The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor

2 je. To the region of ideas, and an intelligible nature,

3 For θερῴηχόνσα here, read θερμὴ ψυχώνσα.

p. 519

exhibiting the union of the universe. For by always making diviner to be more comprelensive than less excellent natures, he causes the world to become one ; but through the forms in each he manifests in the one composition, but in the other demiurgic art.

“Tn order that itmight become most beautiful according to nature, and the most excellent work.”

In what is here said, Timeus recurs to the principle from which all the beforementioned particulars were deduced. For the world has arrangement on aecount of soul, soul subsists on account of intellect, but intellect: proceeds into the universe on account of intelligible beauty, and the world participates of this in order that it may also participate of the one ; and this is the end to it of its composition, that it may be rendered most beautiful and the best. But it becomes most beautiful indeed, on account of the beautifying cause which subsists in the intelligible, but the best, or most excellent, on account of the fountain of good. For the good is the most excellent of all things. And through all these, the world becomes most similar to the Demiurgus. For he was called by Timaus most excellent. IIe however, is the best of demiurgic causes, just as the good is simply most excellent, existing beyond all the divine causes. But the world is the most excellent work, for itis a fabrication. Vor here also the world participates of deity ; since the goodness which is above intellect is deity ; and on this account the world ts denominated most excellent. In an admirable manner Plato likewise, does not -peak of the deity of the world in the same way as concerning intellect and soul, viz. as acceding after intellect. For the union of intellect with its proper deity is ineflable, and itellect itself being divine proceeds from the father, which also is the peculiarity of total production. For as intellect indeed, it derives its subsistence from the total fabrication, but as a divine intellect, from deity.’ Plato therefore, does not make a division into deity and intellect, in consequence of constituting the intellect of the world from the father. What however, is the ~ meaning here of according to nature? Perhaps this is significant of order, according to which the universe is likewise enabled to participate of divine beauty ; and therefore will be the same with according to order. Perhaps also it manifests to us, that

* Instead of axo rns odns hicre, I read axorys Ocoryros.

Tim. Plat. Vou. 1, +e ξ ;

Perhaps also it manifests to us, that

* Instead of axo rns odns hicre, I read axorys Ocoryros.

Tim. Plat. Vou. 1, +e ξ ;

the Demiurgus makes by his very being, and produces both intellect and soul from his essence. And it is not improbable that it is used, because this fabrication, the universe, is complicated with nature, and the most beautiful here is not of such a kind as that which 15. better than nature ; but that which is above nature, is as it were mingled with nature, and intellectual with physical entities.

‘Thus therefore, it is necessary to say, according to assimilative reasoning, that this world was gencrated an animal, possessing in trath for reality) soul and intellect through the providence of God.”

As the world itself is mingled, being composed of images and divine essences, of physical and supernatural things, thus also Plato calls the discussion of it assimilative, and again truth. For according to that which is moved in a confused and disorderly manner, it requires assimilative reasoning, but according to the intellectual essence which is init, it requires truth, and also according to the divine cause from which it proceeds. Hence Plato, when about to speak concerning the world adds the word assiuilative, or probable, but the word truth, when about to speak concerning the providence of divinity, Farther still, you may perceive both assimilation and trathin the speaker himself; not only dividing these conformably to the nature of things. For he frequently apprehends the fubrication of things in a partible manner, assuming reasonings, divisions and compositions, though all things subsist at once in divine production, And frequently, ᾿ he recurs to the whole intelligence of the father, asin the axioms, ‘de was good,” and “it netther was nor will be lawful for that which is most excellent to effect any thing else than that which is most beautiful.” Vor in the former of these his apprehension is assimilative [but in the latter, comes into contact with truth). For from the multiform knowledges that are in us, he indicates what pertains to divine and demiurgic intelligence. But how, say they, dues he detine the universe to be an animal animated, or possessing soul, and endued with intellect ; for it seems indeed, that ἀνέρα is a certain part, but anated agenus? In answer to this, it is necessary to recall to our memory those Platonists who say, that animal extends as far as to plants themselves, and to sce how, according to. this ductrines every thing animated is an animal, but not every animal is animated. For intelligible animal is beyond the causes of soul. For as Plato calls the rational soul an aninal! but also arranges lite after the rational soul, he very pro-

* Zwov is omitted here in the original, aaa ee a Sea ita renner ieee

ROOK 11. ΤΙΜ δ OF PLATO, 347

For intelligible animal is beyond the causes of soul. For as Plato calls the rational soul an aninal! but also arranges lite after the rational soul, he very pro-

* Zwov is omitted here in the original, aaa ee a Sea ita renner ieeeROOK 11. ΤΙΜ δ OF PLATO, 347 perly denominates every thing animated an animal, but not vice versa. If however, this be the case, having said that the world is an animal, since there is an intelligible animal, and also a sensible animal participating of a rational soul, he properly adds, that itis animated. And since of souls, one kind is endued with intellect, but another is deprived of it, in addition to the universe being animated, he likewise asserts that it possesses intellect. For it seems, that animal indeed, accedes from the first intelligible," and thus also from the intelligible father, who is prior to the intellectual Gods. But the animated accedes from the middle cause, both the triadic and the hebdomadic.’ And the possession of intellect accedes from the intellectual father Jupiter]. For if you survey these as with “reference to the Demiurgus alone, according to the paradigm which is in’ him, the universe is rendered an animal; but according to his royal soul, animated ; and according to his royal intellect, endued with intellect. All these however, Plato comprehends unitedly in the words, “ through the providence of God.” For from thence the universe is rendered an animal, anda blessed God,‘ becoming perfect through the providence of divinity. You may also sce how the discourse proceeds from goodness through will, and ends in providence. For will indeed, is suspended from goodness, and providence from will. And the universe is generated, on account of the providence, the will, and the goodness of the father ; the last of these being essence prior to essence [i. e. being superessential essence], the second, being as it were power prior to powers, and the first, energy prior to energies, Tor these pertain to the Gods so far as they are Gods. For goodness indeed is unific of essence, and is the flower of it ; but willis the measure of power ; and providence is an energy prior to intellect. For this I think, the very name itself manifests... We therefore thus distinguish animal and animated.

lamblichus however, arranges animal, with every thing that has life, but animafed, with the peculiar participation of souls. And perhaps he also, through the

‘i.e. Fromro er ov, or from being characterized by the one, and which is the summit of the intelligible order.

* ice. From animal itself or Phanes, the extremity of the intelligible order.

dice. The animated accedes from the life, which is in the order called intelligible, and at the same lime intellectual, and also from the life which is in the intellectual order, which life is the middle cause ia both these orders.

* For καὶ δαιίμὼν in this place, read ευδαιμων.