The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor

Hence, they are not simply beautiful, nor yet are they deformed, because in short, they derive their subsistence according to reason, [or that productive principle which ts in the mind, of the artist.) That these axioms therefure are true, we may through these observations be reminded.

Some however doubt, how Plato assumes as a thing acknowledged, that there is a Demiurgus of the universe who looks to a paradigm: for there is not a De miurgus of it say they who directs his attention to that which is invariably the same. And many of the ancients indeed are the patrons of this assertion ; among whom are the Epicureans, who entirely deny the existence of that which is perfectly eternal. The Stoics admit that there is a Demiurgus, but assert that he is inseparable from matter. And the Peripateties grant indeed, that there is something which is separate from matter, yet do not allow that it is a producing, but that itis a final cause. Hence they also take away paradigms, and place over the whole of things an intellect void of multtude. Plato however and the Pythagoreans celebrate a separate and exempt Demiurgus of the universe, a producing cause of all things, and a providence that is attentive to the welfare of wholes; and this with the greatest propriety; for if the world, as Aristotle says, aspires after intellect, and is moved towards it, whence does it derive this desire ? For since the world is not the first of things, it is necessary that it should possess this tendeney, from a cause which excites it to desire. For he also says that the appetible is motive of that which is appetitive. But if this is true, and the world by its very being and according to nature is appetitive of intellect, it is evident that the whole of its existence is from thence, whence also its being appetitive is derived. Whence likewise is the world, since it is finite, moved ad infinitum? For every body possesses, as he says, a finite power. Whence therefore does the universe derive this infinite power, since it is not from chance, as Epicurus says it is? In short, if intellect is the cause of a motion which ts infinite, uninterrupted, and one, there is something which is productive of the eternal. But if this be the case, what should hinder the world from being perp πα}, and deriving: its subsistence from a paternal cause; for as it receives an infinite: power of being moved, from the appetible, through which it is moved ad intinitum, thus also it will entirely receive from thence an infinitive power of existing, through the proposition which says, that in a finite body there is not at any time an infinite power. Ether therefore, it has not a power through which it is connected, and

p. 225

Ether therefore, it has not a power through which it is connected, andp. 225 how is this possible? For every thing partible, has something impartible which connects it, as Aristotle himself somewhere says, and the universe also is an animal. He therefore says that God is an eternal animal, but every animal is connected by the life which is init. Or the universe has, indeed, a power which connects it, but this power is finite, This, however, is impossible: for if it is finite, it will fail. Or it possesses an infinite power. And again, it will not have this from itself, Something else, therefore, imparts to it the power of existing, and imparts not the whole at once. For it is not receptive of the whole at one time. Hlence it imparts this power by influx, and the influx is perpetual, and always as much as the world is able to receive. So that the world is always becoming to be, and never ts.

But if intellect is the Demiurgus of the world, whether does it make that which it makes, by a reasoning process, or by its very being? If indeed by consulting, an absurdity follows. For there will be a mutation about it, and the passions of a partial soul. It will not therefore consult. And if it should consult, it must entirely antecedently assume in itself the work about which it consults ; Just as every one does who consults before he energizes, But if it makes by its very being, it makes that which is similar to itself And if it does this, it will contain the paradigms of the things that are generated. And again, we must investizate, whether these paradigms subsist: primarily init, or not, and whence it derives this paradigmatic cause of wholes. Farther still, after what manner do we see artificers that are here produce? Ts it not by possessing the reasons cr productive principles of their effects? This, therefore, the damoniacal Aristotle will also grant. But if art imitates nature, it is necessary that natnre, much prior to art, should contain the reasons of the things which she generates. And if nature does this, we must inquire whence she is moved, and whence she is perfected? For she is irrational ; and thus ascending, we must say that the causes of all things are in intellect. In opposition to Aristotle, indeed, much has been said by many ; but our business, at present, is to explore what Plato says.

In the first place, therefore, let us investigate from what cause he introduces to cenerated natures the beautiful and the not beautiful, from the paradigm, and not from the producing cause. It might then have been said, that there are two-fold demiurgic causes, viz. the generated and the intelligible, the latter being effective of beautiful things, but the former of things that are not beautiful. But Plato does: not speak after this manner, but says that intelligible paradigms are the paradigms of beautifal eflects, hut generated paradigms, of such as are pot beau-

Tim. Plat. Vou. I. 2F

But Plato does: not speak after this manner, but says that intelligible paradigms are the paradigms of beautifal eflects, hut generated paradigms, of such as are pot beau-

Tim. Plat. Vou. I. 2F

p. 226

tiful. It may however be said, that what is here asserted contributes to erudition, exhorting us not to reject beautiful actions. Por if he had said that what is generated, is not effective of beauty, perhaps he might have rendered us more sluggish with respect to beautiful actions. But it will be better and more physical, it we say that it is possible for the same eflective cause to look to two-fold paradigms, and to make a certain thing beautiful, and acertain thing not beautiful, Por soul looking to intellect, generates truth and science, but looking to generation, she procreates imaginations, and passive appetites, But itis tipossible for the same paradigm to be the cause of beautiful and not beautifal effects. Very properly therefore is it asserted, that from this cause beauty and deformity accede to genes rated natures. As the paradigm however of this universe is beautiful, itis evident that it is intelheible, and always subsists invariably the same; to Which also the Demiurgus looking, adorns the universe, If, theretore, itas the supplier of beauty, it has the highest order among eternal beings, and belongs to the first intelligibles, Hence the cause eflective of beauty is there, through which all things are beautiful, intellect, soul, and the nature of body. Again, therefore, the Demiurgus, indeed, ts the cause of form, but the paradigni of beauty, and the “οὐ of union, And the last of these. supplies all things at once, but the paradigm is the suppher of beauty and form, and the demiurgic cause, so far as it is Intellectual, of torm: and essence. Moreover, the demiurgie cause looking to the intelligible ts multiform. For the whole Demiurgus fabricates in one way ἡ looking toil. He, therefore, is united to it according to supreme transcendency. But the demiurgic triad fabricates in another way. And of this triad indeed, the first (i. οὐ Jupiter) fibricates uniformly 3 the second fi. e. Neptune} generatively, and the last (i.e. Pluto} convertively.

And in one way in the ruling, in another in the liberated and in another, in the mundane order. But after this triad, we must survey fabrication proceeding after |