The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor

* The words wilhiu the brackets are wanting in the original, but both the sense and the version of Tliomaus require they should he inserted. Hence after to it tvyafiu, it is necessary to add, to it tytpyua *a4 i) fit* uvota.

ROOK III.]

TINLIXS OF PLATO.

p. 21

Wi- may jwrcrivr however, that tlir* psychical esv,-nce is a certain threefold nature. For tin* hyparxis of it is one tiling, and tin* harmony in it another, according to which its essential multitude is eonnerted ; since it is not one essence 1 like intel¬ lect, nor divisible to infinity, like body which is posterior to it ; hut it is divisible into more essential parts than one, of which it consists, yet they are finite in number, there not being more parts of the soul than these, since these parts of it cannot be divided into others, as will be evident as wc proceed. And the form which is effected from tin se is another tiling; so that the essence of the soul is one anil threefold. For the monad and the triad are adapted to it, since we divide the whole soul into three parts. Hence its essence is one anil triple: for hyparxis is one tiling, harmony another, and form another. And the first of these indeed, alone defines existence, the second harmonizes the essential multitude, hut the third contains the peculiarity of the whole system. All these likewise, are in each other. For hyparxis has with itself an harmonized multitude; since it is not without multitude; nor is it multitude alone iinharmouized. And harmony is itseli essential, and is connective ot essence, to whicli also it gives form. Hence likewise it is shown in what resj>eet the soul is harmony, and in what respect it is not, and that Plato accords with himself in asserting here that the soul is harmony, but in the Plurdo confuting those who maintain that it is. For 1/ is one thing to he the harmony of itself aiul of other tilings, ami a differ, nt thing to he the harmony of another thing alone. F'or the latter produces harmony in a subject, and a harmony inseparable from the things harmonized, anil established in a foreign seat, lint the former produces a separate harmony, subsisting from itself, and converted to itself. Form likewise , is comprehensive of harmonic reasons, contains the hyparxis of the soul, and is the one raison according to which the soul is that which it is. All these therefore are in each other, viz. hvparxis, harmonv, and form, and the essence of the soul is one and triple; since it also consists of three genera, essence, same and different. And again, hyparxis indeed, is rather defined according to essence, but harmony according to sameness, and form according to dilfcrcnce, through which it is separated from all things.

And again, hyparxis indeed, is rather defined according to essence, but harmony according to sameness, and form according to dilfcrcnce, through which it is separated from all things.

Since therefore, we find that the soul is triple from the loginning, possessing essence, power and energy, and again, having essence itself triple, according to hyparxis, according to harmony, and according to form, from these wc shall make a pentad; arranging by parxis as the first, harmony as the second, idea or form, as the third, power as the fourth, and energy as the fifth. F’or the pentad is adapted to the soul as to a medium, containing the bond of the monad and the

* iestcad of ovre ft mu eunat is tim place, il k Decenary to read cere fttas nou.

p. 22

PROCLUS ON THE

[book hi.

ennead, just as Hie soul is the Imnd of the intelligible and sensible essence. Adopting likeni>e this arrangement, we shall divide the whole theory concerning the soul into live heads; in the fust place, speaking concerning the hyparxis of the soul; in the second place, concerning the reasons and harmony in it; in the third place, discussing the idea of it ; in the lourth place, the many powers it contains; and in the fifth place, directing our attention to its energies. For Plato also w hen he speaks about the mundane, body, surveying the corporealformed nature of the world itself, by itself, delivers in the first place the nature which is the subject of body, and produces the elements of which the world con¬ sists. In the next place, he delivers the harmony of the elements; for analogy, and the bond subsisting through analogy, are an image of the psychical harmony. In the third place, he delivers the idea of the world exhibiting it to us as a spherical whole of wholes. Ill the fourth place, lie unfolds to us the powers of the world, giving to the spliel't s mdi ed, partible* powers, and such as are ctlecled through partial organs, bill to the animal of the universe, whole and perfect powers. And in the fifth place, he delivers to us the energies ot the world, sur¬ rounding the bod v of it with a wise and intellectual motion. A Iter the same in .in¬ ner likewise, he divides 111 these five heads the theory of the soul. I hat till* »,eneration of the soul therefore, is very properly surveyed by Plato, and in how many, and what heads it is divided, may' through these tilings be manifest.

A Iter the same in .in¬ ner likewise, he divides 111 these five heads the theory of the soul. I hat till* »,eneration of the soul therefore, is very properly surveyed by Plato, and in how many, and what heads it is divided, may' through these tilings be manifest.

After this however, we must discuss that which we proposed, as the third subject of enquiry, viz. how, and on what account we say that the soul is of a middle nature. For it i* necessary that this should In known prior to the reason¬ ing concerning it. Since then there are many things which proceed from the one, as »ar as to Ibrmh *S> I ind tin l.i't matter, h l tis see vvliat are the peculiarities of the first beings, what of the last, and what are allotted a middle order, and how they are adapted to tin* essence of tin* soul. I he follow mg tin relore, are tin* peculiarities of inti lligihles, ti id v existing being, the eternal, the impartible, the immove ible, the entire, the perfect, a sii|>erplcmtude ol existence, an unwearied and unrestrained life, that vvliii h is motive of all things, similitude, the being present with all things, and the lieing exempt from all things. For all tin se properties are unfolded into light m intelligible.s, according to the progressions of being. But again, there are certain oilier peculiarities ol seiisibles, such as the billowing, that which is not truly-existing being, that which is temporal according to essence, the partible, that which is moved, the partial, that which is in want ol another, that which Is always tilling with existence, that which lives according to participation, that which is altcr-molivc, dissimilitude, and that which on npics place l»y its parts. Between these, which arc opposed to each other as things first to tilings last, there are nmiK ill,]

TIM.ELS OF PLATO.

p. 23