The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor

1-'or how i> [real] Iwing unhegotien, except I»y Inn ini; tin* infinite power of existing:, al onrt* wholly present ? And how i> hmlv generated, except by having infinite power always flowing into it, in consefjuenre of not being aide to receive the whole of it at once?

r l lie Mini therefore, as Iwing incorporeal indeed, has through its< If an infinite power of existing, not being generated according to the whole of itself, hut immortal; hut according to its parts, it is always generated to infinity. For if it iiad the same total infinity always present, there would he the same inlinitv of the whole and the part, of the perfect and the imperfect, of that which contains and ol that which is contained. Jiut this is impossible. Moreover, neither can the whole o| it always he hi generation, or heroming to he, hut a part of it lie eternal bring, lest the parts should he better than the whole. 11 cure rice versa, the whole /■' infinite bung, but the purl becoming (a be. So that the lixpo^tasis of it possesses infinite power, aud is venerated to infinity ; and tints at one and the same time, it participates of hein^, and is the first of generated natures, body * both in the whole and in the parts of it being in generation. It is not therefore siiflicir lit to say that it is generated, in consequence of energizing partiblv. hut it is requisite to see how this pre-e\i>tent in the very being of the soul. 1 or every energy which is according to nature, has an essence which antecedently assumes the cause ol the energy ; so that the soul likewise pre-assumes the seed of a hte which is according to time, aud which is common to every soul. For it is neces¬ sary that this also should he generated, and not finite be. If however this be the case, si net the soul pnssisscs being according to (he whole, it has to be generated in its parts. Aud how this is true we have shown. And thus much may suffice con¬ cerning the middle of the soul.

I^‘t also the inti-lligihle breadth, the psychical multitude, and the sensible nature, he separate trom each other; and let the last of things he suspended from those that rank as media, and the media from those that are the first. Ia‘t the soul likewise, lie tie* one bond of beings, subsisting in them. For the one also hinds all things, hut ill an exempt manner. For all things are united to each other as homogeneous, and as being derived from one cause, anil extended to

1 II bHore ilfiuoiislnilrit licit the mmiI, iii €<*UMr<| insure of bring self-motive, produces itself, and iv without "enrralmn; hut in coioei) uence of alwnvs receiving essence and lilt irotn the natures superior lo ilv-lf, it is always becoming to he essence and life, aud is always generated.

* For mi trufinret here, read rov wparor.

Tim. Plat. Vol. II.

I)

p. 26

PROCLUS ON TIIK

[BOOK III.

one object of desire. Hut the soul likewise binds beings, as existing in them. And as in analogy, the middle [lertains to the things that are hound, thus too, the soul must Ik* admitted to lie the middle of lsiugs, binding and at the same time lieing hound as being of a self-motive nature.

These things being discussed, it i' necessary in the next place to show, how, and from what genera this soul, which contains the bond of beings, subsists. Ihit it is more necessary to speak first about the genera themselves, what they are, whence they proceed, and how. For it is requisite to know wholes prior to parts. This therefore, is the fourth of I he things proposed, and we shall discuss it to the utmost ot our ability. That the tnt< lligihle world therefore, coiupn h< mis the causes of secotidarv natures, and that .ill tonus are there, intelligibly or intel¬ lectually, or in whatever way you may he willing to call them, lor they subsist ill both wavs, has been ih inonstratecl in many treatises, and will lie ih moiistrated by Plato in what follows. Of forms themselves however, some are most total, and extend to every thing. Others ire most partial, and are as it were atomic forms. ,\nd ollu rs siihsist hi tween these, extending to many, but not to nil things; as the plena guest or stranger likewise shows in the Soplusta. lor mail is Iroui man itselt, and horse is Iroiu horse itsi it l>ut the sum u "ha s is in men and horses, and in many other things, is Irom similitude itself; and m like manner the dissimilar. Dillerenei*, and sameness however, vvlueh me m all Iwings, are from the sameness and ditlennee which are there Hence some things are from atoime forms, otla rs Iroiu middle, and others trom the most total forms; since also of the sciences which me hi us, same look to one scnuliju object, as medicine to health, hut othii's extend to many, as ant him lie to philosophy, to polities, to the teetonu science, and to main / ot hit's. And this is not only the ease utth arithmetic, hut also with the nnasuninf science, and tilth statics, l'ur Plato says, that uthcr all ot some of the fiihriaiticc arts, regime the assistance oj these, and without these have no accuracy, lint others look to all the aits, and not to those that arefahricatire alone , but to such also as contribute to the contemplative sciences, ax is the case with the dmdtuy ait, as Socrates says in the Plnlehiis. As therefore in the st a net s there are some that are most total, so m inti lligible causes, some are most partial, so tar ns the [initial is III them, and are the leadeis of appropriate numbers ot similar tonus; but others are widely extended, such as the equal, the similar, and the whole: lor whole so lur as whole is not common to all tilings ; since a part, so far as it is a part, is not a whole. < Min is hovvi ver, extend to all things, of w hu h all beings purtu ipate, >o t tr as they are l>eiiigs,and not so far as thev are hv mg,or animated,or possess some other peculiarity ,hut accoiding to the appellation of being. For since being is the fust [ot intclligiblesjt he eaiises also of exist! nee vv ill leave the most total order in the genera ot being. Hut these genera

For since being is the fust [ot intclligiblesjt he eaiises also of exist! nee vv ill leave the most total order in the genera ot being. Hut these genera

ROOK in ]

TIM/'EUS OF IM.ATO.

p. 27

are five in numlter. viz. essence, sameness, difference, motion, and permanency, For every bring i*' essmtialized, united to itself, and separated from itself and from other things, pror eeds from itself and its proper principle, and participates of a certain fpiiel and jiermauency, so tar as it preserves its own proper form. Whe¬ ther therefore, there is an intelligible, or sensible, or middle genus of things, it consists of these ; since all things are from these. For all tilings do nut live, nor are all things vv holes, or parts, or animated; but of these genera all things parti¬ cipate. And with whatever tiling essence is not present, neither will the other genera be present: for they subsist about essence. Sami ness also not existing the whole will he dissipated. \nd the ditference of one tiling from another being' abolished, there will only be one thing, and that void of multitude. Motion like- \ wise not existing, things would Im* unenergetie and dead. And without * perinanem y they would Im' unstable, and immediately hurried away to non entity. Hence, it is necessary that in ail things there should be each of these, ami that essence should subsist as the first of them, this lieing as it were the Vesta and monad of the genera, and hav ing an arrangement analogous to the one. lint alter this it is necessary that samenessanddiflereiice should subsist, the formerlreinganalogous to bound, but the latter to infinity. Anil in a similar manner it is reipiisile that there should be permanency and motion, the former being especially seen about the powers of beings, but the latter about their energies. For every ’ In'ing, so far as being participates after a manner of a certain essence, as it is written in the Sophista, and in the Parmenides. But every essential po.ver is either under sameness, or under diflercnce, or under both; heat indeed, and every separative power, being under ditference, but cold and every collective power, under same¬ ness. And whatever [tower is a medium between these, Wing under Iroth. For every energy [is either motion or permanency, or is m a certain rrs|»ect both these. For the energy of intellect,] 1 and every energy w hich preserves in the same condition that which energizes, or is that about which it energizes, is rather per¬ manency than motion. But the energy of bodies on each other, is a motion which does not sulfur them to remain in the same condition, but removes them from the state in which they are. And the energy which changes the subject of its energy in the same and about the same, is a stable motion. Every Iveing therefore, participates by its very existence of this triad, viz. of essence, jvovver and energy, on account of these five genera, and also is, possesses capability and