The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor

e. to natures which ‘are similarly contused.]

* ile. The first triad of the intellicible order, which is called by Plato in the Parmenides το ¢r 11, the one being, or being characterised by, and absorbed as it were in lhc one.

p. 404

“ For the divinity wishing to assimilate this universe, in the most exquisite degree, to that which is the most beautiful, and in every respect perfect of intelligible animals, he constituted it one visible animal, containing all such things within itself, as are allied to its nature.”

Atticus, in what is here said, doubts whether the Demiurgus is comprehended by intelligible animal. For it would seem, if he were comprehended, that he is not perfect. For partial animals, he says, are imperfect, and on this account things which resemble them are not beautiful. But if he is not comprehended, animal itself will not be more comprehensive than all intelligibles. And having doubted, he easily solves the doubt, by supposing that the Demiurgus is above animal itself. On the contrary, Porphyry gives an order to the Demiurgus inferor to the intelligible. Bor establishing a supercelestial soul to be the inaker of the world, he places in intellect the paradigm of cenerated natures. Phe divine Iamblichus, as a medium between both these, connects and unites the paradigm to the Demiurzus, through the union of intellect with the intelligible, But Amelius makes the intelligible, which is detined according to being, to be the same with the Demiurgus."| We however say, that ammal itself is prior to, subsists in, and is posterior to the Demiurgus. For it proceeds to every intellectual order both total and partial, The Demiurgus himself likewise, sees himself, and the natures prior to himself: for it is not lawfal fur him to look to natures posterior to himself. Beholding therefore, Uhese superior natures, he produces all things, and makes the universe, so faras it is the universe, or the all, to be the image of the whole intelhieihle world. The Demiurzus however, is comprehended by the intelligible, accordine to the cause of the intellectual Gods which there subsist 5 not as beng a part, vrone species of it; but as a second order inthe order which is prior to it. Fora divine intellect is in one way said to be comprehensive of forms, and in another way to comprehend partial intellects. Foreach of the latter indeed, is all things ina self-perfect manner 5 but each of the former is united to other forms,” but is not all things. For each is itself preserving its own peculiarity, unmingled and unconfused. According to the same reasoning also, the intelligibles which are in intelliible intelleet, are comprehended by it in one way, but in another way the intellectual orders which proceed from it. For you may say, that each of these

' Por τῷ μὲν τὸν δημιονογον in this place, itis necessary to read ry μέντοι δημιυυργῳ.

2 Por τῶν αλλων ceo here, read τοῖς ἀλλοῖς εἰδέσιν,

For you may say, that each of these

' Por τῷ μὲν τὸν δημιονογον in this place, itis necessary to read ry μέντοι δημιυυργῳ.

2 Por τῶν αλλων ceo here, read τοῖς ἀλλοῖς εἰδέσιν,

Slant

p. 365

“being self-perfect, is comprehended in all-perfect animal. All such things therefore, as are in the paradigm, are likewise in the Demiurgus ; and in making the world with reference to the paradigm, he also makes it with reference to himself. With respect to al/ness (παντοτης) however, one is intelligible, but another intellectual. For both the tetrad and the decad contain all things in themselves; but the former unitedly, and the latter distnbutedly. The decad likewise, though it contains all such things as the tetrad contains, yet because it contains them in a more divided manner, itis more imperfect than the tetrad. For the tetrad being nearer to the monad is more perfect; and in proportion as quantity is diminished, the Inagnitude of power is increased. So that the Demiurgus possessing ἈΠῸ such things as intelligible animal possesses, yet at the same time, he has an allness inferior to that which is intelligible. In short, as comprehension is twofold, the one being such as that of parts in their wholeness, but the other, as that of effects in their causes, Plato now assumes the former of these, and says, that the genera and species ofanimals, are comprehended as parts in their whole, i. ον in animal itself ; all which likewise, he denominates imperfect, as with reference to the whole. But the Demiurgus indeed, proceeds from thence as from a cause, yet he likewise possesses all things intellectually. The Demiurgus therefore, is comprehended by intelligible animal according to the reason of cause, and is not so comprehended as a part, so as to be also imperfect. Hence likewise, Timzus in a certain respect thus speaks. For the Demiurgus has all intelligible animals comprehended in himself. For in reality, these are contained in him as parts, which remain in unproceeding union with their proper wholeness, and give completion to it, as a whole which is not prior to parts, but is from parts. And thus much in answer to the doubt.

For in reality, these are contained in him as parts, which remain in unproceeding union with their proper wholeness, and give completion to it, as a whole which is not prior to parts, but is from parts. And thus much in answer to the doubt.

In the next place, this also deserves to be surveyed, viz. in what an admirable manner Plato, at one time ina way known to us, passes from images to paradizms, and at another time, from paradigms to images; at one and the same time indicating the connexion of things, and their progressions and conversions. For when he says, that as this world comprehends us, thus also animal itself comprehends intelligible animals, he recurs from sensible animals to the causes of them. But when he says, that divinity wishing to assimilate the world to the most beautiful of intelligibles, rendered it comprehensive of all things, he is willing to pass from causes to their effects, imitating the progression of secondary natures. He is led however, to such a transition as this, through analogy. For as effects are to each other, so are the paradigms of them. And the more total and the more partial,p. 11 subsist in both according to the same ratio. Why however, does he call animal itself the most beautiful of intelligibles, though it is the end of intelligibles? May we not say, that though there are intelligible orders prior to it, yet the most beautiful is inferior to them?) For they do not participate of beauty ; but the producing cause of beauty, and the first beauty and elegance subsist in them. Hence also animal itself is according to Orpheus, intellectually unfolded into lightin this order. And as beauty had a prior existence in che first intelligibles, unitedly and without intermission, hence Phanes is called by Orpheus, “the very beautiful son of ether,” and * delicate Love.” Because therefore, this God is the first that is filled with oceult and ineffable beauty, hence also he is denominated most beautiful, being the first of participants, though all intelligibles are united to each other. For it is not proper to divide them from each other, after the same manneras the intellectual orders, but survey one and an indivisible union of them. These things therefore, are beautifally asserted (by Orpheus and Plato.