The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor

For a div me intellect evolves the total si palatum of them in tin* inti lligible, 1 into all tin* demiurgic multitude. And these observations indeed, arc to be assumed as i moll tries.

Jn the in \t place however, it is worth while to relate such opinions of the more ancient inti rpreters, as introduce a more iiom 1 meaning of the words of the text. Amelins therefore from these words, < speci illy constitutes a triad of demiurgic intellects ; calling the fit st that which is, from “ that which is animal but the second that uhich has, from the words “ in that, for the second is not [ideas,] fu\t they cnli r into it ; and the thud that which sees, from the word “ perceived; though Plato savs, that ideas are nt that which is animal, and does not assert, that animal itsi If is one thing, and that in w liicli the ideas of animals are contain¬ ed, another. Hence that which is, is not different from that which has, if the one is that which is animal, but the other that in which ideas subsist. Ag. in, Nume¬ rous arranges the first [find] according to that which is animal, and says that it intellectually sees lor the use of the second; but he arranges the second alter intellect, and savs that if fabricates for the use of the third ; and the third is arranged by him, according to that which energizes diaiioetically. Hut it is evident that these have certain essential diflcivnci*. Such a division, however, is n,it now made bv Plato, in wInch one thing is an inlelh < t perreiv mg intellectually, hut another an intellect energizing diaiioetically. For Plato does not divide energies coiitraiilv to the energizers; since energies proceed Irom those that « ner ,r ize. Ur rather, in divine essence's, energies concur with essences. Hut to •aiceive ilianucticalh/, and to perceive, are at present assmnul as the boundaries of //,(■ energies (svs^yr^L'trn) of the demiurgic intellect. 1 iy no nn aus therefore, ought book iv.]

‘2 >9 3book iv.]

‘2 >9 these to be contrarilv div ideal in the Demiurgus, since they concur with his hypos¬ tasis. I hose therefore, the diviuc Iaiuhlichiis has sullieieiitl y confuted, adding, that Plato doc* not make such distinctions of di\ine natures, m the Sophi^ta, Pinlehus, and Parmenides, as they speak of, hut separately discusses each of the divine orders which are there mentioned, and divides the hypotheses from each other; separately indeed discussing' the one, separately whole, and successively in a similar manner, circumscribing each hypothesis, he appropriate definitions. We however, for our design is not to confute the opinions of others, remind ourselves, that the tilings proposed to lie considered are, what the one in¬ telligible paradigm is, who the whole Pemiurgiis is, and what the union is of both. I,et us therefore see, how, in what follows, the multitude of paradigms, and the many fabrications of things, are delivered.

“ lint these ideas are four ; one indeed, being the genus of the celestial Clods; another of winged, and air-wandering animals; the third, being the aquatic species; and the fourth, the pedestrinus and terrene.”

As in the d. miurgie intelligence itself, a monad is the leader of the inti Ih-clual multitude, and as in the paradigm, uiiical form has a subsistence prior to nntnher, thus also discourse, which is the interpreter of divine concerns, adumbrating the nature of the things of which it is the messenger, first assumes the whole object of know ledge colli etively, and according to an enthusiastic conception ; hut after¬ wards unfolds that which was conglomerated, and develops the* one intellection, through words. It also divides that which is united, according to this nature of the things, at one lime, explaining their union, but at another, their separation. I ; or it is not naturally adapted, nor is it possible for it, to comprehend both of tlies,* at once. r I he discourse of Plato also, being thus afleeted, first in a divinely inspired manner, unfolds into light the w hole nuinher of intelligible ideas, and alter wards, distr$tinli-s into parts, tin* progressions which this number contains, for there the intelligible multitude shines forth, win re there are the first monads ot ideas. And that this indeed is the custom of Plato, we have before .shown in many instances, as in, “ it uas generated," “ he was good," “ one" and in all the before-mentioned examples.

Betaking curselves however, from words to things, let us consider in the first place, what the tetrad itself of ideas is, and whence this uuinlter is derived ; ami in the next place, what the four ideas are, and how they subsist in animal itself, whether the all-perfectness of it derives its completion through them, or whether