The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor

Every thing gencrated, therefore, is in its own nature imperfect. But being imperfect, it is not naturally adapted to perfect itself; since neither is any other imperfect thing. For every thing which is perfected, is perfected from that

* This is because he discussed metaphysics physically, justas Plato discussed physics metaphysically. Tim. Plat. Vou. I. 21p. 250 which is in energy. Bat that which is in energy is perfect; so that every thing which perfects another ἐμ always when it perfeetein energy! according to that form to which it gives perfection). ‘Phat however, Which ix generated, so far us it is venerated, is imperfect. Hence that which is generated, so far as it is generated is not naturally adapted to perfect another thing, But if it cannot perfect another thing, much more is it incapable of perfecting itself Phe latter, therefore, is ἃ vreater undertaking than the former, Por that which perfects itself, is also) perfective of another thing.’ Butifitis not perfected by itself, it is evident that itis perfected by another. For how will it be generated, unless it is perfected ?

Again, therefore, it must be said, the world is generated, But every thing

For how will it be generated, unless it is perfected ?

Again, therefore, it must be said, the world is generated, But every thing which is generated being imperfeet, is either perfected: by another thing, or by itself. Hence every thing which is generated, is either perfected by another, or hy itself. But it is not perfected by itsell. It is therefore perfected by another, so that it is generated by a certain cause. Farther still, the world 15. a composite, and has its hypostasis from dissimilars. But if itis a composite, itis either composed by itself, or by another, For it is, necessary that composition should be from a eause, unless we intend to make it an accidental thing, and froin chance, If therefore it is composed by itself, again it will perfect itself, and give subsistence to itself, and we shall ignorantly transfer it to an incorporeal essence. Vor how will it compose itself? Will it be from the parts arranging themselves? But thus we shall make bodies to be self-motive. Or will it be from impelling each other? And what in this case is that which primarily moves them, And how is itholy to commit the whole world to such like impulsions and contrivances ? How likewise will there be order from things deprived of order, and ornament from things unadorned? For every where that which makes is better than its effect, and that which generates, than the thing generated. And if indeed the parts are the material causes of the composition of the world, what ' αἰ which made them? For this is what we investigate. Buatif they are the eflicient causes, how is it possible that thingsunadorned ean be eflective of things that are adorned, and disorderly natures, of such as have order and arrangement? Tf however the world is not composed by itself, it is evident that it has this composition: from another. Hence if the world is a composite,’ but that which isa COMposile is

. ν * Tustead of ἀεὶ ον ἐστι ἴῃ this place, we should doubtless read ἀεὶ εὐ ἐργεια ἐστι. τ Instead of τὸ yap εαυτίν τελειωτίκον cor, which is evidently defective, it seems requisite to read ro yap ἐαντὸ τελειοῦν, saca\Xov re λειωζίκον ἐστι».

"δ υθετον is omitted inthe original,p. 251 composed by a certain cause, the world therefore has its generation from a cause. Hence too, trom these things it is manifest, that what is generated, is generated by a certain cause.

"δ υθετον is omitted inthe original,p. 251 composed by a certain cause, the world therefore has its generation from a cause. Hence too, trom these things it is manifest, that what is generated, is generated by a certain cause.

It is not however wonderful, if Plato calls the cause of every thing generated, _ acertain cause. For the cause of all things, is stmply cause, and not ἃ certain cause ; concerning which he also says, that it is the cause of all beautiful things. For itis simply God. Butevery divinity posterior to it is @ certain God, as for instance, demiurgic or vivific. The cause therefore of generated natures is a certain cause, as differing from the cause ofall. Hence, he says, that what is generated, 15 generated by a certain cause. It is also well that Plato says one’ cause precedes the whole of generation, For multitude is co-arranged about one principle, and the many unities about the one. But with respect to other physiologists, some rank cause with con-causes; others recur to physical powers; others to dispersed infinite principles; others to‘ nature ; and others to soul. Plato, how ever, dismisses indeed these causes, but supposes that there is one cause which is the first of all causes. For with this cause, the psychical order indeed co-operates, but nature is ministrant to it, and all con-causes are subservient to it, and are moved conformably to its will, Because, therefore, the demiurgic monad precedes multitude, he denominates this monad a cause: for this is significant of unity. Because, however, it has not the first order among causes, nor is imparticipable,” he adds the word certain. So that the words “ by a certain cause,” have the same signification as, by one cause indced, yet not the first cause. Hence, neither is it reasonable immediately to produce that which is generated, but that which is eternal, from éhe one ; in order that from the one, which is prior to eternity, every eternal nature may proceed ; but from an eternal nature, that which is generated and temporal. And that selfsubsistent natures likewise may proceed from that which is superior to beings that produce themselves; but from these, those that are generated by others, Vor the series and order of things which proceed from the one, is continued; and things nearer to the principle, give subsistence to such as are more remote from it.

“Tt is difficult, therefore, to discover the maker and father of this universe, and when found, it is impossible to speak of him to all men.” * For we here, itis requisite to read εἰς

* The demiurgic monad, (i.e. Jupiter or the Demiurgus,) is not imparticipable because it immediately illuminates, or is con-subsistent with, intellectual intellect. See the 6th Book of my Translation of Proclus on the theology of Plato.

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