The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor

vi, v. 45. Butin Proclus for ava bad \or aibon, read a\\a μαλ᾽ αιθρη.

ἢ For συμμακτικη here, read σημαντικη.

ie, PROCLUS ON THE [βοοκ 111.

universe is a thing of this kind, externally smooth, according to which also, it ix connascent with its own intellect, and with the Demiurgus, Henee tov, pocts establish the Demiurgus on the highest summit of the world; it being allotted so great an aptitude from him, to the participation of intelligible causes,

If you are willing, also, according to another mode, smoothness itselfis a symbol of the divine and simple life in the world. We, therefore, since we havea partible life, have also the parts of the body multiform, and variously mixed, because different things are prepared by nature for a different life, But the universe has one and asimple Jife. For it is purified from those things of which terrestrial animals are in want, through a material: and partible life. Menee it is. the reeipient of one life, butis exempt from a various life. Itis also prepared for one, but is unreceptive of a divided life. On this account, it is said τὸ be accurately elaborated eaternally, and rendered smooth, because it is fitly adapted by the demiurgic cause, to the reception of one life, being constructed as the orzan of such a life. What follows, however, is shgmiticant of this,

“Nor was the addition of eyes requisite to the universe: for nothing visible was left external to it. Nor was hearing necessary : for there was nothing externally audible, Nor was itinvested with surrounding air, that it might be in want of respiration,”

Through these things, Plato appears to do nothing clse, than to take away a partible life from the universe, and the partible organs, which are suspended from us, when we descend intu generation, For while we abide on high, we are not at ail in want of these multiform lives, and partible organs. But the luciform vehicle is sufficient, which possesses all the senses unitedly. If, therefore, we are purified from every !ife of this hind, when we are liberated from generation, what ought we to think respecting the universe? Ts it not, thatit has one simple life, thatitis wholly vigihintly excited to it, and is equally in every part prepared for the completion of one Lite? Or taust we not in a much greater degree admit) hese things of the universe! Por wholes are more divine than parts, and comprehending than comprehended natures, And thas much as to the cotmmon conception of the things proposed,

Since, however, in whatis now said, and in what follows, Plato takes away

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Por wholes are more divine than parts, and comprehending than comprehended natures, And thas much as to the cotmmon conception of the things proposed,

Since, however, in whatis now said, and in what follows, Plato takes awayp. 455 all sense from the world, viz. sceing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and touching, let ug in the first place consider this, whether the universe is sensitive or not. For of the ancients, some were led to one, and others to another opinion on this subject. We indced hear theologists speaking of the fountain of sense, and asserting of the father [i. ον of the Demiurgus] that he possesses intelligibles through intellect, but introduces sense to the worlds."| And again, we hear from the Greeks,

Sun who see’st all things, and dost all things hear,”

Seeing and hearing not existing in him partibly, as in us, but according to one life, and one subject. Since in us also, Aristotle proclaims, that there is principally one sense, and one principal sensorium. Nor were the wise men among the Greeks ignorant that there are divine senses, nor did they refuse to assert of the Demiurgus himself,

The undecaying royal ether forms
Hlis intellect from falsehood free; by which
He all things indicates and knows; nor voice, !

Nor sound, wor rumor can Jove's cars clude.

And why do I speak of theologists, when Plato himself says that the universe is an animal, and that animal is characterized by sense? So that asserting likewise that a plant is an animal, he immediately imparts to it a certain other sense. On hearing therefore, as [have said, these things, we are unwilling to admit that the universe is without sensation. For in the Theetetus, sense is said to be the frustration of truth ; and it is universally agreed that its knowledge is passive, and conversant with the images of things. lence, it is better, in order that we may be in the middle of both these, to take away from the universe every sense of this kind, and to give to it another more excellent than this, and more adapied to the Gods. What, therefore, is this sense, and after what manner may it be assumed? That the universe, indeed, is sensitive, we may render manifest from its being an animal, and from the soul of it being dianoetic and doxastic, and imparting to the mundane body a participation of both these, which participation is an image of dia-

Ὁ This is asserted in the Chaldean Oracles.

• * Cayss. XT. v. 108.
• * Foravéa here, read avéq; nod for mAvOer im the foliowing line, ἡ ληθει. These verses are Orphic.

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ποῖα and opinion ; and this we say is the mundane phantasy itself, adumbrating intelligence, and possessing invisible sensations * of the sensibles which exist in every period. It is possible, therefore, from these and many other arguments, to be persuaded that the universe possesses sensation. Batit requires an appropriate

It is possible, therefore, from these and many other arguments, to be persuaded that the universe possesses sensation. Batit requires an appropriate inspection, to know what sense it possesses. Tsay then, that of sense, the first and most principal kind, is that which imitates intellect. For every where things | that rank as first, have an imitation of the natures prior to them. Hence, this sense is conjoined to things that are first, comprehending in itself the sensible object of its perception, and neither passing from some things to others; for this is the province of sense distributed into various parts; nor proceeding outwardly 5 for this is imperfect ; but it possesses the whole of what is sensible in itself, and 13, as it were, rather consciousness than sense. The second kind of sense after this, 1s that which proceeds indeed outwardly, but according to a perfect energy, which every where always apprehends the whole object of its knowledge with invariable sameness, and is purified from all passion, and from all the imbecility which 18 adapted to partible and material organs. But the third kind of sense is that, which suffers from externals, and is mingled from passion and knowledge; beginning indeed from passion, but ending in knowledge. And the last kind of sense is that with which the most obscure knowledge is present, which ts full of passion, and proximate to physical sympathy, so as not to have a kuowledge of the forms of sensibles. Thus, for instance, it does not know that the thing which acts on it is hot or cold, but alone perceives that what falls on it is pleasant or painful, Por Timzus farther on informs us that the sense of plants is a thing of this kind, being an apprehension alone of the pleasing and the painful from sensible objects.

Sense, therefore, thus procceding supernally, the world, indced, 1s sensitive according to the first kind of sense. For according to the whole of itself itis the thing seen, and the eve [by which it is seen]; since we also say that the sun, and each of the stars, is aneye. Phe whole world therefore is sight and that which 15 visible, and is truly comprehensible by sense and opinion, Hence the knowledge in itis all-perfect, its sense is tudivisible, and itis itself all things, viz. that which is sensible, the senusorium, and sense; just as the Demiurgus of it, 15. intellect, intelligence, and the intelligible. As, likewise, it comprehends in its whole body partial bodies, so inits fofal sense it contains many senses. And it does not

» αισθησεις is omitted in the original.

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