The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor

It must now howeve r be* shown vv hat each of these i-, and m a manner most eouformahle to the doctrine ol IMato.

Aristotle inch e*d, admitting time* to lie the* numbe r of motion, asserts that it is c o, not according to that which numb* rs, but according to that whic h is numbered. Hence, he very properly inepiires what that is which muuls rs it, it time is that which is numlx reel. For the se are* relatives, and tin* one e xisting, the other also exists. He solves the itupiiry however weakly, by saying that it is a certain soul w'hich numbers time.* lmr it is lie e e-ssary, that prior to pe rpetual number, tlie re* should lie a perpetual nume rator, in order that lie* may always produce, that which is generated always existing. Admitting these lore time* to lie the* number of motion, lie also *,un that eternity is intelligible, deriving its app< lketion from exist¬ ing always, and possessing and comprehending the whole ot time. Hence also lie says, the existence and life of all things are suspended from this, of some things more obscurely, hut of others more clearly. It is necessary however at present, that we should particularly see what eternity and tune* are* according to Plato, anil that we should not admit the* image eif time to !r* time alone, nor eternity to be simply a certain intelligible (Jod, but in the first place show, in what order of the

* For ft tw urripvy in tin) place, it is necessary to read >) »*■' uxetpiy.

’ In defence of Vristotle however, il ruav be said, that when lit assert) that II i) a certain soul which numbers time, lie tines not speak of tune according to its hrsf subsistence, hut llie tune which is parti¬ cipated bv material natures, and of which, tlie multitude, as i’rotrlus observes. Lave a conce ption, dint co-seiisalion.

lllHIK |\.]

TIM/El S OF PLATO

Ift3

intelligible* it sulisiste. For this is t specially the peculiarity of the science of Plato.

Lave a conce ption, dint co-seiisalion.

lllHIK |\.]

TIM/El S OF PLATO

Ift3

intelligible* it sulisiste. For this is t specially the peculiarity of the science of Plato.

It is manifest then to every' one, that eternity is more venerable, primordial, and as it were more stable than animal itself, though animal itself is the most beautiful, and most perfect of intelligible animals, as Plato lias Indore said. For if the eternal is said to be, and is eternal as participating [of eternity.] but eternity is not said to participate of animal itself, nor to receoe its appellation from it, it is evident that the former is secondary, but the latter more simple and more primary. For eternity neither participates of animal itself, liecause it is not an animal; for neither is time a visible animal; nor is it any other animal. For it has been demonstrated that animal itself is niily-ljcgnttcn and eternal, because eternity is more excellent. For the eternal is neither that which eternity is, nor is more excellent than eternity. lint as we all say that the participant of intellect, and the animated, are posterior to intel¬ lect and soul, so likewise the eternal is secondary to eternity'. W hat then some one may say% will eternity l>c f if it is more venerable than animal itself, which is said to be the most beautiful of intrliigibles, -and iu every respect perfet t 1 May it not he said, that it is especially most beautiful, in consequence of receiv¬ ing the summit of beauty, on account of excessive participation, but that it does not receive the summit of the good ; for it is not said to be most excellent. So that it may be subordinate to that which is ihe best. To which may lie added, that it is not simply the most beautiful of all inlelligibles, but of intelligible animals. Hence eternity* is no animal, but if it is life, it is infinite lif*. In the next place, it is not necessary that what is in every respect perfect should be the first. For the perfect has all things, so that it has things first, middle, and last. But that which is above this division \vill he super-perfect. Hence nothing prevents eternity from being superior to the animal which is the most Ireautiful of all intelligible animals, and is in every respect jtcrfect, if eternity is most excellent and super-perfect. Fartlu r si ill, animal itself lias not* an arrangement prior to the multitude of intelligible animals. On tins account therefore, l’lato says, “ F«r to that "a Inch ts the most bcautijul of intelligibles anil in even/ respect perfect .” But eternity is prior to the multitude of intelligible animals. For these are eternal; but eternal natures participate of eternity, which is not co¬ arranged with the multitude of them, and lias rather an arrangement contrary to them. For it unites multitude, and is said to abide in one, as Itcing void of mul-

1 There u an omiMion in the onpnal iu llui place of o m«r. ’ O* m omitted here in the original.

For it unites multitude, and is said to abide in one, as Itcing void of mul-

1 There u an omiMion in the onpnal iu llui place of o m«r. ’ O* m omitted here in the original.

lMtm ix’s on Tin-:

[book iv.

p. 1114

,i,Animal itself however, comprehends all such animals as are intelligible ; on hit'll account also, it ts in want of eternity, in order that it may parti* ipate through it, of union, containing power, and a firm and immutable life. lienee too. lie that it is eternal, yet does not add, that it has multitude in its, If, hut r^ieaks of it in tin- singular numher ; signifying that union is especially present „iti, ,t from eternity, so that the whole essence of intelligible animals shines forth .is one nature, on account ol eternity.

If therefore, these things are rightly asserted, eternity will not In- one certain