goes on to his second requisite for mental restraint. ‘ Indifference to worldly objects is the consciousness of having subdued desires &c. (Vasikara sasigfa) which belongs to one having no longing for objects visible and those which Indian Literature (p. 223, note 235), that the author of these Sitras was older than Buddha? * Sétra 12, Abhyfse-vairigyibhyfim tannirodhas. 10 BHAGAVADGITA.
3(Vasikara sasigfa) which belongs to one having no longing for objects visible and those which Indian Literature (p. 223, note 235), that the author of these Sitras was older than Buddha? * Sétra 12, Abhyfse-vairigyibhyfim tannirodhas. 10 BHAGAVADGITA. are heard of’ (from S4stras &c., such as heaven and so forth). He next proceeds to distinguish another and higher species of ‘indifference, and then he goes on to point out the results of that self-restraint which is to be acquired in the mode he has expounded. That is one instance. Now take another. In chapter VI, stanza 10 and following stanzas, the Git& sets forth elaborately the mode of practically achieving the mental abstraction called Yoga. It need not be reproduced here. The reader can readily find out how sundry directions are there given for the purpose specified, but without any attempt at systematizing. Contrast the Yoga-sitras. In the Sadhanapdda, the section treating of the acquisition of Yoga, Patasigali states in the twenty-ninth aphorism the well-known eight elements of Yoga. Then he subdivides these elements, and expatiatcs on each of them distinctly, defining them, indicating the mode of acquiring them, and hinting at the results which flow from them. ‘That inordinate love of subdivision,’ which Dr. F. E. Hall! has somewhere attributed to the Hindus, appears plainly in these aphorisms, while there is not a trace of it in the corresponding passage in the Bhagavadgita. In my opinion, therefore, these comparisons strongly corroborate the proposition we have laid down regarding the unsystematic, or rather non-systematic, character of the work. In the one we have definition, classification, division, and subdivision. In the other we have a set of practical directions, without any attempt to arrange them in any very scientific order. In the one you have a set of technical terms with specific significations. In the other no such precision is yet manifest. In one word, you have in the Gita the germs, and noteworthy germs too, of a system ?, and you have most of the raw material of a system, but you have no system ready-made. Let us look at the matter now from a slightly different point of view. There are sundry words used in the Bhaga- ' In the Preface to his Sankhya Sara, I think. * This is all that we can infer from the few cases of division and classification which we do meet with in the Gita. A subject like that treated of in this work could not well be discussed without some classifications &c. INTRODUCTION. lr
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1And the result is the development of a whole multitude of philosophical sects, following the lead of those thinkers, and all professing to * See, as to this, Colebrooke's Essays, vol. i, Pp 328 (Madras). 8 BHAGAVADGITA. draw their doctrine from the Gita or the Upanishads, yet cach differing remarkably from the other!.’ Since this was written, Professor Max Miiller’s Hibbert Lectures have been published. And I am happy to find, that as regards the Upanishads, his view coincides exactly with that which I have expressed in the words now quoted. Professor Max Miller says: ‘There is not what may be called a philosophical system in these Upanishads. They are in the true sense of the word guesses at truth, frequently contradicting each other, yet all tending in one dircction 2.’ Further corroboration for the same view is also forthcoming. Professor Fitz-Edward Hall, in a passage which I had not noticed before, says*: ‘In the Upanishads, the Bhagavadgita, and other ancient Hindu books, we encounter, in combination, the doctrines which, after having been subjected to modifications that rendered them as wholes irreconcileable, were distinguished, at an uncertain period, into what have for many ages been styled the Sankhya and the Vedanta.’ We have thus very weighty authority for adhering to the view already expressed on this important topic. But as Professor Weber appears to have expressed an opinion * intended perhaps to throw some doubt on the correctness of that view, it is desirable to go a little more into detail to fortify it by actual reference to the contents of the Gita. the more especially as we can thus clucidate the true character of that work. Before doing so, however, it may be pointed out, that the proposition we have laid down is one, the test of which lies more in a comprehensive review of the whole of the Gita, than in the investigation of small details on which there is necessarily much room for difference of opinion. And first, Ilct us compare that indisputably systematized work, the current Yoga-sdtras*, with the Bhagavadgita on * See the Introductory Essay to my Bhayavadgita, translated into English blank verse, p. Ixvii. See also Goldstucher’s Remains, I, 48, 773 II, 10. * P. 317; cf. also p. 338. * Preface to Sankhya Sara, p. 7 (Bibl. Indic. ed.) * History of Indian Literature, p. 28. ® Are we to infer from the circumstance mentioned in Weber's History of INTRODUCTION. 9
2Ixvii. See also Goldstucher’s Remains, I, 48, 773 II, 10. * P. 317; cf. also p. 338. * Preface to Sankhya Sara, p. 7 (Bibl. Indic. ed.) * History of Indian Literature, p. 28. ® Are we to infer from the circumstance mentioned in Weber's History of INTRODUCTION. 9 one or two topics, where they both travel over common ground. In the Gita, chapter VI, stanzas 33, 34 (p. 71), we have Arguna putting what is, in substance, a question to Krishna, as to how the mind, which is admittedly ‘fickle, boisterous, strong, and obstinate, is to be brought under coatrol—such control having been declared by Krishna to be necessary for attaining devotion (yoga)? Krishza answers by saying that the mind may be restrained by ‘practice (abhydsa) and indifference to worldly objects (vaira4gya).’ He then goes on to say, that devotion cannot be attained without self-restraint, but that one who has self-restraint, and works to achieve devotion, may succeed in acquiring it. Here the subject drops. There is no further explanation of ‘ practice’ or ‘ indifference to worldly objects,’ no exposition of the mode in which they work, and so forth. Contrast now the Yoga-sitras. The topic is there discussed at the very outset of the work. As usual the author begins with ‘Now therefore the Yoga is to be taught... He then explains Yoga by the well-known definition ‘Yoga is the restraint of the movements of the mind.’ And then after pointing out what the movements of the mind are, he proceeds: ‘ Their restraint is by means of practice and indifference to worldly objects 1,—the very terms, be it remarked in passing, which are used in the Bhagavadgita. But having come thus far, the author of the Sdtras does not drop the subject as the author of the Gita does. Ile goes on in this wise: ‘ Practice is the effort for keeping it steady.’ ‘And that becomes firmly grounded when resorted to for a long time, without interruption, and with correct conduct.’ So far we have a discussion of the first requisite specified, namely, practice. Pataggali then goes on to his second requisite for mental restraint. ‘ Indifference to worldly objects is the consciousness of having subdued desires &c. (Vasikara sasigfa) which belongs to one having no longing for objects visible and those which Indian Literature (p. 223, note 235), that the author of these Sitras was older than Buddha? * Sétra 12, Abhyfse-vairigyibhyfim tannirodhas. 10 BHAGAVADGITA.
3(Vasikara sasigfa) which belongs to one having no longing for objects visible and those which Indian Literature (p. 223, note 235), that the author of these Sitras was older than Buddha? * Sétra 12, Abhyfse-vairigyibhyfim tannirodhas. 10 BHAGAVADGITA. are heard of’ (from S4stras &c., such as heaven and so forth). He next proceeds to distinguish another and higher species of ‘indifference, and then he goes on to point out the results of that self-restraint which is to be acquired in the mode he has expounded. That is one instance. Now take another. In chapter VI, stanza 10 and following stanzas, the Git& sets forth elaborately the mode of practically achieving the mental abstraction called Yoga. It need not be reproduced here. The reader can readily find out how sundry directions are there given for the purpose specified, but without any attempt at systematizing. Contrast the Yoga-sitras. In the Sadhanapdda, the section treating of the acquisition of Yoga, Patasigali states in the twenty-ninth aphorism the well-known eight elements of Yoga. Then he subdivides these elements, and expatiatcs on each of them distinctly, defining them, indicating the mode of acquiring them, and hinting at the results which flow from them. ‘That inordinate love of subdivision,’ which Dr. F. E. Hall! has somewhere attributed to the Hindus, appears plainly in these aphorisms, while there is not a trace of it in the corresponding passage in the Bhagavadgita. In my opinion, therefore, these comparisons strongly corroborate the proposition we have laid down regarding the unsystematic, or rather non-systematic, character of the work. In the one we have definition, classification, division, and subdivision. In the other we have a set of practical directions, without any attempt to arrange them in any very scientific order. In the one you have a set of technical terms with specific significations. In the other no such precision is yet manifest. In one word, you have in the Gita the germs, and noteworthy germs too, of a system ?, and you have most of the raw material of a system, but you have no system ready-made. Let us look at the matter now from a slightly different point of view. There are sundry words used in the Bhaga- ' In the Preface to his Sankhya Sara, I think. * This is all that we can infer from the few cases of division and classification which we do meet with in the Gita. A subject like that treated of in this work could not well be discussed without some classifications &c. INTRODUCTION. lr
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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