The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor

For it is not proper to divide them from each other, after the same manneras the intellectual orders, but survey one and an indivisible union of them. These things therefore, are beautifally asserted (by Orpheus and Plato.

That however, which is most synopucal' in the words of Plato, is this, that he says animal itselfis the most beautiful, not of all intellgibles simply, but of mtelhgible animals. Por comparing all-pertect animal with more partial animals, he says, itis the most beautiful of all intelligible animals ; so that if there is something more excellent: than the nature of animal, it has nothing to do with the present assertion. Tt as necessary however, that there should) be a thing of this Kind, because bemy itself, and beauty itself are more simple than the nature of animal, on which account also they are participated by things which are not animals, Moreover, the interpreters say, that the word asysinilation is appropriately assumed by Plato. For he is frequently dubious ccncerning the mode of parteipation, Whether itis from: forms themselves being present with sensibles, or from their communmeating with them im some other way: but he is not dubious whether or not it is stmilitude which makes the sensible world to be the image of the intelligible. Dividing however, they say, that of physical forms indeed, the sensible world participates as of impressions in wax, but that it receives the representations of psychical, and the sunilitudes of intelligible forms.* So that since Plato is speaking concerning intelligible paradigms, he very properly, as they say, assumes similitude, Parther still, the world is an animal, as the image

1 Por συνεκτικωτατον here, Tread σννοπτιλωτατων.ς * Concerning the mod > in which forms themselves are participated by sensibles, see the Notes to my translation of the Parmenides of Plato.

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of this intelligible animal, and of intelligible allness. But it is visible as being assimilated to the splendour of its paradigm. For what colour is there, that the visible is here.

‘The Gods adinir'd, mv ether when they saw
A light unlook’d for, bursting on the view,

Prom the immortal Phanes’ glittering skin ;"

But it is visible as being assimilated to the splendour of its paradigm. For what colour is there, that the visible is here.

‘The Gods adinir'd, mv ether when they saw
A light unlook’d for, bursting on the view,

Prom the immortal Phanes’ glittering skin ;"

fsays Orpheus}. And the world comprebends all kindred natures, because it is comprehensive of all sensibles. But Plato adds, “as are allied to its nature,” because intelligibles are paradigms to the world of things which are according to nature, and not as some Platonists are accustomed to say, of things preternatural, Torin short, mundane things being divided into such as are according to nature, and such as are preternatural, into universals and particulars, and into essences and accidents, we always admit that there are formal causes of the more, hut by no means of the less excellent. For that which is produced from ideas, proceeds through nature. But if this is the case with that which is according to nature, but not with that which is preternatural, that which is generated from ideas is a certain whole, and is perpetual, For if this is not admitted, one of two things must take place, either that things contingent will have no existence, or that of forms some will necessarily produce, but it will happen that others may either produce or not produce. And in the third place, every thing whieh proceeds from ideas is essence... Vor since they produce by their very being, each is productive of essences. For it would be ridiculous to say that a partial nature is effective of essence, but that intelligible form gives subsistence to accident? These things however, we shall elsewhere more copiously discuss. Bat what- -eyer the world contains is allied to it, because all things in it subsist according to intelligible causes. Plato likewise appears in this place to have given a definition uf the world, viz. “one visible animal, comprehending in itself all animals.” For intelligible animal also is one, but is not visible. And the sun, and each of the monadic natures, [or those natures of which there. is only one,jis one visible animal, but does not comprehend all others. So that it is evident that the above is the detinition of the universe. Let us however proceed to the words of Plato. |

* For ro ov «πεστιλβε in this place, it is necessary to read ry μὲν αἀπεστιλιβε. Ὁ For συμιλεβήκοτος evos νποστατικον, read ovp/3e/3qxoros εἰναι νποστατικον.

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“ Whether therefore, shall we assert that there is one world, or is it more right to say that there are many and infinite worlds ?”

Ὁ For συμιλεβήκοτος evos νποστατικον, read ovp/3e/3qxoros εἰναι νποστατικον.

p. 368

“ Whether therefore, shall we assert that there is one world, or is it more right to say that there are many and infinite worlds ?”

This problem follows indeed logographically what has just now ' been said. For because he had detined the world to be one visible animal, comprehending within itself all such animals as are naturally allied to it, it is necessary that he should think this to be worthy his attention and discussion, whether the world is one certain thing, or not. For of physiologists, some make the world to be one; but others assert that there are many worlds; and others contend that there are not only many, but also infinite worlds. The consideration of this likewise, has a connection with what has been before said, derived from the things themselves. For since it has been shown that the world is the image of animal itself, and is an animated animal, endued with intellect, it was requisite to add a summit to the discussion of it, by showing that itis also one, For thus he will demonstrate that it isa God, in consequence of participating a unity which is above intellect. For it was not only possible for him to say that it is an image because other things also are images, some being fashioned by nature, but others by art. Nor an animal alone, because there is a multitude of partial animals, Nor alone animated; for man likewise is an image, and an animated animal. Nor alone endued with intellect; for both a demon and an angel are amimnated animals possessing intellect. But this which especially and primarily pertains to divine natures, he before suflered to be ineffable, through the cause which we have already assigned. Now, however, he adds the one, and the alone. For every thing which ts monadic in the world is divine, as being an image, if it be. lawful so to speak of ἐμὲ one. But I denominate divine, that which is such as the anzelic, as the dwemoniacal, and as that which is in partial souls. For each of these is divine, so far as it 1s suspended from its proper deity, and cach of these ts monadic. Such monadic natures however, as have generation and corruption, and are expelled into the mortal abode, are opposed to every thing divine. Hence this problem 1s suspended from what has been before said. For since the paradigm of the universe is indeed a God, and 15 intelligible, is the suppher of lite, and is also intellect ; according to that which is divine in him, he makes the world to be one; according to the one and the intelligible, he causes it to be sensible; but according to the one, the intelligible, and life, he makes it to be

* For ra νὸν here, read ra νυν».

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