The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor

And the last of things proceed ' indeed into existence from amore excellent cause, but are not. self-subsistent. It is not however yet time for these observations.

But with respect to perpetual being, it must not be supposed, that it is partly being, and partly non-being ; for if it were, it would be a composite, and consisting of things of this kind, it would be dissimilarly a composite. Nor is it at one time being, and at another non-being ; for itis said to be advays being. But it is simply and eternally being, and is unmingled with every thing whatever it may be, thatis of a contrary nature, For it appears to me that the addition of the words, “ but not having generation,” indicates the unmingled and undefiled purity of perpetual being, according to which it is exempt from every hypostasis which is borne along in the images of being, and is changed by time. Not as some assert, that perpetual being is said, for the sake of perspicuity, to be without generation ; nor according to others, that Plato was willing to speak of it both affirmatively and negatively ; but that it is necessary perpetual being should be intellectually perceived subsisting by itself, remote from al! temporal mutation. For soul

* For wapeco: in this place, it is requisite to read xpoecm.

p. 198

temporal mutation. For soul

* For wapeco: in this place, it is requisite to read xpoecm.

p. 198

participates of time, and the heavens are allotted a life which is evolved accoding to time; but the intelligible nature alone is, according to the whole of itself, eternal. Hence, some of the ancients call the intelligible breadth truly existing being; the psychical truly evisting and at the same time not truly evisting being ;* the sensible not truly existing being ; and matter, truly non-being. After what manner, however, they made this arrangement, we shall elsewhere investigate. But that the addition of “ sot having veneration,’ is for the sake of indicating the separate essence of perpetual being, is 1 think evident from what has been said. > Inthe next place, with respect to that which is generated, whether does 1 signify the whole world, or a material and perfectly mutable composition? For some of the ancients explain this in one way, and others in another. But we understand by it every corporeal formed nature, and not the soul of the universe 5 so faras this nature is of itself indeed unadorned, but is always or at a certain time, arranged by another. For the soul of the universe ts, in acertain respect, perpetual being. Much less is intelleet that which is generated: for this ts immediately perpetaal being. But body alone is that which is generated, and is truly never real being. For body is always in) want of the world-producing cause, and is always deriving from it the representation of existence. Why then it may be said, did not Plato add, always, and that which is generated, in the same manner as dei, or at a certain time, in order that he might have whatts generated entirely opposed to perpetual being? May we not say that Plato devised this mode of expression, Jooking to the various nature of that which is) generated, and taking away from eternal being the existence ata certain time, and the perpetuity ofa generated nature? Lor the wholes of such a nature are generated always, but the parts ata certain time, Aud atter another manner of considermg the ΠῚ with respect to forms, seine are inseparable from matter, and are always generated from that whichis truly always ybut others are in time, and depart from matter. Lor corporicty, indecd, is aleays generated and its always about matter ; but the form of pure, or of air, enters tntoand departs from matter, becommg separated from it and perishing, through the domination of a contrary nature, Vout ifthe perpetuity which detams matter is always generated, it never therefore is ; and if the existence ata certain time is generated, it ts never being, νοῦν thing sary to read ores καὶ μὰ cvs orrws or.

* After ovrws pew ον καλευσιν τὸ γεητυν πλατοι, instead Of Cua οὐτῶν δε cy τὸ ἐυχίκον, it ts neces:

SSE EA a

p. 197

SSE EA a

p. 197

however, which is generated, is either always generated, or at a certain time. Hence, every thing which is generated, is never {real} being.

These things, therefore, having been said, let us, recurring to the discussion from the beginning, show whether perpetual being in this place is asserted of all. beings, or not ofall. For if, indeed, we admit that perpetual being indicates an eternal nature alone, having the eternal according to the whole of itself, it is not asserted of all bings. For neither the being prior to eternity, nor the order of eternity, nor again, such things as have indeed an eternal essence, but produce energies according to time, ean be arranged under this being. But if we assume every thing whatever that is eternal, and which always is, either according to the whole | of itself, or partially, then soul also ranks among eternal natures, and also that / Which contains in itselfthe causes ofall things, unically, as itis said, and universally. For the ease is as follows: one thing (i.e. being itself] is super-eternal ; (another thing is eternity 3") another is simply eternal, and another is in a certain respect eternal, With respect, however, to each of these perpetual beings, the first is as the power and fountain of the ever ; the second, as that which is primarily always being, and the ever tse/f, and not according to participation ; but the third is always, as participating of the ecer, and as primarily wholly eternal; and the fourth, is as that which in a certain respect participates of a peculiarity of this hind, For each thing subsists triply, either according to cause, or according to hyparnis, or according to participation. And the one being, indeed, is being alone according to hyparxis, but is perpetual being according to cause. Eternity is perpetual being according to hyparxis, but: δοίη, according to participation. And the eternal is perpetual beng according to participation, but according to hyparxis isa certain other intelligible, or intelligible and intellectual, or intellectual fonly). And if the last of these, it is either total or partial; and if this, it is either supermundane or mundane, and if this, itis ether divine, or is posterior to the Gods, and is each of these either according to existence alone, or according to power and energy, and as far as to the perpetual being of things which are in a certain respect eternal,

Again therefore, with respect to that which is generated, if we assume the universal, we must assume generation all-variously changed τ but ifevery thing generated, in whatever way it may be, we shall find that the heavens also are gene. rated, so far as they partake of motion and mutation, and that soul is the first of generated natures, so far as it ives in time, and time is connascent with its ener-

" The words ro δε aw», are wanting in the original, but must necessaiily be supplied.