The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor

In order therefore, that lie might demonstrate these things which are very properly circu¬ lated about the soul, he calls it the medium between the eternal and the generated li \ postasis.

Prior to this, however, we should ratlu r make tin* following division ; that it is necessary with rcspectto the impartible and partible.cither that hotli should he prior to the soul, or both posterior to the soul, or hoth in the soul; or that the one should Ik* prior, hut the other posterior to the soul. Hoth, therefore, will not lie prior to the soul since the soul is hi tter than the partible life ' w liieh is rising into existence; [for she has a nature separate from bodies, but the partible life is merged in bodies. IS or is it fit to say that hoth are posterior to the soul:] * for the impartible essence is eternal, and subsists with invariable sameness. Hut the soul is not entirely eternal, since, as he s,i\s in the I,aw s, .she pai ticipates of generation. IN or are both in tin* soul; because it is impossible for all tlie.se which difler from ca< h other, to give completion to one thing; viz. for the inseparable and the separate from bodies, the unbegntten and the generated. Hence it remains, that the one which is more excellent should he prior, lint that the other which is less excellent should he posterior to it Sinee, however, these subsist about it, it is necessary as it does not consist of these, that it should consist of tilings analogous to them, which either have a subsistence separate from each other, or mingled together. But it is impossible that it should consist of them s» parale from each other: fur Plato elf-arly says, that these are mingled logellu r. Hence it is neces¬ sary that the essential part of the soul should consist from the mixture of these. And since in the soul one thing is better, hut another worse, that which is impar¬ tible m it [is h*ss excellent than the impartible prior to it, and that which is partible in it] * is better Ilian the partible nature which is posterior to it. For Wing a medium, it has that w hich is more excellent, in an inferior manner, hut that which is less excellent, in a superior manner. And this indeed is evident

1 &wi)i is omitted in the original.

* The words wiihiu the brackets are added from the version of Thomrus, being omitted in the onglbdl.

J Here likewise, the words within the brackets, are wanting in the original, and are supplied from the .ersion of Thomaus. So that in the original after ro puy aptp.orty, it is necessary to add, yripny t[ft row *po avnji nptpiorov, to It pitpiaroy.

hook ill ]

TIM/T.rs Ol PLATO

p. 41

snce it iloos not consist of these very tilings themselves, Imt' of others that are analogous to them.

So that in the original after ro puy aptp.orty, it is necessary to add, yripny t[ft row *po avnji nptpiorov, to It pitpiaroy.

hook ill ]

TIM/T.rs Ol PLATO

p. 41

snce it iloos not consist of these very tilings themselves, Imt' of others that are analogous to them.

But that the essence of the soul lines not consist of those, as giving completion to it, is evident. For again let us make this ury tiling the subject of considera¬ tion. In the first place, tin refort t how is it possible for the impartible to Ik* mingled vv ith the partible, and the eternal w itli the generated ; for these are in a cer¬ tain respect contrary to, and most remote Irom each other, so that as we hare In-fore said, the\ can by no means be conjoined vv itli each other. In the second place, shall we not make the soul posterior and secondary to the things that are in it, * and the essence inseparable from body more ancient than that which ^separate, if it consists of an essence which is divided about bodies? Farther still^iow can the soul lie justly said to be a third thing ; for that which is a third tiling is e\ idently so in conjunction with the other two, which are preserved and not corrupted, lhit things that are mingled together, are no longer themselves, but a certain other tiling, and not a third tiling is produced from them. For they themselves have no i \istenee, but are corrupted through the mixture. 'Again, if the Demiurgus taking a portion of the impartible constituted the soul, that which is said to lie an impartible essence will no longer he so. l'nr how can any one take away a part of it, if it is impartible ? But if he consumed the whole of the impartible in the essence of the soul, he will no longer he beneficent, in eonseipieuee of consuming' more divine natures, which are nearer to himself and are more causal, into the hypostasis of less excellent natures. In addition to these things alsoj if the soul derives its romplelion from a generated partible nature, that partible nature will not only be divisible about bodies, but likewise about the soul. Hence the impar¬ tible itself, and the partible itself do not, as some fancy, give completion to the soul; hut that winch is asserted by Plato is true, that the Demiurgus from the impartible essence, and from that which is partible about bodies, mingled a middle form of essence. So that the same thing is partible indeed, as with reference to that which is impartible, hut impartible with reference to that which is partible, and truly affords us the middle nature of the soul.

So that the same thing is partible indeed, as with reference to that which is impartible, hut impartible with reference to that which is partible, and truly affords us the middle nature of the soul.

Moreover, this third thing itself, exhibits to us the nature of analogy iiiexistent in tbe soul. For if the same thing is both the middle and the third, but ibis is as the first,and is also as the last, the soul is at one and the same time, tin* iirst and the last; which analogy is naturally adapted to effect in the most beautiful manner. And if this third tiling is also the middle, it w ill evidently, since it is one thing, be the mid¬ dle of two certain extremes, and not a middle together with another thing. For it

Tim. Plat .

1 V\A’ it it.uiling lure m liie original.

* I "»r fierur III lliis Jil.it c, rrltd rir’ uvry,

VOL. II.

p. 42

PROCLUS OS THE

Fbook hi.

would be the fourth, four things being analogous. But if three tilings are analo¬ gous of which the soul is the middle, it is not simply the middle of essence and generation, but of an essence which is entirely unbegotten, and of an essence Incoming to be partible about bodies, being itself an essence w hich is both im¬ partible, and becomng to he partible, yet not about bodies, but liecoining to 1m* partible by itself, and being not at all in want of bodies, in order to be that which it is. To consist also of both these is adapted to the soul, not only, as some sav, liecausc it subsists at» a medium W tween both, but because it is both, being impartibles ironically, but partible* |uiradigmutirully. For it possesses the reasons of both. All things, then fore, subsist in it co-ordiliati ly. Since, however, intellect is all things, and the sensible nature is all things, Plato adds, “ in the middle” showing by this how all things are to he assumed m the soul, vi/. in a middle way, and neillu r primarily, nor according to the I ist mode of .subsistence.