The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor

What therefore can he make more divine than the universe? For he will not make any thing of a less excellent nature, when looking to that which is more excellent. Very properly therefore, does Plato when investizating the paradigmatic principle of the world, recur to all-perfect animal,

What then, some one may say, are not the sun and moon and each of the stars beautiful? But how is this possible? For each of these is assimilated to a partial animal. To this we reply, that each of these is beautiful, when surveyed in conjunction with the whole, and co-arranged with the whole: just as the eye and the chin are beautiful, in conjunction with the whole face, and while in the whole ; but surveyed by themselves apart from the face, do not extibit the beauty which is adapted to them. For in subsisting as a part and not as a whole, cach when essentially divulsed fromthe whole, sutters a diminution of its own proper beauty. The pertect therefore, and the beautiful are present with these which are parts, on account of the whole. ‘The cause, however, of this, says Porphyry 15, that in intelligible forms the part isa whole.t | For all such things are in each partially, as are in the whole all-perfectly, on account of the union of intelligible forms. And the asseruon is indeed true, that each of the parts in them is in a certain respect a whole, each receiving the form of whole, and becoming essentially united on account of its Communicating with all, and being all things according to participation. Nevertheless the wholeness of it subsists partially, and not like that wholeness which is simply a whole. For itis one thing to be alter a solar manner a whole, or to be so after a lunar manner, in consequence of cach.

* Instead of ro cNoy μέρὺς ἐστιν, it is necessary to read ro pepos ὑλὺν Core.

-- -τοτοτεςσσ σα καιοαταξυς

BOOK I] TIMMUS OF PLATO. 357

For itis one thing to be alter a solar manner a whole, or to be so after a lunar manner, in consequence of cach.

* Instead of ro cNoy μέρὺς ἐστιν, it is necessary to read ro pepos ὑλὺν Core.

-- -τοτοτεςσσ σα καιοαταξυς

BOOK I] TIMMUS OF PLATO. 357

intellect possessing all things ina way adapted to itself, one form having dominion, which makes the intellect to be such an intellect, and a certain intellect; and another thing to be all things, without a partial peculiarity, being all things so far asintellect, and not so far asa particular kind of intellect. What) then, are not these also generated according to intelligible paradigms, viz. the san and moon and each of the stars? How therefore, are these beautitul? To this we reply, that these are beautiful, but not most beautiful. Butthe world is that which is truly most beautifal. As therefore each of these is perfect, but not all-perfect, so likewise each is beautifal, but not ke the universe most beautiful. For that each of these is perfect, Plato manifests farther on, when he says, “ that the world was generated perfect from things perfect, anda whole framwholes.” Uence the perfection of the whole is one thing, and ofthe part another. And the wholeness of the all-perfect is different from the wholeness of that which is only perfect. The beauty likewise which is in the most beautiful is one thing, but that which receives a more partial partictpation of beauty, is another. And thus much in answer to this doubt.

And the wholeness of the all-perfect is different from the wholeness of that which is only perfect. The beauty likewise which is in the most beautiful is one thing, but that which receives a more partial partictpation of beauty, is another. And thus much in answer to this doubt.

The words however, {in the form of a part,” may be easily understood, if they are considered as signifying the same as, in the order of a part. And this is the same with, fecoming a part. But the divine Tamblichas thinks fit to add the conjunction «sto the words inthe form, and to understand the whole as implying that every partial animal in intelligibles, naturally exists as in the form of a part. For since part in them is not such as it is in sensibles 3 since each is there according to its own order all such things as the whole is; on this account the philosopher adds, asin the form, in order that surveying the appellation of part ina manner adapted to forms, we may not understand it as a thing attended with interval, and susceptible of division, and thus relinquish the union of united and impartible essences. For these according to the philosopher himself are impartible and united. But with respect to the word “ naturally,” we wust not now understand by it according to nature, but the being cssentalized. For all essences ure Sroquently called natures, as by Socrates in the Philebus, when he says,“ hence, in the nature of Jupiter you may say, that there isa royal soul, and a royal intellect, according to the reason of cause.” But the words, “ he thought it would be adequate touts divnity,’ are said as if spoken in conjunction with the Demiurgus, and as truly apprehending the dignity of a divine cause. For he who mystically narrates the evempt and all-perfect intellectual conceptions of a divine nature, has an arrangement in conjunction with him. And the words, “ for that which is similar to an imperfect thing can never be beautiful,” is indeed true, but is attended with a doubt.

358 PROCLUs ON THE [BOOK II,