The Bhagavadgîtâ, with the Sanatsugâtîya and the Anugîtâ — SBE Vol. 8 (trans. K. T. Telang, 1882)
The translator’s English as printed (K. T. Telang). The original-language text is not held; names are romanised as the translator printed them.
Turning now to the materials available for ascertaining the relative chronological positions of the Anugita and the rise of Buddhism, we have again to complain of their unsatisfactory character. We will briefly note the two or three circumstances which appear to have a bearing upon this question. In the first place, we have the word Nirvâṇa used in one passage of the Anugîtâ in the sense of the highest tranquillity, and there the simile of the extinction of the fire is expressly adduced. On this it may be argued, that if the term Nirvâṇa had become the wellunderstood property of Buddhism, such a use of it as we find here would probably not have occurred, Again, we have the injunction that an ascetic must dwell in a town only for one day and no more, while he may stay at one place during the rains. This is very similar to an injunction prescribed by the Buddhistic teachers also. But eee eee Se eee this fact furnishes, I think, no safe ground for a chronological inference, more especially because, as pointed out by Dr. Bühler, the Buddhistic injunction is itself only borrowed from the Brahminical rules on the subject, It is impossible, therefore, to say that the Anugîtâ borrowed its doctrine from Buddhism. It is, of course, equally impossible on the other hand to say, that Buddhism borrowed its rule from the Anugita. And, therefore, we can build no safe inference upon this fact either. We have next the very remarkable passage at chapter XXXIV, where various contradictory and mutually exclusive views of piety are stated, or rather passingly and briefly indicated—a passage which one most devoutly wishes had been: clearer than it is. In that passage I can find no reference to Buddhism. True it is that Nîlakaṇṭha’s commentary refers some of the doctrines there stated to Buddhistic schools*. But that commentary, unsatisfactory enough in other places, is particularly unsatisfactory here. And its critical accuracy may be judged from its reference to: Saugatas and Yogakâras apparently as two distinct schools, whereas in truth the Saugatas are Buddhists, and Yogâkâras one of the four principal Buddhist sects. And it must be further remembered, that the interpretations of Nîlakaṇṭha, upon which his specifications of the different schools are based, are by no means such as necessarily claim acceptance. If then we do not find any reference to Buddhism in this passage, that fact becomes certainly a remarkable one. Still, on the other hand, I am not prepared to apply the ‘negative argument’ here, and to say that inasmuch as Buddhism is not. referred to where so many different opinions are referréd to, Buddhism cannot have come into existence at the date of the Anugîtâa. It seems to me that the argument will here be a very hazardous one, because if the author of the Anugita was, as we may assume he was, an orthodox Hindu, he might well have declined, although not unacquainted with Buddhism, to put into the mouths of the seven sages even as a possible view, that pin a) D which was the view of a school esteemed heretical by the author and his co-religionists. This passage, therefore, also fails to furnish any tangible ground for a chronological inference, at all events in the present state of our knowledge. Lastly, we come to the allusion to those who indulge in constant talk in disparagement of Vedas and Brâhmaṇas, the two being thus bracketed together in the original. That seems, at the first blush, to be a somewhat more distinct allusion to Buddhism than any of those we have noted above. But even that isnot unambiguous. Ifthe stanzas quoted by Madhavafarya, in his Sarvadarsanasañgraha in its first section, are the composition of the original founder of the Karvaka school, or even if they correctly represent the earliest opinions of that school, it is at least quite as likely that the Karvakas were the target for the denunciations of the Anugîtâ in the passage in question as that the Buddhists were so. To me, indeed, it appears to be more likely. For Buddha’s opinion with regard to the Vedas is, that they are inadequate; with regard to the Brâhmaṇas, that they are in no sense the chosen of God as they claim to be. The opinion of the Xarvakas, on the other hand, is a far more aggressive one, so to say. According to Madhavakarya, they taught that the Vedas were either simple fatuity or imposture, and that the Brahmavas were impostors. It seems to me much more likely, that this, which I have called a comparatively aggressive attitude, was the one at which the remarks of the Anugita were levelled; and more especially does this appear to be correct when we remember, that the view taught by Gautama Buddha regarding the Vedas and the Brâhmaṇas was propounded by him only in its strongest form; and that even before his time, the doctrine of the inadequacy of the Vedas for the purpose of securing the summum bonum of humanity had been taught by other teachers. It is further to be recollected, that we have evidence showing that other thinkers also than Buddha, or Brthaspati, had in early days attacked the authority of the Vedas. Kautsa is the name of one who was probably the most distinguished among them. It is certainly possible that his followers were the people branded as of ‘the dark quality’ by the Anugîtâ in the passage in question. We have, therefore, at least two different recognised bodies of thinkers, and one individual thinker, to whom the words under discussion may apply, and it is plainly unsafe, under these circumstances, to draw any chronological inference based on the hypothesis of one particular body out of those three being the one intended by the author. Before closing this part of the investigation, it may be interesting to note, that the phrase ‘turning the wheel,’ a phrase now so familiar to us as one of the household words of Buddhism, ‘is used in the Anugîtâ with respect to king Ganaka. Ido not think, however, that either alone, or even coupled with the word Nirvâṇa, that phrase can be made the basis of any legitimate deduction in favour of the priority of the Anugita to Buddhism. At the outside, the only deduction admissible, if any deduction were admissible, would be, that the Anugita was composed prior to the recognition, of Nirvâṇa and Kakrapravartana as specially Buddhistic words. But priority to such recognition is not, I apprehend, necessarily synonymous with priority to the rise of Buddhism.
! They are also referred to in the Buddhistic Lalita Vistara, p. 65.
Turning now to the materials available for determining the relative chronological positions of the Anugita and the rise of Buddhism, we must again complain of their unsatisfactory character. We will briefly note the two or three circumstances that appear to bear on this question. First, the word Nirvâṇa appears in one passage of the Anugîtâ in the sense of the highest tranquillity, and there the simile of the extinction of fire is expressly invoked. One might argue from this that if Nirvâṇa had already become the well-understood property of Buddhism, such a use of it as we find here would probably not have occurred. Again, there is the injunction that an ascetic must stay in a town for one day only and no more, though he may remain in one place during the rains. This closely resembles an injunction prescribed by Buddhist teachers as well. But this fact provides, I think, no safe ground for a chronological inference, particularly because, as Dr. Bühler has pointed out, the Buddhistic injunction is itself only borrowed from the Brahminical rules on the subject. It is impossible, therefore, to say that the Anugîtâ borrowed its doctrine from Buddhism. It is equally impossible, on the other hand, to say that Buddhism borrowed its rule from the Anugita. We can therefore build no safe inference on this fact either. Next comes the very remarkable passage at chapter XXXIV, where various contradictory and mutually exclusive views of piety are stated—or rather briefly and in passing indicated—a passage one most devoutly wishes had been clearer than it is. In that passage I can find no reference to Buddhism. It is true that Nîlakaṇṭha's commentary refers some of the doctrines stated there to Buddhistic schools. But that commentary, unsatisfactory enough elsewhere, is particularly unsatisfactory here. Its critical accuracy may be judged from its reference to Saugatas and Yogakâras apparently as two distinct schools, whereas in truth the Saugatas are Buddhists, and Yogâkâras one of the four principal Buddhist sects. It must further be remembered that the interpretations of Nîlakaṇṭha on which his identifications of the different schools are based are by no means such as necessarily command acceptance. If, then, we find no reference to Buddhism in this passage, that is certainly a remarkable fact. Still, I am not prepared to apply the negative argument here and say that, since Buddhism is not referréd to where so many different opinions are referréd to, Buddhism cannot yet have come into existence at the date of the Anugîtâa. The argument would, it seems to me, be a very hazardous one, because if the author of the Anugita was, as we may assume, an orthodox Hindu, he might well have declined—though not unacquainted with Buddhism—to put into the mouths of the seven sages, even as a possible view, that which was the view of a school regarded as heretical by the author and his co-religionists. This passage, therefore, also fails to furnish any tangible ground for a chronological inference, at least in the present state of our knowledge. Lastly, we come to the allusion to those who indulge in constant talk disparaging the Vedas and Brahmaṇas, the two being bracketed together in the original. This seems at first glance to be a somewhat more distinct allusion to Buddhism than any of those noted above. But even that is not unambiguous. If the stanzas quoted by Madhavāchārya in his Sarvadarsanasañgraha, in its first section, are the composition of the original founder of the Kārvāka school, or even if they correctly represent the earliest opinions of that school, it is at least equally likely that the Kārvakas, rather than the Buddhists, were the target of the Anugîtâ's denunciations in the passage in question. To me, indeed, it appears more likely. For Buddha's view of the Vedas is that they are inadequate; his view of the Brahmaṇas, that they are in no sense the chosen of God as they claim to be. The view of the Kārvakas, on the other hand, is far more aggressive. According to Madhavāchārya, they taught that the Vedas were either simple fatuity or imposture, and that the Brahmaṇas were impostors. It seems to me much more likely that this comparatively aggressive attitude, as I have called it, was what the remarks of the Anugita were levelled at; and this appears all the more correct when we remember that the view taught by Gautama Buddha regarding the Vedas and the Brahmaṇas was propounded by him only in its strongest form, and that even before his time the doctrine of the inadequacy of the Vedas for securing the summum bonum of humanity had been taught by other teachers. It should further be remembered that we have evidence showing that thinkers other than Buddha or Bṛhaspati had attacked the authority of the Vedas in early days. Kautsa is the name of one who was probably the most distinguished among them. It is certainly possible that his followers were the people branded as of the dark quality by the Anugîtâ in the passage in question. We have, therefore, at least two distinct recognised bodies of thinkers, and one individual thinker, to whom the words under discussion may apply, and it is plainly unsafe in these circumstances to draw any chronological inference based on the assumption that one particular body out of those three was the one the author intended. Before closing this part of the investigation, it may be interesting to note that the phrase turning the wheel—now so familiar as one of the household words of Buddhism—is used in the Anugîtâ with respect to king Janaka. I do not think, however, that this phrase alone, or even coupled with the word Nirvâṇa, can be made the basis of any legitimate deduction in favour of the priority of the Anugita to Buddhism. At most, the only admissible deduction, if any were admissible, would be that the Anugita was composed before Nirvâṇa and Cakrapravartana came to be recognised as specially Buddhistic words. But priority to such recognition is not, I submit, necessarily the same thing as priority to the rise of Buddhism.
They are also referred to in the Buddhistic Lalita Vistara, p. 65.