The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor

Hut they are dissoluble as h iving together with a bond, a separation of the simple things of which tin \ consist, according to the definite causes of tilings, that are bound, existing in lmn that binds. For as that which is selt-subsistent is said nooK v.]

i IM/KUS or I*LATU.

.14 r, to l*o so in n twofold respect, one, as supplying all things from itself alone, hut another, as subsisting inch ed from itself, and also from another, which is the cause of it, thus aUo the uidisoohihle is so, from anoth* r,' and from itself; just as that which is moved is twofold, and .subsists m a similar manner.

To these two modes however, two modes of dissolution are also opposed ; viz. that which is dissoluble from another and tiom itself is opposed to that which is indissoluble from another and from itself. And the former indeed, is dissoluble in itself, ns consisting of things that are separate. [bit m consequence of having in something eke prior to itself the causes of its subsistence, by this cause, and according to this mode alone, it becomes dissoluble. Again, that which is simply dissoluble in a twofold respect, and which contains in itself the cause of i!« disso¬ lution, and ako receives it from another, is opposed to that which is simply indissoluble in a twofold respect, from itself and from another. These then fore are four in niimlwr, viz. that which is simply indissoluble from another and from itself. And again, that which is indissoluble after a certain manner in a twofold respect; that which is dissoluble afier a certain manner m a twofold resj»ect; and that which is dissoluble simply from itself, and from another. * Of these four however, the first pertains to inlelligihles; for they are indissoluble, as bring entirely simple, and receiving no composition or dissolution whatever. But the fourth belongs to mortal natures, which ar« dissoluble from thrmselvi s and from others, as consisting of many things, and being compos* d bv their causes in such a way, as to lie at a certain time dissolved. And the middles pertain to the mun¬ dane (iods; fur the second and the third of these four concur with them. Bor niter a certain manner, these as being the works of the father are indissoluble; and they are saved (rum thcui'ilvc*. and through his will. \nd again, they are in a certain respect dissoluble, because thev are bound by him ; and lie contains the productive principle of those simple naluies from which they are composed. Ik cry thing then-lore which is hound is dissoluble; and this is ako the case with the wot ks of the father.

\nd again, they are in a certain respect dissoluble, because thev are bound by him ; and lie contains the productive principle of those simple naluies from which they are composed. Ik cry thing then-lore which is hound is dissoluble; and this is ako the case with the wot ks of the father.

For bodies indeed, are hound through analogy ; for this is the most beautiful bond of them. But animals aie bound with animated bonus, as we have l>efore observed. And souls w hich contain something of a partible nature are hound by media, [viz. by geometrical, arithmetical and harmonieal ratios;] for Plato calls these ami all tin* productive principles of which the soul consists, bonds. For impartible natures alone are unimiigent of bonds; but those that arc hound,

’ Hap* tTTpnv is omitted in the original.

i hr v»ords cat Xiri)i>arXwi wp «ai>rov cat Tap’ mpoo, are omittrd m the original.

Tim. Pint Vol. II. *2 X

34«

PHOCLUS ON Til K

{ f IMH V

For impartible natures alone are unimiigent of bonds; but those that arc hound,

’ Hap* tTTpnv is omitted in the original.

i hr v»ords cat Xiri)i>arXwi wp «ai>rov cat Tap’ mpoo, are omittrd m the original.

Tim. Pint Vol. II. *2 X

34«

PHOCLUS ON Til K

{ f IMH V consist of things that have a separate subsistence; these not being separated according to time, but according to the causal comprehension of simple natures in the Demiurgtis. After this manner therefore, the dissoluble of the mun¬ dane Gods as from another, or rather as in another, subsists. Ifencc thev are in a certain rospe-ct, but by no means simply dissoluble. For if the\ were dissoluble from themselves, but indissoluble according to the will of the father, as Severus, Atticiis, and Plutarch are accustomed to say, against whom many arguments are adduced by many if this were the ease, wlienee did thev derive the being dissoluble from tin inselves ? For if dissolution is natural to them, who imparted to them tins natural power? For it was not any other than the Demiurgtis. If liowe r, In* is the supplier of nature to them, lie also is the cause of their dissolution, lint if tin !» mg dissoluble is preternatural to them, the con¬ trary, the indissoluble, is natural to them. And if it is natural to tln-m, they will possess the indissoluble from themselves ; and the very existence of them will be a thing of this hind ; itv the same manner as self-motion is natural to soul, levity to fin*, and to every thing, lh.it winch necessarily exists in it essentially ; so that the mundane Gods will possess this from themselves. Ibit I say from themselves, because they will possess it lrom their proper colnpositinn, wliieli they are essen¬ tially allotted; for they will not poviss it a> sell-.siihsjstent. It is ridiculous therefore to say, that being dissoluble of theuist Ives, they are alone indissoluble through the will of the father, which these men assert to he the ease, in conse¬ quence of wishing to preserve the axiom, that every tiling generated lias corrup¬ tion, and who also contend that the world was generated, list Tima-us should apjvear to contradict Socrates, whom lie had heard on the preceding dav admit¬ ting that the imbegoilen,* is incorruptible. Hein e, if the genus of the mundane Gods is of itself indissoluble, it is al>o of itself unbegntten, and not alone through the will of the father. For unless we admit this, how c an we accord with Plato, who makes a twofold indissoluble, one according to nature, but another accord¬ ing to the* d< miiirgic will ? And, if we deny this, must we not also speak impiously of the 1>« miiirgiis himself? For it being willing to make* his fabrications indisso¬ luble, lie does not possess the* power of effecting this, we must separate his will from bis power, which would lie* absurd, since* this does not take* place with worthy men. lint if he is both willing anel able te> make* the*se indissoluble, Iceing able*, lie* will make* the in te> be* indissoluble?; su that the* indissoluble- in them is according to nature. 1 e»r each of them was g< ne-iateel indissoluble, but was