The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor

As these, therefore, are the extremes, viz. every intelligible and intellectual essence, and every sensible essence, let us direct our attention to the intermediate nature. For Timeus calls both time and the soul generated. And it is evident that these, as not being sensible, are in a certain respect beings, and in a certain respect generated, but perfectly neither of these. Porphyry, therefore, rightly observes, that Plato now defines the extremes, viz. that which is primarily being,

* For xapagrace here, read παρατασει.

p. 216

Porphyry, therefore, rightly observes, that Plato now defines the extremes, viz. that which is primarily being,

* For xapagrace here, read παρατασει.

p. 216

and that which is alone generated, and that he omits the media; such for instance as, that which is at one and the same time deing and a generated nature, or that which is both generated and being ; of which being and gencrated are adapted to the nature of souls, but vice versa that which is generated and being, are allied to the summit of generated natures. Such as this, however, is the nature of the universe which vivifies the universe. For this nature so far as itis divisible about bodies, ts venerated, but so far as itis entirely incorporeal, is unbegotten, But it is absurd to say that matter is both generated and being. For thus it: would be superior to generated sensible natures, since these are eenerated alone, but matter would also participate of being. Andif you are willing separately to assume that whichis alone perpetual being, and that which is alone venerated, by taking away from one of the definitions intellect, and from the other sense; you will produce the definition of the medium. For this is known by reason and opinion, For reason knows both itself and opinion, and opinion knows itself an reason 3 the former indeed both in conjunction with cause; but the latter both, without cause. Vor in this reason and opinion differ from each other. Opinion also is known by reason, and reason by opinion, And the whole [rational] soul subsists through both these which are media. Thus too, by assuming the worse of the two upward terms, viz. reason, and making it to be spurious reason, and of the two downward terms sense, and making it to be insensible sense, you will then have the manner in which Plato thought matter may be known, viz. by spurious reason, and insensible sense. Assuming likewise analogously in each, that which is the better of the two, and mahing it to be spurious according to that which is more excellent, you will Lave the manner in which ¢he one is known, viz. by a spurious intellect, and spurious opinion. Henee it is not properly simple, and is not known from cause. It is known therefore by a spurious knowledge, because it is known in a superior manner according to each. For opinion does not know from cause, and the one is not known from cause, but from not having a cause. And intellect knows that which is simple; but a spurious intellect: knows the one, because it is superior to intellectual perception. The superior therefore, here, is spurious as with reference to intellect, as de one’ also is more excellent than that which is simple, such as that is which is intelligible to truly existing intelleet, and to which intelleet ts allied and is not spurious. It perceives therefore, the one, by that in itself which is not intellect. But this is the ove in it, according to which also it is a God.

It perceives therefore, the one, by that in itself which is not intellect. But this is the ove in it, according to which also it is a God.

ee Ste F : For ἐκεῖνος liere, it is necessary to read eseau. For Proclus is speaking of the τὸ Ἂν».

p. 217

“ Ievery thing however, which is generated, is from necessity generated by a certain cause. [or it is pertectly impossible that it should have generation without a cause.”