The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor

Ttis also according to Aristotle always in the end, the always being temporal, according to temporal infinity, Por as the solar-form light: proceeds from its) proper fountain, thus also the world is always venerated, and always produced, and is always becoming to be, and at the

Pap is omitted in this ploee; aod the sentence ought to be interrogative, Hence instead of τι τὴν QUTNS COTWS ε!εέργείιν, TEs HITE Τὴν δέντεμαν avususrrdews, We ust read ἐπὶ γαρ TYS αὐτὴν ἐστων crepyeas «XN. with ἃ note of interrogation at theeud.,

* After uredero re saz here, the word σεν τον must be supplied.

rook αι] TIMZUS OF PLATO. 245 same time always was so, Asa composite likewise itis generated. For all | Composition is ceaeration. But if is always composed, it Was always becoming ᾿ to be, with which to be generated conears. And it appears τὸ me that Plate Knowing this, says ἐδ weas generated instead of it is generated, just as of [real] being, hesavs it was, instead of itis: for his words are“ whether it aleays was.” Sor as in the intelligible, the was and is are the same ; for all things are there accord. / Ing to sameness, since all things are in dhe now, which is more mpartible than the now which is according to time; thas also iis generated and it was generated proceed to the same thing inevery sensible nature. For it was generated, as that Which always was becoming to be,and as generated, itis. But that a thing generated, when it is assumed aceording to a certain time, does not indicate that which is simply a composite, is evident: from its opposite. For to. this Plato opposes perpetual being. Tf therefore, perpetual being manifests that which is simple, we must say that what is alone a composite is generated. Bat if eternal heme siguified that which is always according to time, that which is originating trom ἃ certam thing, would be said to be becoming to be. For that which is cenerated is not opposed to the eternal, so far as itis cenerated, but) so far as it participates of time; on which account also it iss generated. That perpetual being, however, [er that which alw avs is,} manifests the eternal, is evident ; since the Deminrgus also who produces time, is called perpetual being, and the paradigm likewise is thus denominated. Hence, it: sicnifies an eternal hypostasis, and not that which participates of temporal perpetuity.

Hence, it: sicnifies an eternal hypostasis, and not that which participates of temporal perpetuity.

Some one, however, who acnnowledges this ay nevertheless doubt, why we have before καὶ that the world is generated, from having a body? For as there are in ita body, which is alone generated, a divine soul, which always is, and a divine intellect prior to this, why do we say that it is generated on account of its body, and not denominate it unbegotten, on account of its soul, or its intellect? tis said, therefore, that the whole world is every where characterized from form, and not from the subject nature. For do we not call Socrates mortal, though he has an immortal soul, because the animal which is in him is mortal? If, however, you say that we now consider the corporeal-formed nature of the universe, not yet co-arranged with sont, you will speak richtly. Bat when vou see it animated and endued with intellect, vou may eall ita God. Por thus Plato in the Republie calls it a divine generated thing, But inthis dialogue, he thinks fit to denominate the world, a blessed God. In the very words also before us, he ina sreater degree celebrates the universe. For as he is about to call that which is

Ϊ H Ϊ Ϊ 5

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\ 7 \ ri ifp. 246 unbegotten [viz. soul] generated, though he attributes an unbegotten subsistence to eternal natures, thus also he calls the world generated. For it is not when denominated generated, diminished by a juataposition with the eternal, He likewise conjoins the becoming to be of it, with if was generated ; in order that as all or the universe, he may evince that it is perfect and being, but as having its essence in time, that it is generated. Te likewise assigns to it the principle ofa certainand not of all generation. And according to its corporeal-formed nature, he calls it, generation, omitting the divine powers in it, through which it is happy, and ts called a God.

Te likewise assigns to it the principle ofa certainand not of all generation. And according to its corporeal-formed nature, he calls it, generation, omitting the divine powers in it, through which it is happy, and ts called a God.

Moreover, the demonstration is worthy of admiration, viz. how. scientifically it proceeds from the definition. Llence also, he mverts the order. For inthe hypotheses indeed, he defined that which is generated to be the objcet of opinion butte the demonstration of that which is generated, he assures the converse, in order that he may make the definition to be the middle term, as in demonstrations is perfectly requisite. Por this will cause what ts said to be traly a demonstration, For opinion through ' possessing the reasons of generated natures, introduces the order of eauses with reference to them. Elence itappears to me that Plato is not satistied with the term sensible ma order to demonstrate that the world is generated, but adds also that what is sensible is the object of opinion 5 since sense indeed knows the energy of sensibles, in consequence of suffering by them, but opinion knows also. their essences. Por itantecedently comprehends the reasons of them. In order, therefore, that he might evince the esscnce of sensibles to be generated, he forms lis demonstration from that which ts the object ofopinton, Farther stu, lis not adding that which ts destructible to that which is venerated, shows his reverential Conceptions of the world; though it ds in a certain respect trae that the world is destructible, as we dave before said. At the sume time, this exhibits tous the caution and reverence of Plato: for having that which is consequent [τὸ the being generated], vet he does not add it; which he ought to admire who thinks that the world was generated according to Plato in time. Por this generated natare which he calls the object of opinion, isat the same time destructible ; but the world is not cestructible at) the same time that itis generated. Hence the world is both destructible and ticerraptuble, yet the philosopher does not call it both these according to the same; for this would be ridiculous ; but he calls it incorruptible, in the same manner as unbegotten, according to time, For if that which ts gencrated according to time,

"Instead of ἡ yap Sofa ra τοὺς Auzous execw τῶν yeryrwy in this place, itis necessary to read y yap toga τῷ rovs Noyors KA.

p. 247