The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor

And thus we may collect from all these, that for that which is most excellent to be well imitated, itis difficult mdeed according to deeds, but it is still more dullicult for it to be well imitated according to words in a written work. For this is the thingp. 55 proposed to be effected in poetry. And you may see how this accords with things themselves. For he who in a written work narrates the deeds of the most excellent men, composes a history. But he who narrates the speeches of these men, ifhe intends to preserve the manners of the speaker, assumes a disposition similar io the speaker. For words are seen to difler according to the inward dispositions. For thas we deride most of those, except Plato, who have written the Apology of Socrates, as not preserving the Socratic manner in their composition. Though the narration of this very thing, that Socrates was accused, made an apology, and was sentenced to die, would not be thought worthy of laughter, but the dissimilitude of imitation in the composition, renders the imitators ridiculous. — Since, also» to say of Aclilles, that he came forth armed after such a manner, and that he performed such deeds, is not dificalt; but to narrate copiously what he said» when detained in the river, is not easy. But this is the province of one who is able to assume the manners of the hero, and to write conformably to what he would have said. This also is evident from Socrates in the Republic, very much Dblamine Homer respecting the imitation of words. But as to the Gods, it is said to be easy by language to uifa/e the words or the deeds of the Gods. For who can delineate their works according to their desert? Or it may be said that it is the same thing with respect to the Gods, to imitate their words or deeds. For since their words are intellections, and their intellections are productions, the imitator of their words is also the imitator of their productions, So that by how much he fails in the one, by so much also is he deficient in the imitation of the other. Longinus, however, has the following doubts with respect to the proposed words. For if poets are not worthy imitators of the works pertaining to such a city as this, because they are not educated in the manners of the city, neither will Critias and his associates be able to effect this. For neither did they live performing the office of magistrates in it. But if it is because they have not science, but are imitators alone, why by receiving types from us, may they not be able to imitate, since they possess an imitative power? In answer to these doubts, it may be said, that the imitation of such a polity proceeds through a life concordant with its paradigms. For he who does not live according to virtue, is incapable of adducing words adapted to worthy men. It is not, therefore, sufficient merely to hear what form of life the polity possesses, in order to imitate it, as the doubt of Longinus says itis, Bat Porphyry adds, that as all things, such for instance as the diurnal light, are not imitated by painters, so neither is the life of the most excellent polity imitated by poets, in consequence of transcending their power.

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“ But with respect to the tribe of sophists, though I consider them as skilled both in the art of speaking, and in many other beautiful arts, yet as they have no settled abode, but wander daily through a multitude of cities, IT am afraid, lest with respect to the institutions of philosophers and politicians, they should not be able to conjecture the quality and magnitude of those concerns, which wise and politic men are engaged in with individuals in warlike undertakings, both in deeds and

» words.

With respect to the sophists, some of them frequently pretended to be skilled in astronomy, others in geometry, others in politics, and others in the art of dividing. Hence they are now said to be skilled in many beautiful arts. Since, however, they did not possess a scientific knowledge of these, it is added, that they are skilled in them. For skil! manifests an irrational occupation in’ mere words, unaccompanied with the Knowledge of the why. Because, however, they not only lived at different times in different cities, but were full of deception, of false opinion, and unscientific wandering, they are justly called wanderers. But as they led a disorderly and inerudite life, energizing according to passion, they are very properly said not to have a settled abode ; since it is requisite that every one should arrange himself prior to other things. For all such particutars, as ave ina family and a city, are Likewise in manners, and these prior to externals ought to be titly governed. Who then are the proper imitators of the deeds and words of the best polity, if neither the poets nor the sophists are? Phey are such as are both politicians and philosophers. For the union of both these is necessary, in order that through the political character they may be able to perceive the works of the citizens ; but through the philosophic, their words, te consequence of inwardly pre-assuming their life. And through the former, indeed, they comprehend their practical wisdom, but through the latter, the intellectual energy of the rulers. But from these images we should make a transition to demiurgic causes. For it is necessary that these also should) be total and Intellectual, mn order that the universe may be consummately perfect, and that generation may possess ironically such things as the heavens primarily contain.

“ The genus, therefore, of your habit remains, which at one and the same time participates of both these, by nature and by education.”

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“ The genus, therefore, of your habit remains, which at one and the same time participates of both these, by nature and by education.”

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Longinus, not disdaining to survey these words, and those that precede them, — says, that in that part of them beginning with, “ But with respect to the tribe of sophists, Lam afraid, as they are wanderers,” &c. there is a difference of expression through the desire of dignity and gravity in the diction. That in the words that follow, “ Lest with respect to the institutions of philosophers and politicians, they should not be able to conjecture the quality and magnitude of those concerns,” &e. there is a distortion of phrase from what is natural. And that the third part, “ The genus therefore of your habit remains,” &c. is perfectly unusual. For it is not at all dissimilar to the strength of Hercules, to sey ig Τελεμαάχοιο, the sacred strength of Telemachus,” and other such like expressions. But Origen admits, that the form of expression in the proposed words, is conformable to the manner of historians. For such like periphrases are adapted to a narration of this kind, as well as to poetry. We, however, say, that Plato everywhere changes his mode of diction, so as to be adapted to his subjects; and in unusual things, studies mutations of expression. But we do not admit that the proposed words are a periphrasis. For they do not manifest the same thing as the expression you, like the strength of Hercules ; from which there would only be an ability of giving that which is adapted to the imitation of the best polity. For those who are both philosophers and politicians, by energizing according to the habit which they possess, and which differs from the poetical and sophistical habit, will be able to effect that which Socrates desires. And thus much for the words themselves,

Looking, however, to the conceptions which they contain, we must say, that Socrates excites Critias and [lermocrates to what remains to be accomplished in the polity. But he likewise calls on Timieus to assist the undertaking. And this is the fifth head of the things proposed for elucidation. You may also see how magnificently Socrates celebrates the men from the very beginning, calling [the wisdom which they possess] a Aabit, in order that he may exempt them from sophistical wandering. But he says that they are partakers of the political science, both by nature and education, in order that you may contradistinguish it from poetical imitation, which is nourished by less excellent laws. And he designates the perfect from nature and educaiion ; lest depriving nature of education, you should cause it to be lame ;* or you should think that education ought to be thrown into an

• * Odyss. 11. 409.
• * For xoAny here, it is necessary to read χωλην,

Tim. Plat. το α, te

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