The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor
The text is shown on its own: no facing layer is held for this issue.
It is necessary therefore that it should not always Je, but should always be generated, or becoming to be, receiving as much as possible a flowing existence.
Being, therefore, as 1 have said, and perpetual being, manifest the eternal. But “ that which was generated,” signifies the being allotted an hypostasis, measured by time, such as is a sensible nature, which also 1s apprehended by opinion in conjunction with sense. It has however been already said by us, that the intelligible is sclf-subsistent and eternal; but that the sensible nature is produced by something different from itself, and is con-subsistent with time. For the eternal in number is one thing, and the temporal another. And the former is in number,
BOOK 11. TIM.TUS OF PLATO. 935
but the latter iy generated in number. For to the former eternity is conjoined, but to the latter time. That which is generated likewise, thouch it is said to be perpetual, has an hypostasis co-extended with ali time, and which is always generated, and always adorned by its producing cause. If therefore, perpetual being manifests the eternal, but that which has a principle of generation signifies that which is produced by another cause ; for such is that which is always generated ; but Plato always inquires, whether the world always was, or has the principle of acertain generation ;—this being the case, an inquiry of this kind will be the same asx an investigation. whether the world belongs to eternal natures, or to things which are generated according to the whole of time; and whether it belongs to self-subsistent natures, or to things which are adorned by another cause, whether the world belongs to eternal natures, or to things which are generated according to the whole of time; and whether it belongs to self-subsistent natures, or to things which are adorned by another cause,
Farther still, that which is generated belongs to things which are multifariously predicated, For this very thing which has a temporal beginning, and is so much spoken of, is called generated, whether it arrives at being through generation, or without generation, as Aristotle says. Every thing likewise which proceeds from _ a cause, is called generated, that also which is essentially a composite, and that which has a generable nature (or which is naturally capable of being generated] though itshould not have been generated 3 such asis that which has a visible nature, thoughit should not be seen. That which is generated therefore, being predicated multifariously, that which is generated according to time, has all the generations. For it proceeds from a cause, is a composite, and has a generable nature. Tt does not, however, entircly follow that what is generated after another manner, has all the generations. [If therefore Plato had inquired whether the universe has all the gencrations,} or not all," we should say that he investigated whether itis generated according to time, or has not a temporal principle of generation. Since, however, this is not the case, but he asks whether it has no principle whatever of generation, or has a certain principle of it, he renders it manifest to those who have the smallest degree of intelligence, that he does not doubt about its temporal beginning, but whether the universe, since there are many generations, has a certain principle of generation. For if it has no principle whatever of generation, it belongs to eternal and self-subsistent natures, in which there is not generation, because neither is there time. For though we sometimes speak of the generations of the
+ It seems that the following words are wanting in this place in the original: εἰ τοινυν ecnre 9
πλατων ποήέρον Τὸ παν πασαξέχει PAS γενεσειξ.
p. 236
For though we sometimes speak of the generations of the
+ It seems that the following words are wanting in this place in the original: εἰ τοινυν ecnre 9
πλατων ποήέρον Τὸ παν πασαξέχει PAS γενεσειξ.
p. 236
Gods, yet we say this indicating their ineffable progression, and the difference of secondary natures with reference to the causes of them. Theologists, however, previously subverting all such doubts, in order that the generations of the Gods may be rationally devised by them, call the first principle of things Time, because it is ft that where there is generation, time should precede, according to which and on account of which generation subsists. With these, therefore, cause and time are the same; since also with them progression is the same as generation. That however which is truly generated, is that which does not generate itself, but is generated by another, becomes the image of another thing, 15 composed of many dissimilar things, and always receives a renovated hypostasis; with which also time is conjoined. It Vkewise has a never-failing generation, co-extended with the infinity of time, and is always becoming to be one and the same in number, but is not one according to an eternal subsistence. But that which is. thus generated you may say proceeds from non-being. For that which is self-subsistent, being generated by itself, does not proceed from non-being. For though youmay divide it by conception into cause and effect, yet it proceeds from being. For the maker and that which is made are one, so that it proceeds from the being of itself, Hence also it: is eternal, never at any time deserting itself, But that which is alone from another thing, subsists from non-being, because it no longer is when separated from its cause; and the cause 15 different from the effect. Thus, therefore, the physical axiom δ may be adapted according to analoy to this generated nature : and that which is always generated and illuminated by being, to that which is always in time, But this is evident; forif you take away the maker, the universe is immediately imperfect ; which is likewise the case with every thing that is 51}}} generated. At one and the same time, however, the universe is generated and perfect, and is always venerated. H{ence also its pey- -petuity and its perfection, are according to the whole of time. For time was generated together with the heaven (or the universe], not a part of time, but all time: so that the heaven is generated in an infinite time, and is never-failing both with respect to beginning and end, in the same manner as time. Thus, therefore, it is also said to have a principle of generation, and to originate from a certain other principle. And in the first place, indeed, it originates as he says from the most proper principle, the final. For from this, the generating cause commences the generation of the world. In the next place, the generation of the
No commentary for this page under the selected tracks.
There is commentary on page 1.