The Bhagavadgîtâ, with the Sanatsugâtîya and the Anugîtâ — SBE Vol. 8 (trans. K. T. Telang, 1882)
The translator’s English as printed (K. T. Telang). The original-language text is not held; names are romanised as the translator printed them.
(in essence draw their doctrine from the Gita or the Upanishads, yet each differing remarkably from the other 1? Since this was written, Professor Max Miiller’s Hibbert Lectures have been published. And I am happy to find, that as regards the Upanishads, his view coincides exactly with that which I have expressed in the words now quoted. Professor Max Müller says: ‘There is not what may be called a philosophical system in these Upanishads. They are in the true sense of the word guesses at truth, frequently contradicting each other, yet all tending in one direction ae¹. Further corroboration for the same view is also forthcoming. Professor Fitz-Edward Hall, in a passage which I had not noticed before, says*: ‘In the Upanishads, the Bhagavadgita, and other ancient Hindu books, we encounter, in combination, the doctrines which, after having been subjected to modifications that rendered them as wholes irreconcileable, were distinguished, at an uncertain period, into what have for many ages been styled the Sâñkhya and the Vedanta.’ We have thus very weighty authority for adhering to the view already expressed on this important topic. But as Professor Weber appears to have expressed an opinion* intended perhaps to throw some doubt on the correctness of that view, it is desirable to go a little more into detail to fortify it by actual reference to the contents of the Gita, the more especially as we can thus elucidate the true character of that work. Before doing so, however, it may be pointed out, that the proposition we have laid down is one, the test of which lies more in a comprehensive review of the whole of the Gita, than in the investigation of small details on which there is necessarily much room for difference of opinion.
And first, let us compare that indisputably systematized work, the current Yoga-sûtras*, with the Bhagavadgita on one or two topics, where they both travel over common ground. In the Gita, chapter VI, stanzas 33, 34 (p. 71), we have Arguna putting what is, in substance, a question to Kṛishṇa, as to how the mind, which is admittedly ‘ fickle, boisterous, strong, and obstinate, is to be brought under control—such control having been declared by Kṛishṇa to be necessary for attaining devotion (yoga)? Kṛishṇa answers by saying that the mind may be restrained by ‘practice (abhyâsa) and indifference to worldly objects (vairagya). He then goes on to say, that devotion cannot be attained without self-restraint, but that one who has self-restraint, and works to achieve devotion, may succeed in acquiring it. Here the subject drops. There is no further explanation of ‘ practice’ or ‘ indifference to worldly objects,’ no exposition of the mode in which they work, and so forth. Contrast now the Yoga-sûtras. The topic is there discussed at the very outset of the work. As usual the author begins with ‘Now therefore the Yoga is to be taught. He then explains Yoga by the well-known definition ‘Yoga is the restraint of the movements of the mind.” And then after pointing out what the movements of the mind are, he proceeds: ‘Their restraint is by means of practice and indifference to worldly objects +, —the very terms, be it remarked in passing, which are used in the Bhagavadgita. But having come thus far, the author of the Sûtras does not drop the subject as the author of the Gita does. He goes on in this wise: ‘ Practice is the effort for keeping it steady.’ ‘And that becomes firmly grounded when resorted to for a long time, without interruption, and with correct conduct.’ So far we have a discussion of the first requisite specified, namely, practice. Patañgali then goes on to his second requisite for mental restraint. ‘ Indifference to worldly objects is the consciousness of having subdued desires &c. (Vasikâra saṃgñâ) which belongs to one having no longing for objects visible and those which are heard of’ (from Sâstras &c., such as heaven and so forth). He next proceeds to distinguish another and higher species of ‘indifference,’ and then he goes on to point out the results of that self-restraint which is to be acquired in the mode he has expounded. Thatis one instance. Now take another. In chapter VI, stanza 10 and following stanzas, the Gita sets forth elaborately the mode of practically achieving the mental abstraction called Yoga. It need not be reproduced here. The reader can readily find out how sundry directions are there given for the purpose specified, but without any attempt at systematizing. Contrast the Yoga-sûtras. In the Sâdhanapâda, the section treating of the acquisition of Yoga, Patañgali states in the twenty-ninth aphorism the well-known eight elements of Yoga. Then he subdivides these elements, and expatiates on each of them distinctly, defining them, indicating the mode of acquiring them, and hinting at the results which flow from them. ‘That inordinate love of subdivision,’ which Dr. F. E. Hall’ has somewhere attributed to the Hindus, appears plainly in these aphorisms, while there is not a trace of it in the corresponding passage in the Bhagavadgita. In my opinion, therefore, thesé comparisons strongly corroborate the proposition we have laid down regarding the unsystematic, or rather non-systematic, character of the work. In the one we have definition, classification, division, and subdivision. In the other we have a set of practical directions, without any attempt to arrange them in any very scientific order. In the one you have a set of technical terms with specific significations. In the other no such precision is yet manifest. In one word, you have in the Gita the germs, and noteworthy germs too, of a system ?, and you have most of the raw material of a system, but you have no system ready-made.
1 See the Introductory Essay to my Bhagavadgîtà, translated into English blank verse, p. Ixvii. See also Goldstiicker’s Remains, I, 48, 77; II, 10. HET ChialsOnp. 335.
8 Preface to Sankhya Sara, p. 7 (Bibl. Indic. ed.)
* History of Indian Literature, p. 28. Are we to infer from the circumstance mentioned in Weber’s History of
(in essence draw their doctrine from the Gita or the Upanishads, yet each differing remarkably from the other 1? Since this was written, Professor Max Müller's Hibbert Lectures have been published. And I am happy to find that, as regards the Upanishads, his view coincides exactly with what I expressed in the words just quoted. Professor Max Müller says: 'There is not what may be called a philosophical system in these Upanishads. They are in the true sense of the word guesses at truth, frequently contradicting each other, yet all tending in one direction ae¹.' Further corroboration for the same view is also forthcoming. Professor Fitz-Edward Hall, in a passage I had not previously noticed, says*: 'In the Upanishads, the Bhagavadgita, and other ancient Hindu books, we encounter, in combination, the doctrines which, after having been subjected to modifications that rendered them as wholes irreconcileable, were distinguished, at an uncertain period, into what have for many ages been styled the Sâñkhya and the Vedanta.' We thus have very weighty authority for holding to the view already expressed on this important topic. But since Professor Weber appears to have expressed an opinion* intended perhaps to cast some doubt on the correctness of that view, it is desirable to go into a little more detail and to support it by actual reference to the contents of the Gita — the more so because doing so allows us to shed light on the true character of that work. Before doing so, however, it may be pointed out that the proposition we have laid down is one whose test lies more in a comprehensive review of the whole of the Gita than in the investigation of small details, on which there is necessarily much room for difference of opinion.
Now let us compare the undeniably systematic Yoga-sûtras* with the Bhagavadgita on one or two topics where both works cover the same ground. In the Gita, chapter VI, stanzas 33, 34 (p. 71), Arjuna puts to Kṛishṇa what is essentially a question: how is the mind—admittedly "fickle, boisterous, strong, and obstinate"—to be brought under control, given that Kṛishṇa has declared such control necessary for attaining devotion (yoga)? Kṛishṇa answers that the mind may be restrained by practice (abhyâsa) and indifference to worldly objects (vairagya). He goes on to say that devotion cannot be attained without self-restraint, but that one who has self-restraint and works toward devotion may succeed in acquiring it. There the subject ends. No further explanation of "practice" or "indifference to worldly objects" is offered, no account of how they work, and so forth. Now contrast the Yoga-sûtras. The topic is taken up at the very opening of the work. As usual, the author begins with "Now therefore the Yoga is to be taught." He then defines Yoga by the well-known formula: "Yoga is the restraint of the movements of the mind." After pointing out what those movements are, he continues: "Their restraint is by means of practice and indifference to worldly objects†"—the very terms, it is worth noting in passing, that the Bhagavadgita uses. But having come this far, the author of the Sûtras does not drop the subject as the author of the Gita does. He continues: "Practice is the effort for keeping it steady." "And that becomes firmly grounded when resorted to for a long time, without interruption, and with correct conduct." So far we have a discussion of the first requisite named, namely practice. Patañjali then turns to his second requisite for mental restraint. "Indifference to worldly objects is the consciousness of having subdued desires &c. (Vasikâra saṃjñâ) which belongs to one having no longing for objects visible and those which are heard of" (from Sâstras &c., such as heaven and so forth). He next distinguishes another and higher form of "indifference," and then goes on to point out the results of the self-restraint to be acquired in the way he has described. That is one instance. Now take another. In chapter VI, stanza 10 and the stanzas following, the Gita sets out at some length the practical method of achieving the mental abstraction called Yoga. There is no need to reproduce it here. The reader can easily see that various directions are given for the purpose, but without any attempt at systematizing. Contrast the Yoga-sûtras. In the Sâdhanapâda, the section dealing with the acquisition of Yoga, Patañjali states in the twenty-ninth aphorism the well-known eight elements of Yoga. He then subdivides these elements and expatiates on each one separately, defining them, indicating how they are to be acquired, and hinting at the results that flow from them. "That inordinate love of subdivision" which Dr. F. E. Hall¹ has somewhere attributed to the Hindus is plainly visible in these aphorisms, while there is not a trace of it in the corresponding passage in the Bhagavadgita. In my opinion, therefore, thesé comparisons strongly support the proposition we have laid down regarding the unsystematic—or rather non-systematic—character of the work. In the one we have definition, classification, division, and subdivision. In the other we have a set of practical directions with no attempt to arrange them in any very scientific order. In the one there is a set of technical terms with specific meanings. In the other no such precision yet appears. In a word, in the Gita you have the germs—and noteworthy germs—of a system², and most of the raw material of a system, but you have no ready-made system.
1 See the Introductory Essay to my Bhagavadgîtà, translated into English blank verse, p. lxvii. See also Goldstiicker's Remains, I, 48, 77; II, 10. HET ChialsOnp. 335.
8 Preface to Sankhya Sara, p. 7 (Bibl. Indic. ed.)
Are we to infer from the circumstance mentioned in Weber's History of Indian Literature, p. 28,