The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor

]*or every number likewise, according to its proper form, is one and impartible, but according to that w hich is as it were the matter o| it, it is partible ;‘ yet not the whole of this, hut in this also the last in which the division t< miniates, is impartible.

1 I^unit'll* I hniiia'iiv appear* from ho version to have read in his manuscript r.njrot* rnr in lliis placr, iii'U ,i»l of iMpm mi ; Iml it ii[i|if ao Iona* tlmt we should read ioqrcr on torpor xui irXfiroi. tor what I’rorluv here says, applied to every intelli^iliii* ami intelleetnal essence, hut in a tian*rcndcnt decree lo the loriner.

1 Tim* tor instance, seven monads or unit*, are as it were the matter of the number seveu, but the heptadic form proceeding from the licptad itself which siijiervciics and invests these monads, is one and impart i bie.

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32 PItOCLUS ON 1'IIL [book hi.

If you are willing likewise, this may he surveyed after another manner. Since these middle genera are three, when essence vamiuishes same and different, then according to the mixture of the media, a divine soul is generated, and the more and the less in the domination, produce the extent according to breadth ofdivine souls. Hut whell sameness and at the same tune essence, vanquish difference, then an angelic soul is generated. \\ hen sain* in >s alone predominates, a da iuoniacal soul is produced; hut when sameness toget her w ith ditfereiice, have dominion over essence, then an heroic soul is generated; and when difference alone pre¬ vails, a human soul is produced. I'or it is impossihle that the (extremes should vampiish the medium, hei use lliev cannot without it he conjoined with each other, lint according to eat h of the mixtures, the more and the h ss of the pre¬ dominating natures produce thehn adtli ol souls. 1 liese things, linvvrv* r, xxill In* mole till lx discussed elsewln re.

1 liese things, linvvrv* r, xxill In* mole till lx discussed elsewln re.

It ieiuaills tin r< line, ill the next place, to consider what the impartible, and also w hat the partible form of « >s* lice is. For among the more am u nt interpre¬ ters, there w as a di/lereiiee of opinion on tins subject. I h nee concerning these things, let Us fust speak more generally, hut alt* rwards, in a iiiaiim r more proxi¬ mal* to the proposed subjects ol inquiry. i or it is possible to .speak in both these ways. \\ e say, tliei <-lore, that ex cry Hit*lligilile and intellectual essence both total and partial, and which is imiuaterial and separate and prior to the eternal, or wInch is eternal, is impartible; but that all essences which proceed about bodies whethcr they are mundane 1 i\is, or natures which verge to corporeal masses, or physical reasons which are divided about the body that is void Of (piahty, ar< partible. 1 or all th* se are div isible about bodies. And some of them indeed subsist in these visible bodies and are in them as in a subje* t. Hut others have an ess* nlial subsistence, and are the forms of life, but are inseparable from bodies, as nature. And others are distributed into parts imbed, but collect themselves into tin* impartible, as sense. And if you are willing, you may say that the impartible essence is triple, subsisting according to being, according to life, and according to intellection. And the essence which subsists according sensible perception, is instead of intellection ; that which subsists according to nature, is instead o! lif* ; and that which subsists according to the forms that are div id« d about the bulks of bodies, is instead of 1 m ing. Fur the three latter being images of the three former have a subsistence contrary to them with respect to their order to each other. Hut the media between these are the being, life, and intellei ti*ui in souls, w Inch preserve the order of the natur* s prior to tin m, through a .similitude to them, but have a distribution into parts equal 1 to the natures that this place, it appears vo sliouM re.nl ^tlie seieo also requiring lllis tinemlalion) roe £e fir^te/wv ru ifu>v r C/i* prart vru.

* I r«jm ill*' version ill 1 .1-011 it US Tiioma lit, lllstrllil of roe £t fitfuouvv yen;, roil fitru ruvra in

BOOK III.]

IIM/UJS <>i PLATO

.Tl

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.Tl are posterior to them. Wn must therefore give a triple division to all things, ami thus dividing, we must arrange the psychical essence Ix-twecn the impartible and the partible nature, as being the imago of the former, but the paradigm of the latter; and as abiding and at the same time proceeding ; as simple and compo¬ site ; and as exempt from, and co-arranged with the corporeal essence. I’or the appropriate middle nature of it, presents itself to the view according to all these. And thus in a general way we may admit every essence lietwoen the one and the soul to be impartible, and every essence between the soul and bodies to be partible.

If, however, it lx* requisite to define the partible and the impartible in a more proximate manner, we must speak as follows: The Demiurgus constituted the universe an animal, animated and endued with intellect, conceiving that the animated is better than the inanimate, and tin: intellectual than that which is deprived of intellect. Hence there is in it a corporcal-forined life, according to which it is an animal: for being bound with animated bonds, it became an animal. The soul itself however, is not mingled with body. For the opinion that it is, Socrates also reprobates in the Pir.edrus. Hut the soul is divine, ac¬ cording to which the universe is animated, having indeed a connascent life, and having likewise a separate life. Then: is also in it, an immaterial 1 and divine intellect. For it is necessary to call this an essential intellect, hut not 1 an intellect which subsists as a habit of the soul. For the Demiurgus did not con¬ stitute the latter, hut the soul, according to the motion of itself about the intelli¬ gible, as Tinueiis afterwards says. So that the universe has a triple life, viz. cnrporeal-formed, psychical, and intellectual. And the intellectual life of it, indeed, is impai tihle, as lx*ing eternal, as at once comprehending rverv intelligible, as immoveable, and as united, according to a supreme transcendency of secondary natures. Hut the cnrporenl-formed life is partible, as proceeding about corporeal masses, being mingled with body, and verging to subjects. And the psychical life is tliig middle lietvveen both, transcending the latter through a separate subsistence ; through circularly covering externally as with a veil the hulk of the universe, as has been saitl, and will he again asserted in what follows; through being extended to intellect, and yet again being inferior to it; through jierceiv ing intellectually in time; through evolving the impartiality of the intellectual life; and through in a certain respect coining into contact with body. Plato, however, by constituting the mundane eoul from these media, manifests that it is a medium lietwecu the natures that are si-

1 For nvrot here, it is necessary to read «vXm.

* For aAXo ^njr here, it u necessary to read aXX’ cv.

VOL. II.

Tun. Plat.

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p. 34