The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor

Iliad, lib. li. 443.

BOOK III.]

TIM/EL'S OF PLATO.

p. 117

similar. For the interweaving exhibits the presence of the soul in the world, through similitude. For all communion of essences, powers, and energies, sub¬ sists from this. But the circularly covering the universe as with a veil, as it signi¬ fies transcendency', represents to us, how the soul incommensurable to the world, an throng h its incommensurability, is imparticipable. For that which is incommensurable, is certainly dissimilar to that to which it is incommensurable. Perhaps however both have both. For to be interwoven, is the province of things, which are partly similar, and partly dissimilar. And to circularly cover as with a veil, togf tlirr with the inseparable, exhibits intellectual comprehension, which is secondarily present to the universe. For through this comprehension, the universe imitates intellect, of which it becomes ' the first resemblance. Hence it is present with the universe, in a s -parate manner, and illuminates all things, without* being itself converted to the illuminated natures, or receiving habitude, or co-ordination vv ith them. For these things are foreign to the whole soul [or to the soul which ranks as a whole]. Because however body proceeds together with the soul, hut not the soul together with body ; and the soul by its infinite power, com¬ prehends the world ; by its non-possession of interval, all interval; by its impart¬ ible nature, every tiling partible; and by its simplicity,that which is composite;— hence, the fabrication of body is suspended from the generation of the soul, but not vice versa. The essence of the soul therefore, is tin* lender, as bring more allied to intellect, and body is suspended from the soul, as from its cause. Is there then any reason why we should endure to admit such an interweaving, as some adduce, who conceive the soul to he present with body, through partible powers, cntelccheid and inseparable lives? By no means. For everv distribution of tins kind, is secon¬ dary to the one soul [of the universe]. Since in us also, tbe cntcUcheia animates the body iu one way, but the separate soul m another; the former indeed, being divided about the corporeal masses; but the latter being established in itself, and imparlihly present everywhere, and containing partible lives, by its own impart¬ ible powers. But if it be requisite to speak in a manner becoming the dignity of the whole soul of tbe universe, tbe interweaving is an unmingled union of tbe body with the soul, and a communion, connected comprehension, and vivification of tbe soul, proceeding from the Demiurgus, and lielng again converted to him. For as we must not understand tbe “ circularly covering as with a veil" either ac-

* For yo-o/jo iji' litre, it is obviously necessary to read ytrcfitv or.

* Ov« is omitted here, in the original.

For as we must not understand tbe “ circularly covering as with a veil" either ac-

* For yo-o/jo iji' litre, it is obviously necessary to read ytrcfitv or.

* Ov« is omitted here, in the original.

1 The cause by which the animal is ri tatty moved, is tbe rational soul, but tbe cause by which the animal thus moved, is defined or bounded, is called by Aristotle tnttlechti*. See my IranjUtKlp of bis treatise On the Soul

p. 148

PItOCLUS ON T1IE

[book hi companies with interval, or locally, lmt as signify in" that the soul is on all sides similarly exempt from the body, and by Immii" thus exempt uniformly compre¬ hend*. it; thus also, we must not understand the " being interwoven^ as accompa¬ nied with contact, but as manifesting the animation which jw-rvades through all things, and the union of all things with it. Tor the soul tilling all thiugs with itse!t r and connectedly containing all things, contains, prior’ toother things, itself in purity, and converts the world to itself, lb nee, by a much greater pri¬ ority, it is itself converted to itself. On this account, Tinneus adds, that it is itself com <d veil in itself in order that he may indicate the difference between the soul, and the body of the universe, which is indeed convolved, yit notin itst If, hut in the whole of place which it occupies. For tliis is convolved locally, but the soul vitally and intellectually, understanding itself, and finding itself to be all things. For it is the plenitude of wholes, ami contains the images of all things, which intellectually perceiving, it is said to revolve in itselt ; the revolu¬ tion indicating the intellectual and at the same time apucatastatic ; but its rcvolvin?> in itself, the peculiarity of self motion. For the universe also revolves, but is moved b\ another [l. e. by soul .

For the universe also revolves, but is moved b\ another [l. e. by soul .

Ib re, therefore, we have a solilMoii of that which was investigated by Us. For We inquired, looking to the whole of the psychognuy, where Plato lias delivered to us tin* gnostic pi cnliarity of the soul, m tlie same manner as lie h.is tin? essen¬ tial and tin vital peculiarities; the former indeed through the triple mixture; but the latter through the motion in the same. Through the circular conversion therefore, of the soul to itself, the Deimiirgus effected its gnostic peculiarity, ami which Plato in wiiat is now said, more clearly manifests. Fur in order to show how the soul knows all things, lie says, that it revolves in itselt, and thus revolvm* r be ,r all to live a wise and iiitcllci tiial hie. Ilcnce, it Is inline.liatt ly evident, that the conversion to itself, is the knowledge of itself, ami of every tiling in, prior to, ami proceeding troin itself. Fur all knowledge is a conversion to the object of knowledge, and an alliance and adaptation to it. .lnd on this account also, truth is an agreement of that which knows tilth the thing known. Since however, con¬ version or regression is two-fold, the one r* turning as to the good, but the other as to being, hence the vital conversion of all things is directed to the good, but the gnostic to biiug. Hence loo, the forint r win n converted, is said to have the good, but the latter to have being. 1 he appri /tension of truth also, is the comprihension of bung, whether existing in that by which it is apprehended, or prior to, or posterior to it. This therefore, as 1 have said, becomes evident to us from these tilings.

‘ Far w,,cf ru> o\\u. ill tills plate, rtatf tuv uWv*.

HOOK III ]

TIM XUS OF PLATO.

14 !)