The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor

‘There is therefore a denuargic cause of the universe, [fthere isa Demiurgus, there is also a paradigm of the world, with reference to which he who constituted the universe fabricated. And thus in a consequent

’ For ov here, itis obviously necessary to read er,

* φανερὸν is omitted in the original.

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order the discussion about these things is introduced, and the physical theory beautifully terminates for us in theology.

* What that is which is always being, but is without generation, and what that is which is generated indeed, [or consists in becoming to be]

but is never [real] being.”

According to some, all beings whatever, whether they subsist paradigmatically or iconically, are comprehended in this distinction ; but not all beings according to others, And the interpreters contradict each other respecting this, not a little. We however, cannot know which of these assertions it is fit to adopt, unless we examine each of them by itself, Let us then consider from the beginning, what power each of the words fof Plato] possesses in itself.

In the first place, therefore, τὸ τι, or the what is definitive. For we are accustomed to give rs an antecedent arrangement in definitions. But it is not a genus, as the Platonic Severus thought it was, who says that ro τί is the genus of being and that which is generated; and that the all is signified by it. For thus that which is generated, and likewise perpetual being, will be all. It was also doubted by some that preceded us, why Plato did not demonstrate ἐλ αν there is such a thing as perpetual being, prior to the inquiry what it is. For whence is the subsistence of perpetual being evident? And it is the law in demonstrative discussions, to consider if a thing is previous to the investigation, what itis. In answer to this doubt it may be said, that perhaps Timeus did not think this was requisite to his purpose; as the day before, it was shown by Socrates in what he said about the soul, that the soul is unbegotten and incorruptible, and that it philosephises through its alliance to real beings, with which it comes into contact.

And likewise, as it was shown by him, that what is perfectly being, and tmily the object of science, is one thing; that what is partly being, and partly non-being, is another, and on this account is of a doxastic nature; and that what in no respect is being, and is entirely unknown, is another. This was also granted to Timwus by Socrates, when he divides a line into four parts, the intelligible, the dianoetic, the sensible, and the conjectural; where likewise speaking about the good he says, that it reigns in the intelligible place, in the same manner as the sun in the visible region." And farther still, the introduction of prayer previous to the discussion, is a demonstration of the existence of being which always is. For if

* See the latter end of the 6th book of the Republic, where all this is asserted,

For if

* See the latter end of the 6th book of the Republic, where all this is asserted,

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“ there are Gods, it is necessary that there should be truly existing being: for this is united to the Gods; but not that which is generated and which perishes, but is never ¢ruly being. Or rather prior to these things it may be said, that the existence of something which always is, is deposited in our common conceptions. For whence was that which is generated produced except from perpetual being? For if this also was generated, it must have been venerated from some other being. And this must either be perpetual being, or must likewise have been itself generated. So that we must either proceed to infinity, or generation 1s In acircle, or perpetual being has a subsistence. But it isnot lawful to proceed to infinity. For from one principle which is te one, all things originate. Nor is generation in a circle, lest the same things should be both better and worse, causes and eiects. Hence it remains that (true) being always is. Why then, it may be said, is not generation from the one? Because, we reply, itis absurd that multitude should be entirely produced without being. Itis necessary therefore, that there should be truly existing being, which primarily proceeds from ¢he one, in order that the first principle may not be alone the cause of the last of things, but prior to these may be the cause of being, from which also generation proceeds. After all that has been said, however, the most true solution of the doubt 15, that Plato now assuming as an hypothesis that there is perpetual being, defines it. But after the discussion about the fabrication of the world, resuming this very thing, he demonstrates that perpetual being has a subsistence. Preserving however, what pertains to physiology, he proceeds from this hypothesis, and demonstrates such things as are consequent to it. For science itself also is from hypothesis, and requires that hypotheses should be assumed prior to its demonstrations. In what he says therefore about matter, he demonstrates not only that matter is, but also that being 15. But a little after, from one of the hypotheses, i. e. from the third, demonstrating that there is a Demiurgus of the world, he obtains also from this that perpetual being subsists prior to that which is generated. And again from the fourth hypothesis he evinces, that the Demiurgus fabricated the universe, looking to an eternal paradigm. But in the place we have mentioned, be demonstrates that perpetual being is itself by itself prior to generated natures. And thus much for this particular.

And again from the fourth hypothesis he evinces, that the Demiurgus fabricated the universe, looking to an eternal paradigm. But in the place we have mentioned, be demonstrates that perpetual being is itself by itself prior to generated natures. And thus much for this particular.

With respect however, to. perpetual being itself, whether does it signify the whole intelligible world, or the Demiurgus, or the paradigm of the universe? for it is diflurently assumed by different interpreters. And if indeed, it is the whole intelligible world, whence does the intelligible breadth begin, and where does it

μονρ γα ρα τον

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