The Bhagavadgîtâ, with the Sanatsugâtîya and the Anugîtâ — SBE Vol. 8 (trans. K. T. Telang, 1882)
The translator’s English as printed (K. T. Telang). The original-language text is not held; names are romanised as the translator printed them.
Sanatsugâta said :
There is great danger¹ in attributing diśrînctions to it. The everlaśrîng² (principles) exist by connexion with the beginningless‘ (principle). So that his greatness is not lost at all*, and beings exist by connexion with the beginningless* (principle). That which is the real—the supreme Being⁶—is eternal. He creates the universe by means of changes’, for such is his power held to be; and for such connexions of things the Vedas are (authority)⁸.
1 What is the purpose of its existence, and what misery does it undergo on entering the course of worldly life?
2 {The danger, says Sankara, ‘is that of contravening Vedic texts such as “I am the Brahman,” “ Thou art that,” &c.’ May it not rather be that pointed out at Kaṭhopanishad, p. 129, viz. never attaining final emancipation? Cf. also Nṛisiṃha Tapini, p. 223. $ The individual selfs, Śaṅkara. Nature or mâyâ. > The appearance of degradation to an inferior state being delusive.
6 The original word implies the possession of aisvarya, dharma, yasas, śrî, vairâgya, moksha. See Svetâsvatara, p. 329 (where the list is slightly different). For another definition, see Maitri, p. 6 (gloss). T See note 9, p. 156.
8 Sankara says: ‘The queśrîon of Dhṛitarâshṭra having suggested a difference between two principles, one of which constrains, and the other of which is constrained, the answer is—Such a difference ought not to be alleged, as it involves “danger.” Then the queśrîon arises, How is the difference, which does appear, to be explained? The reply is, It is due to the beginningless principle—delusion or ignorance. The next sentence shows that the universe as it appears is also a result of delusion.’ Nîlakaṇṭha says expressly, changes= delusion. He renders the original which we have translated by ‘ beginningless of first, to mean ‘collection of objects of enjoyments.’ Sankara’s explanation seems tautological as regards the words ‘connexion with the beginningless,’ which occur twice in the above. Nila-
Sanatsujâta said:
There is great danger¹ in attributing diśrînctions to it. The everlaśrîng² (principles) exist by connexion with the beginningless (principle). So his greatness is not lost at all, and beings exist by connexion with the beginningless (principle). That which is real—the supreme Being⁶—is eternal. He creates the universe through changes,⁷ for that is how his power is understood; and for such connexions of things the Vedas are (authority)⁸.
1 What is the purpose of its existence, and what misery does it undergo on entering the course of worldly life?
2 {The danger, says Sankara, 'is that of contravening Vedic texts such as "I am the Brahman," "Thou art that," &c.' Might it not rather be the danger pointed out at Kaṭhopanishad, p. 129, namely, that of never attaining final emancipation? Cf. also Nṛisiṃha Tapini, p. 223. § The individual selfs, Śaṅkara. Nature or mâyâ. > The appearance of degradation to an inferior state being delusive.
6 The original word implies possession of aisvarya, dharma, yasas, śrî, vairâgya, moksha. See Svetâsvatara, p. 329 (where the list is slightly different). For another definition, see Maitri, p. 6 (gloss). † See note 9, p. 156.
8 Sankara says: 'The queśrîon of Dhṛitarâshṭra having suggested a difference between two principles, one of which constrains and the other of which is constrained, the answer is—Such a difference ought not to be alleged, as it involves "danger." Then the queśrîon arises, How is the difference, which does appear, to be explained? The reply is, It is due to the beginningless principle—delusion or ignorance. The next sentence shows that the universe as it appears is also a result of delusion.' Nîlakaṇṭha says expressly, changes = delusion. He renders the original, which we have translated as "beginningless" or "first," to mean "collection of objects of enjoyments." Sankara's explanation seems tautological as regards the words "connexion with the beginningless," which occur twice in the above. Nîla-