The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor

* i. r. IWchut.

p. 38

PKOCLUS ON Tin:

[rook mi.

divided God was the Demiurgus. Orpheus, therefore, calls the intellect of Bac¬ chus, the impartible essence of the God. But he denominates his genitals, the life which is divisible about body ; this lieing physical and productive of seeds. This also he says Diana, who presides over all tin* generation in nature, and obstetrieatrs physical reasons, extends as far as to the subterranean realms, distribu¬ tin'.,' the prolific power of Baet Inis. But all the remaining body of the God, forms the psychical composition, this likewise being divided into seven parts.

All ibe scuii |i irti tlii\ scat lei <1 ol itic bo\ , says the theulogist concerning the Titans; just as Timms also divides the soul into seven parts. Perhaps too lie reminds us of the Orphic' 'V itamc distribu¬ tion into parts, when he says that the soul is extend, d* through the whole world ; through which the soul not only circularly covers the universe as with a veil, but likewise is extended through the whole ot it. Hence, Plato very properly calls the essence which is proximat. lv above soul, impartible. Anil, in short, he thus denominates the intellect which is participated by the soul, tallow ing the Orphic fables, and wishing to he as it were, the interpreter of arcane and mystical assertions. Returning, therefore, to the words ol Plato, it is necessary to show that what has been before said a< cords with his conceptions.

These things, however, being discussed by us, it is wonderful, since intellect is an impartible cs-ence, how Parmenides in the second' hypothesis, distributes leina into infinite parts, ami together with bang, (be cue ; as it is acknowledged by nearly all the interpreters that the subject of that hypothesis, is the nature that is lieyond souls. Or may it not lie said, that the distribution into parts which is there spoken of, signifies the progression of the many unities 4 from the one bi ing [or being characterized by the one), these unities proceeding in a well-ordered manner from their proper principles, into an appropriate multitude ? Plato, how¬ ever, does not intend to signify that the one being derives its completion Irom these many unities, in the same manner as he say s, that soul being one, has a multitude which terminates in it. But his meaning is that the one bang precedes the many unities and at the same time beings, and that the multitude ol these is subordinate to it; and also that both utiical and all i“>v ntial number, are causally comprehended in it; just as in this dialogue he calls animal itself one whole, hut

' t or re nratitr<u p^apuv, re. O^uou a.o/n^M., in lh«S » “<* d h 'p" h a U ftlV 1 . X«

1 til Wad of rtraypti rjr here, U is neiesjary lo read Ttraptvnv.

O^uou a.o/n^M., in lh«S » “<* d h 'p" h a U ftlV 1 . X«

1 til Wad of rtraypti rjr here, U is neiesjary lo read Ttraptvnv.

‘ For r,„ ...nrvhm, .1 in ueces>arv to riad r.,e tevr.pa,. For the whole progression of true Wing „ diNcuNM'.i in the second hypolhesis of ihe Parmenides. See ruy translation of .1, and ihe Holes on it.

4 Instead of ruWwr oi oiyruy in this plaee, it is requisite to rt^if ou^wi.

BOOK III ]

tim t;us or plato.

3 »

the four ideas the parts of it; animal itself not deriving its completion from them, hut they being comprehended in it, as distributing by the multitude of themselves the monad of that one bring, each of them having the power of a part of it, hut all of them not being equivalent to the whole monad of it. For thus also both numbers, the unical and the essential, are parts of that one l>eiiig [discussed m the Parmenides] not being completive of i*, so as that it consists of each of these. And thus much in answer to this doubt; hut let us proceed to the words betore us.'

“ From an essence always impartible and subsisting with invariable sameness, and again, from an essence which is becoming to be partible about bodies, he mingled from both a middle form of essence.”

That by the one impartible essence, Plato means the intellectual essence, which in the whole of itself participates of eternity, and by the essence which is partible about bodies, that wbieli is ms, parable from corporeal masses, and is allotted its hyparxis in the whole of time, he manifests by saying that the former of these “ subsists ith invariable sameness," and by denominating the latter “ that which is becoming to he in order that lie may not only call the soul impartible and at the same time partible, hut abo inti Uigible, and the first of gem rated natures. For an eternal perpetuity is one thing ; but that whir li subsists according to temporal infinity is another,having its hypustasis in extension; and that is another which is mixed from both, such as is the perpetuity of the sou). For the soul is immoveable indeed ac¬ cording to essence, but is moved according to intellections, and is i ternal according to the former, but temporal according to the latter. It is likewise evident, that the .soul necessarily has something of this kind according to liyparxis, or she would not exhibit in her natural energies, the peculiarity of genera*',,n, and temporal extension. And it appears to me that Plato in an ndmirahli manner perceiving this says, that the Pemiurgus not only made the soul a medium between the impartible essence, and the essence which is partible about bodies, hut abo that \ ^ he made it a medium between the essence which subsists with invariable same- / ness, and that which is generated, or becoming to l»e. For how could lie appro¬ priately w rite the Psyrhogony,’ if there was neither generation, nor composition in the soul? How also would it be possible to take away parts from that which

For how could lie appro¬ priately w rite the Psyrhogony,’ if there was neither generation, nor composition in the soul? How also would it be possible to take away parts from that which

1 Leonii u* Tliomxus lias omitleii to traii'lafe the whole of what 11 here said about the supermundane »oul, bcpiiiiimg (Yon, the wool', *' IIV think it it rrquiutt,’' ami ending with the ,above paragraph.

* ». c. (Jonitrmug the generation of the *oi»I.

p. 44

PKOCLUS ON THE

[book 111.

w essentially impartible ( For of simple natures there is not any generation what¬ ever. And even such forms as are material, are without generation and corrup¬ tion, as Aristotle says. For through their simplicity, they preserve in the last of things, the peculiarity of the first forms. It i> possible, however, to deliver in words the generation of things which receive any hind of composition. In order therefore, that lie might demonstrate these things which are very properly circu¬ lated about the soul, he calls it the medium between the eternal and the generated li \ postasis.