The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor

On this account also, they are spontaneously conjoined to e ii h other; and the body is excited to the participation ol the soul, and the soul to the ear* of the liody .

Part her still, tin* intention ol the words “ from cerium things of ter the / o'lo„ii/g manner, is to lead into light the genera and the things v.iiirh constitute the soul, and also tin* mode of the mixture of them, and the reasons according to which the mixture is divided. Tor the corporeal nature was ni.uh I*y divinity to consist of certain elements, and after a Certain mamn r, ami lie urtiiieiaiiy devised a 'i i tain analogy ol them and physical hum], lint if divinity artificially produced till 1 soul from certain tilings, and alter a n rtnui manner, lie constituted both the subject of her as it were, and the form, it is ridiculous therefore to say, that the essence of her is unliegotten, if-shc consists of certain elements, but that the form of her is generated. Tor Plato says, that divinity produced, both the mat¬ ter as it were of the noul, and the reason according to which slw» is diversified

1 mi. Mir j>i(Kcrilv frimi Prr>'rr|>inr ami Juno.

I'KOCLUS ON Till-:

[BOOK III

id w ith such forms as she possesses ; Ijeincj Wind by certain media. If however, divinity generates the elements as it were of her, viz. essence, same, and different, and from these the whole, every tiling that is essential in the soul is ge¬ nerated.

“ From an essence always impartible, and subsisting with invariable sameness, and again from an essence which is partible about bodies, he mingled from both a middle form of essence."

“ From an essence always impartible, and subsisting with invariable sameness, and again from an essence which is partible about bodies, he mingled from both a middle form of essence."

In the first place, it is requisite to show through 1 what cause Plato ih-thers the generation of the soul, si nee it is according to him unbegotten; in the next place, to divide appropriately the whole psychical generation ; in the third place, to de¬ monstrate the middle n it lire of the soul ; in the fourth place, to speak concerning the genera ol those things, from which Plato constitutes all other beings and the soul; in the fifth place, to show how the'mixtuiv of these genera is to he assumed m tin* soul; in tin* sixth place to demonstrate what thd> impartible and the partible natures are; and in the seventh place, to unfold the meaning of the words of Plato, and to ewnce that they accord with all that has been before said. For if we are able to discuss all these particulars, we shall obtain in an appropriate manner the end of this investigation. Ia t us liegin therefore from the first, because some of the ancients have blamed Plato, asserting tli it he does not rightly investigate the principl of a principle, and the generation cf -’'•>viii«-gntten thing. I or it we investigate the < aiises of first nattires, and coins ive g< derations of things self-suhsisteiit, we shall ignorantly proceed to infinity, and have no cud of the theory. Fur as he w ho thinks that all things arc demonstrative, especially subverts demonstration itself, after the same manner also, he who investigates the causes of all things, entirely subvr ,ts all beings, and the order of tin til proceeding from a certain definite principle. 'Filings of this kind indeed, are objected by Theophrastus to Plato, concerning the ir< m ration of the soul, who likewise says, that we ought not to investigate the uhi/ in all physical inquiries. Fur, he adds, it would Ik ridiculous to doubt whv fire burns,on wliat account lire exists, and whv snow refrigerates. Hut those who have written against him in defence of Plato say, that alone to know the on or that of natural tilings,’ is irrational knowledge, and isado.xastic, or Sensitive apprehension of them; but that to add likew ise the uhy t and to investigate the caitsi *of them, is truly the employ incut ofdianuia, and a scientific intellect. For in this right opinion differs from scientific reason.

* vi/. Merely to know that they exut, without knowing the bon, or u~hy tf.**y exist

BOOK 111.]

TIM/EUS OF PLATO.

p. 17

For in this right opinion differs from scientific reason.

* vi/. Merely to know that they exut, without knowing the bon, or u~hy tf.**y exist

BOOK 111.]

TIM/EUS OF PLATO.

p. 17

We however, attending to what both of them say, think that the latter speak well, but in the first place, we would ask Theophrastus himself, whether the cause of no one tiling is to be assigned, or of a certain tiling ? For if of no one thing, besides subverting science which especially knows causes, he will also accuse himself, by enquiring whence thunder is produced, whence winds arise, and what are the causes of lightning, corruscatiuns, fiery whirlwinds, rain, snow and hail; all which in his Meteors, he very properly thinks deserving of an appropriate conjej tural dismission. Hut if the cause of a certain thing is to be assigned, why are some things pertaining to physics to lie surveyed according to causes, hut others are to he delivered irrationally without cause? For it does not follow that in things in w hich that tfny c.rist is manifest, in these it is likewise known why they o\i*-t. But after Theophrastus, we shall ask the lovers of Plato, whether we are entirely to investigate the causes of all things, or not of all things ? For if of all things, we must therefore investigate the cause of the one, which we say is more excellent than cause. For that the one is, we may learn from principles. For if not the one, but multitude ([is the principle of things,3 w hat is it that unites ; since that which is united is from the one, just as that which is essentialized is from essence, and that which is animated is from soul ? But why the one is one cannot be unfolded, for it is more ancient than every cause. And if we are not to inves¬ tigate the causes of all tilings, why should we investigate the cause of soul, and the generation of it from a cause, but should hy no means do this in other tilings?