The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor

For the works of a rightly instituted city, are the third from the paradigm of truth fi. e. of the true or intelligible polity}. Hence, wishing to remain in the second from the truth, he says, he is not able to bear thep. 53 descent to the third species of life. And an impotency of this kind is an abundance of power. For to be able to abide in paradigms, is eflected through power which ts transcendent. You may likewise see how this accords with what has been before said by us respecting the analogy of these things to wholes. For the second fabrication ts assimilated: to the first, and on this account is proximate to it. For the whole demiurgic series is one, possessing union together with separation. Very properly, therefore, is Socrates precedaneously extended to Critias and Hermocrates, and he rightly thinks it fit that they should weave together the particulars that are next in order, For Timaus is about to deliver these things in a more universal and elevated manner, and not through images, in consequence of directly preserving his analogy to the Demiurgus of wholes, who paints the heavens with the dodecahedron, but generation with appropriate figures.

Indeed, that I should be incapable of such an undertaking is not wondertul, since the same inbecility seems to have attended poets, both of the pastand presentage. Not that [ despise the poetic genus; but it is pertectly evident, that the imitative tribe easily and in the best manner imitate things ino which they have been educated. But that which is foreign to the education of any one, it is difficult to imitate well in deeds, and still more dithcult in words.”

This is the third of the before-mentioned heads of discussion, in which Socrates shows that none of the poets have been adequate to the praise of men and cities of this kind, which have casually been engaged in warlike actions. Longinus, however, and Origen, donbt, whether Plato comprehends Homer among the poets, when he says, that he has not only the same opinion of the poets then existing (for this is nothing novel), but likewise of those of former times, so that Porphyry informs us that Origen passed three whole days exclaiming, blushing and toiling, asserting that the hypothesis and the doubt were great, and being ambitious to show that the imitation in the poetry of Homer is sufficient for virtuous actions, For who speaks more magnificently than Llomer, who, representing the Gods as contending and fighting with each other, does not err in his imitation, but speaks loftily conformably to the nature of things? Porphyry, however, in reply, says, that Homer is indeed sufficient to give magnitude and elevation to the passions, and to excite actions to an imaginative bulk, but that he is not capable p. 54sS ON THE {BooK 1.

Porphyry, however, in reply, says, that Homer is indeed sufficient to give magnitude and elevation to the passions, and to excite actions to an imaginative bulk, but that he is not capable p. 54sS ON THE {BooK 1.

of delivering an impassivity which is intellectual, and which energizes according to a philosophic life. But YT should wonder if Homer is not sufficient for these things, but Critias is, or Hermocrates, and should be thought fit to speak about them. It appears, therefore, to me, that Plato divides poetry into the divinelyinspired, and the artificial, And having made this division, he refers the magnificent diction and sublimity derived from inspiration, to the Gods. For oracles in a remarkable degree possess grandeur, vehemence, and magnificence of language. But he evinces that the poetry proceeding from human art, is not adequate to the praise of the fortitude of this city, and of the great deeds of the men that are educated init. For if there is any artificial sublimity 1m some one of the poets, it has much of contrivance in it, and grandeur of diction, and makes great use of metaphors, as is the case with Antimachus. But Socrates requires a panegyrist, who exlubits in his pratse a spontaneous sublimity, and a magnificence of language, which 15 free from compulsion and pure; justas actions Cin bis Republic] have magnificence, not casually, bat adapted to the education and discipline of the men, That Socrates, however, does not reject’ the divinely-inspired poet, nor the whole of poetry, but that only which is artiticul, he manifests, PE think, when he says, “that he docs not despise the poetic genus.” The poctic genus, therefore, is divine, as he elsewhere says. But he despises the imitative species of poetry; nor yet Uns simply ; but that whieh ts nourished in depraved manners and laws. For this, in consequence of verging to things of a less excellent nature, is not naturally adapted to be imitative of more exalted manners. And thus much in answer to the doubt.

For this, in consequence of verging to things of a less excellent nature, is not naturally adapted to be imitative of more exalted manners. And thus much in answer to the doubt.

The last part, however of the words of Socrates, being ina certain respect difficult, may be rendered perspicuous as follows: But the words are, that which ts Sorcign to the education of any one, itis dificult to imitate well in deeds, and still more difficult in werds.” Por it scems to be easy to imitate words or deeds. Not a few, therefore, act suphistically, by exlibiting virtue as far as words, bat in deeds being entirely alienated from it. Willit not, therefore, be better to interpret these words thus, viz.: To suppose the most excellent education is implied in the words, that which ts foreign to the education of any one; but to assume, in decds and in words, as equivalent to, conformably to deeds, and conformably to words ; and to imifate well, as having the same meaning with fo be τε εὐ imitated 2. And thus we may collect from all these, that for that which is most excellent to be well imitated, itis difficult mdeed according to deeds, but it is still more dullicult for it to be well imitated according to words in a written work. For this is the thing

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