The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor
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For, in short, if the cause of symmetry is the health of the cloments, it is necessary that this should exist in the most beautiful manner in the universe, in which there is mn the most
* Tustead of ἀλλ᾽ οὐδε ovSevos here, it is requisite to read αλλὸν δὲ οἱδενος,
* For owy τὸ ἐκάστου τουτων στοιχείων, | read cior τὸ ἕκαστον τουτων στοιχέιον. The eclestial bodies consist of, what Aristotle calls, a fifth element, and which is essentially different from cach of the four elements,BOOK 110.) TIM-EUS OF PLATO, 439 eminent degree a symmetry of all the elements; so. that the fountain of this is primarily with the Demiurgus. And it seems that there is one concurrence with each constitution of composite natures, and which is a certain demiurgic health ; but another which renovates the existing state of being, or the state of being, which is still preserved, or is in a perishing condition; which is preserved, indeed, in the natures that are connected by indissolable bonds, but is in a perishing condition in those whose connecting bonds are dissoluble. For indissoluble natures, as being finite, and having a finite power, are in want of renovating causes: for they are renovated from things which possess infinite power. And here indeed (1. e. in what Plato now says] the providence of divinity about the universe, in order that it may be free from disease, concurs with the composition of the universe. But the providence mentioned in the Politicus, according to which divinity coming into contact with the helm of the universe, corrects what was vitiated in a former period, is the paradigm of the second kind of health, which is of a renovating nature, [ence also theologists refer one kind of health to E:sculapius, this being all the medicine of things preternatural, whether it perpetually or sometimes only represses a preternatural subsistence. But they generate another prior to Esculapius, which is consubsistent with the fabrication of things, and which they produce from Persuasion and Love. Uence, as Plato says, the universe is from intellect: and necessity, intellect’ persuading necessity; but necessity being converted to intellect, in order that it may lead all things to that which is best. For it is evident from these things, that the universe subsists according to nature, from its first composition, through the persuasion proceeding from intellect, and the conversion of necessity to intellect. lence, it is manifest that. the Demiurgus comprehends the fountain of health, both that) which is Esculapian, and that whichis Demiurgic. And thus much for this particular, lence, it is manifest that. the Demiurgus comprehends the fountain of health, both that) which is Esculapian, and that whichis Demiurgic. And thus much for this particular,
But the constituted body, is a composite, and alter-motive. That which is selfmotive therefore, is preservative of itself; but that which is alter-motive, in a particular manner requires not to be disturbed by other things, The universe, however, so far as itis a body is alter-motive. But Plato assumes heat and cold as things ofan eflicacions nature, and as possessing strong and vigorous powers; the former producing corruption through section, but the latter through violent congelation, But the word unscasonably manifests the privation of symmetry, and the ‘inaptitude arising from the want of symmetry, and besides these, the incursions
* For τὸν τὸν here, read τὸν you.
p. 440
p. 440
from chance. For it appeared to those who leave something external to the universe, that it was proper to commit the accidents of bodies to fortune and chance. Plato, however, in saying that heat and cold by surrounding and falling on the world, would introduce disease and corruption, may seem to grant that the world is in short both hot and cold. For if it did not suffer something of this kind, though the natures which surround it should be hot and cold, it would suffer nothing from them. For he says that the world would suffer by the things which would surround it. And if indeed it consisted of things some of which are hot and others cold, it would suffer by these; but if of others, which have strong and vigorous powers, it would suffer from them, For whether these surrounding natures should happen to be contrary to the things of which the world consists, because contrary, they would cause the composite on which they fall, to decay ; or whether they were similar, they would dissolve the proportion according to which the world was constituted, through being mingled with the similar natures that are in it. As he speaks, therefore, of every composite, he very properly makes mention of heat and cold, as of things universally known. For there 3a certain composite, and it consists of these, and is known to all. Tlenece, because it is known, he mentions these. Since, however, every composite does not consist of these, he adds, in what he afterwards says, universally, ‘ and all such things as have strong and vigorous powers,” though they should not be heats and colds. For it is necessary that every physical body should have a physical power, through which it may be able to act according to nature, If, therefore, any body should surround the world, whether similar or dissimilar to certain things contained in it; if dissimilar, indecd, it would disturb the world; but itis necessary that what is impassive should not be disturbed by that which is foreign, and by something which is situated ia a certain place; and if similar, In consequence of being mingled with what is similar to it, it would dissolve the ratio of the elements in the world, from which it is constituted according to the most beautiful Lond. Such therefore is the explanation of the particulars of the text.
Let us, however, survey itself by itself, how there is nothing external to the universe. For why did not the Demiurgus who constituted matter, fabricate many kinds of matter, and many worlds?) May we not say, that he constituted matter, and always constitutes it, according to the unity which he contains, so that on this account, he very properly produces but one matter ; and that the multitude of sensible forms possess differences, which distinguish them from each other, but that matter is without difference and without quality? Por though we should
BOOK IIL.) TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 441
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