The Bhagavadgîtâ, with the Sanatsugâtîya and the Anugîtâ — SBE Vol. 8 (trans. K. T. Telang, 1882)
The translator’s English as printed (K. T. Telang). The original-language text is not held; names are romanised as the translator printed them.
The mind said :
The nose smells not without me, the tongue does not perceive taste, the eye does not take in colour, the skin does not become aware of any (object of) touch. Without me, the ear does not in any way hear sound. I am the eternal chief among all elements, Without me, the senses never shine, like an empty dwelling, or like fires the flames of which are extinct. Without me, all beings, like fuel half dried and half moist, fail to apprehend qualities or objects, even with the senses exerting themselves*,
The senses said:
This would be true as you believe, if you, without us, enjoyed the enjoyments (derived from) our objects*. If when we are extinct, (there is) pleasure and support of life, and if you enjoy enjoyments, then what you believe is true; or if when we are absorbed 4 and objects are standing, you enjoy objects according to their natures by the mere operation of the mind.
’ Cf. Kaushîtaki-upanishad, P- 93; Æ’Aândogya, p. 297; Maitri, P-158; and Bṛihadaraṇyaka, p. 284. The passages in the last two works seem to be identical ones, ? Le. in their respective operations.
* The implication, of course, is, as Arguna Misra says, that this is not so, as what is not perceived by the senses cannot be the object of the mind’s operations,—a proposition which reminds one of the maxim, ‘ Nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu,’ apparently without Leibnitz’s limitation of it. Cf. Archbishop Thomson’s Laws of Thought, P. 52.
* As in sleep, &c.
The mind said:
The nose cannot smell without me; the tongue cannot taste; the eye cannot take in colour; the skin cannot register touch. Without me, the ear cannot hear sound in any way. I am the eternal foremost among all elements. Without me the senses have no light in them — like an empty dwelling, or like fires whose flames have gone out. Without me, all beings, like fuel that is half dry and half wet, fail to grasp qualities or objects even when the senses are straining to work.
The senses said:
This would be true, as you believe, if you enjoyed the pleasures that come from our objects without us. If pleasure and the support of life remain when we are extinct, and if you enjoy those pleasures, then what you believe is true; or if, when we are absorbed 4 and objects remain standing, you enjoy objects according to their natures by the mere operation of the mind.
Cf. Kaushîtaki-upanishad, p. 93; Æ Aândogya, p. 297; Maitri, p. 158; and Bṛihadaraṇyaka, p. 284. The passages in the last two works appear to be identical, i.e. in their respective operations.
* The implication, of course, is, as Arjuna Misra says, that this is not so, since what is not perceived by the senses cannot be the object of the mind's operations—a proposition that calls to mind the maxim 'Nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu,' apparently without Leibnitz's qualification of it. Cf. Archbishop Thomson's Laws of Thought, p. 52.
* As in sleep, etc.