The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor

And if indeed, so far as it is soul it becomes intellectual,' it would be necessary that every soul should be the same [i. e. should be

* Instead of και et μεν abe voepa, ψνχη ywera, in this place, it is necessary to read, και εἰ μεν cabo ψνχη, voepa γινεται.

p. 342

intellectual]. But if it becomes intellectual through the participation of intellect, it is necessary that it should participate of an intellect commensurate to it. A thing of this kind however, is not intellect itself, but that which is a medium between intellect itself and soul, which has intellectual perception adscititious. This intellect also is a certain intellect, and is essentially intellect, and not becoming to be so, like soul; for it is better than soul. But by being! a certain intelleet, itis co-ordinate with soul. For intellect itself is intellect by eristing, and not by becoming to be, and intellect which is simply so by its very being, is superior to a co-ordination with soul. Ifalso you consider, that every monad constitutes a multitude similar to itself, a divine monad, a divine multitude, a psychical monad, a psychical multitude, just as an intellectual monad produces an intellectual multitude, and that secondary orders always participate of the natures prior to themsclyves, it is necessary these things being admitted, that there should be a certain intellect of the whole world. For it is necessary that an intellectual soul should participate of intellect. But if some one should say, it’ participates of the intellect which ranks as a whole, it is absurd. For this intellect will not be the Demiurgus of all things And if it) par- Ucipates of a certain other intellect, this is the intelleet of the universe, and that which is properly participated, as giving completion to the universe in conjunction with soul. But the intellect which ranks as a whole, is so participated by, as illuminating the soul of the universe. Mf therefore intellect presides over Wholes, the universe is animated ; but if the universe is animated, it is also endued with intellect.

“Through this reasoning process therefore, placing intellect in soul, but soul in body, he fabricated the universe.”

In the first place, it is requisite to sce what this intellect is, and whether it is essential, established above soul, or a certain intellectual habit of soul. From analogy however, it may be inferred that it is essential. For as intellect is to soul, so is soul to body, But soul does not so subsist with reference to body, as tobe ahabit ofits and therefore neither is intellect a habit of κοι], This like-

' For ro δε ris είναι, read τῳ δε res εἰναι. , * viz. The intellect participated by soul, will not be the Demiurgus of all things. For the demiurgic is an imparticipable intellect, or in other words, is not consubsistent with soul,

p. 343

, * viz. The intellect participated by soul, will not be the Demiurgus of all things. For the demiurgic is an imparticipable intellect, or in other words, is not consubsistent with soul,p. 343 wise, may be inferred from the final cause. For Plato says that soul was constituted on account of intellect.". But the converse is not true. If however. soul is for the sake of intellect, but intellect is that for the sake of which soul subsists, intellect is not a habit; for no where*® does essence subsist on account of habit. And inthe third place, the Demiurgus constitutes this intellect; but the soul as Plato says, gives subsistence to the intellect which is according to habit, throneh the motion of the circle of sameness about the intelligible. For fas he adds] through this motion, imtelleet and scicnce are necessarily produced, Liow therefore does the Demiurgus constitute prior to soul, that to which soul herself gives subsistence? To which we may add, that it is right to assume, that in the Demiurgus there is a royal soul, and a royal intellect, as Socrates says in the Philebus, subsisting according to the reason of cause [or causally]; and that according to these fountains of these two-fold genera, the Demiurgus now places intellect in soul, and soul in body, not because better are in less excellent natures, nor that intellect is in want of a certain seat, or that the soul of the universe is in a certain thing, For these things are unworthy of wholes and divine essences; through which the world is called by Plato, a blessed God. Because however, we conceive of the nature of things in a two-fold respect, either according to their progression, or according to their conversion; hence, when we survey their progression, we begin from first natures, and say that causes are in their effects. But we assert the converse of this, when we survey their conversion. For then we say that the things caused ’ exist in their causes. This second mode therefore, Plato delivers to us shortly after, when he places body in soul, and analogously soul in body. Now, however, treating of tie mode of progression, he places intellect in soul, because the whole of it has the form of intellect, and nothing pertaining to it can be assumed, which is not under the dominion of an intellectual nature. But soul in body, because this according to the whole of itself participates of soul, and no part of it can be assumed which is inanimate; but even that which is deprived of its proper life, so faras it isa part of the universe, is animated, For as we say that providence proceeds every where, and is every where because itis present with all things, and leaves nothing destitute of itself; after the same manner likewise, we say that intellect is in

' For δια νὸν here, it is necessary to read δια your,
* After ovsapou in this place, it requisite to supply yap.
7 For ra aria here, it is necessary to read ra acriara.

7 For ra aria here, it is necessary to read ra acriara.

p. 344

soul, as circularly illuminating the whole of it, and soul in body, because it is present with the whole of it.

Nor docs Plato speak after this manner, and Orpheus after another; but fit be reyuisite to give my opinion, the conceptions of the theologist become manifest through what is here said. For Ippa who is the soul of the universe, and is thus called by the theologist, perhaps because her intellectual conceptions are essentialized in the most vigorous motions, or perhaps on aceount of the most rapid lation of the universe, of which she is the cause,—placing a testaceous vessel on her head, and encircling the fig leaves that bind her temples, with a drazon, receives Dionysius (or Bacchus}. For with the most divine part of herself, she becomes the receptacle of an intellectual essence, and receives the mundane intellect, which proceeds into her from the thigh of Jupiter. For there it was united with Jupiter, but proceeding from thence and becoming participable by her, it clevates her to the intelligible, and to the fountain of her nature. For she hastens to the mother of the Gods, and to mount Ida," from which all the series of souls is derived, Hence also, Ippa is said to have received Dionysius when he was brought forth from Jupiter. For as Plato before observed, it is impossible fur intellect to accede to any thing without soul, But this is similar to what is asserted by Orpheus ; by whom also Dionysius is called the sweet offspring of Jupiter. This however, isthe mundane intellect, which proceeds into light conformably to the intellect: that abides in Jupiter. hus too, the divinely-delivered theology [of the Chaldeans] says, that the world derives its completion from these three things (viz. from intellect, soul amd body}. Soul therefore says [in the Chaldean Oracles,] concerning Jupiter fabricating the universe : +} soul reside after the paternal conceptions, hot, and animating all things.’ For the father of Gods and men placed our intellect in soul, but soul he deposited in sluggish body.” Plato likewise, bears testimony tu the Oracles, when he calls the Demiurgus father, and represents him yvenerating souls, and sending them into the generation of men according to the first life. And thus much concerning these particulars. Since however, us we have said, both soul and intellect give completion to one animal, Plato appears tome to use very appropriately the words to constitute and co-fabricate, through the common preposition σὺν in both,

* For Aawy in this place, 1 read Aueor. 2 je. To the region of ideas, and an intelligible nature,

3 For θερῴηχόνσα here, read θερμὴ ψυχώνσα.

p. 519