The Bhagavadgîtâ, with the Sanatsugâtîya and the Anugîtâ — SBE Vol. 8 (trans. K. T. Telang, 1882)
The translator’s English as printed (K. T. Telang). The original-language text is not held; names are romanised as the translator printed them.
* Each sense can only offer up its own perceptions—the mind offers up all knowledge whatever.
* Arguna Misra says this is an implied simile, the mind is an upholder of the body as the ‘ knower’ or self is.
* Arguna Misra says this means ‘the mind.’ I think it better to take it here as the self (see p. 238 supra), to which the ‘ mind’ and the ‘other,’ mentioned further on, would be subordinate ; the ‘other’ Arguna Misra renders by the ‘group of the senses” The senses are compared to fires at Gita, p. 61. The passage at Taittiriya-âraṇyaka above cited refers only to the Gârhapatya and Ahavaniya fires. Nîlakaṇṭha’s text and explanation of this passage are, to my mind, not nearly so satisfactory as Arguna Misra’s.
* In the Taittirîya-brâhmaṇa and Âraṇyaka loc. cit., the equivalent of the original word for ‘lord of speech’ here occurs, viz. Vakpati for Vakaspati here; but that is there described as the Hotṛ priest, and speech itself as the Vedi or altar. The commentator there interprets ‘lord of speech’ to mean the wind which causes vocal activity, and resides in the throat, palate, &c. As to mind and speech, see also Khândogya, pp. 285-441, and comments of Śaṅkara there. The meaning of this passage, however, is not by any means clear to my mind. The Dasahotr7 mantras in the Taittirîya are stated to be the mantras of the Ishä, or sacrifice, performed by Pragâpati for creation. It is possible, then, that the meaning here is, that speech which is to be learnt by the pupil, as stated further on—namely, the Vedas—was first produced from that Ishä (cf. Kullûka on Manu I, 21); But to understand that speech, mind is necessary ; hence it is said to look up to the mind. The Braéhmama’s wife, however, seems to understand speech as ordinary speech, hence her question.
* Each sense can only offer up its own perceptions—the mind offers up all knowledge whatever.
* Arjuna Misra says this is an implied simile: the mind upholds the body just as the 'knower,' or self, does.
Arjuna Misra says this means 'the mind.' I think it better to take it here as the self (see p. 238 supra), to which the 'mind' and the 'other,' mentioned further on, would be subordinate; the 'other' Arjuna Misra renders as the 'group of the senses.' The senses are compared to fires at Gita, p. 61. The passage from the Taittiriya-âraṇyaka cited above refers only to the Gârhapatya and Ahavaniya fires. Nîlakaṇṭha's text and explanation of this passage are, to my mind, considerably less satisfactory than Arjuna Misra's.
In the Taittirîya-brâhmaṇa and Âraṇyaka loc. cit., the equivalent of the original word for 'lord of speech' here occurs, namely Vakpati in place of Vakaspati; but there it is described as the Hotṛ priest, and speech itself as the Vedi or altar. The commentator there interprets 'lord of speech' to mean the wind that causes vocal activity and resides in the throat, palate, and so forth. On the relation of mind and speech, see also Khândogya, pp. 285–441, and Śaṅkara's comments there. The meaning of this passage, however, is not at all clear to me. The Dasahotr7 mantras in the Taittirîya are said to be the mantras of the Ishä, or sacrifice, performed by Prajâpati for creation. It is possible, then, that the meaning here is that the speech the pupil is to learn—that is, the Vedas, as stated further on—was first produced from that Ishä (cf. Kullûka on Manu I, 21); but to understand that speech, mind is necessary, and so speech is said to look up to the mind. The Braéhmama's wife, however, seems to understand speech as ordinary speech, which explains her question.