The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor

it is the demiurgic goodness. For as the paradigm is two-fold, the one being intelligible, but the other intellectual ; and as the one is prior to the Demiurgus,

" For avro here, read azo,

* Lcre is omitted in the original.

SONS TAT ee RE OF TNT τοῦp. 303 being primarily eternal and united, and comprehensive of all intelligible animals, but the other which is in the Demiurgus of wholes, unically comprehends the demiurgic number of forms ;—thus also with respect to goodness, one kind is simply so, but another ts in the demiurgic intellect. And the former indeed, is the fountain of all intelligible, intellectual, and supermundane good ; but the latter being a certain goodness, is the cause and fountain of some things, but is allotted an order subordinate to others. For if we wish to explore what it is which makes a God, whether he be intelligible or intellectual, supermundane or mundane, we shall find that it is nothing else than goodness. For what is it that makes each of the bodies that are animated to be so, except the resemblance of soul? What is it which makes intellectual souls to be such, except the intellect that is in them, and which is an illumination of total intellect?) What therefore can deify intellect, and an intelligible essence, except the participation of the first God, and the forerunning illumination that proceeds from him? What therefore is the first? If indeed, he were intelligible "beauty we should say that intellect was a God through beauty. But since the first God is the good, intellect also through participating of goodness is a God. Hence this is the hyparxis of the Gods; and the very essence of the Gods, if it be lawful so to speak, is goodness. According to this likewise, every God exists as a God. And on account of this he has a providential, or a demiurgic, or a vivific, or a connective characteristic. For

‘intellect indeed, so far as intellect, is naturally adapted to have an intellectual perception and knowledge of beings; but to energize providentially is divine. So that the demiurgic intellect likewise, possesses its subsistence as demiurgic, on account of the goodness which it contains. For on account of this, the intellect which is in the Demiurgus, is the maker, and is not only gnostic of being. The being also which is in him, is an efficacious paradigm, and produces by its very existence, and is not alone perfective of intellect. And intellect indeed in making is corroborated by both these; by the paradigm, because it produces with relation to it; and by goodness, because it produces on account of it. But the paradigm is corroborated by unity.

You have therefore, these successive, viz. goodness, the paradigm, intellect. And these subsist in one way indeed, in the Demiurgus, and in another prior to the Demiurgus. And if you are willing so to speak, the first goodness is the one,

* For nrrey in this place, it is necessary ¢o read γοητον.

goodness, the paradigm, intellect. And these subsist in one way indeed, in the Demiurgus, and in another prior to the Demiurgus. And if you are willing so to speak, the first goodness is the one,

* For nrrey in this place, it is necessary ¢o read γοητον.

p. 304

which is beyond even intelligibles themselves: for it 1s imparticipable " goodness. But the paradigm is that intelligible which unitedly comprehends all the number of forms. And the maker is the intellectual intellect which gives subsistence to wholes. So that if Amelius said that there are three demiurgi after this manner, perceiving this triad in the one Demiurgus, he said rightly. For one of them, says he, makes [as it were] by contrectation, another by mandate, and another by his will alone. And the first indeed, is arranged analogously to the manual artiticer; the second pre-exists conformably to the architect; but the third is established prior to both, analogously to a king, So far therefore, as the Deniturgus is intellect, he produces all things by the intellectual perceptions of himself ; but so Jur asheis intelligible, he makes by his vory being ; and so far as he ix a God, by his willalone. Whowever Amelias divalses the three Deunurgt from the one Demiurous, we must not admit it, while we follow Plato, Por the same Demiurgus Ip cood, so far as he is a God, and on account of goodness he produces all things by his will, and is intellizible ‘intellectually 3 for such is the demiurgic being. Lle is also intellect, the artificer of the world, The words therefore, “ he was good,” have an explanation of this hind: in the term was, the super-plenary, the consummately perfect, and the super-eternal nature of his divine hyparats, being indicated. Lor the term ts, is significant of eternal things ; the term Was, of the super-eternal unities ; and the term WILL BE, Of things which subsist in time. For of the term ws pertains to eternal natures, the term was will be adapted to the natures prior to these, and the term WILL BE, fo the natures posterior to these. But such are the beings which are indigeut of time,

Since however the Demiurgus is good, envy Is never ingenerated in him about any thing. But some one may say, what is there {remarkable} ino intellect: not being envious? For this? does not happen even to men that are moderately good. The term therefore never, is significant of eternal perfection; since souls are at one time passively effected, but at another, recur to impassivity. Bat the term about any thing, is significant of self-suflicieney 5 since we indecd, for the sake of other things, are frequently purified fromenvy, but in those things in which we have less jthan we think we ought to have in these we are filled with envy. What however, ts

• * For aperafexros here, reac ase Oearos.
• * Vor vonrws ἐστε γοέρως, tis necessary to read in this place γόητος ἐστι voepws,

What however, ts

• * For aperafexros here, reac ase Oearos.
• * Vor vonrws ἐστε γοέρως, tis necessary to read in this place γόητος ἐστι voepws,

2 For rov yap here, it is requisite to read rovro yap. yo ’ 1 yorp. 305 the meaning of the term ovjeg, none.” Is it because there are many kinds of envy that he adds none? Or is it said through transcendency, in consequence of making a pertect negation of envy?) But what kind of transcendency is it possible to find in assertions concerning the Gods? For all the appellations and words which are employed about them, are beneath their dignity. Is not envy therefore, a pain arising from the goods belonging to others, this passion if us being mingled from pleasure and pain, as Socrates has shown in the Philebus?) Envy likewise, is for a man to be able to benefit, and yet not benetiting, but keeping the good contined tu himself. And envy ts also the want itself of good ; which the philosopher appears to me especially to assume at present, exterminating it from a divine essence. For it is naturally adapted to be periectly exempt from this alone, since it is essentialized in goodness itself. For to be pained from the goods pertaining to others, is inherent in all good which subsists according to participation, and which is not primarily good. Tor adventitious good is one thing, good according to habit another, and primary good another. For the first is mingled with its contrary, in the same manner as adventitious beauty is mingled with deformity. But the second is wholly boniform, yet is such by participation. And the third, which is primarily good, ts good itself. For as intellect itself is the first intellect, and as the beautiful itself is primarily beautiful, so good itself is primarily good. What therefore is this? It is the deity of each thing, according to which every trulyexisting being is a God. For it differs in no respect from goodness. But if any one ofsecondary natures should be said to be a God, or good, itis among the numher of things deified, and rendered good, and is a God through participation, and not on account of its own proper essence, nor from itself,

This participation therefore, Plato is accustomed to call indigence ;* just as in the Banquet, he calls Love the want of things beautiful and good. Hence, a divine nature, so far as it is divine, is primarily good, and not according to participation ; so that neither is it indigent of good. Hence too, it is superior to all envy. Foras to the sun, which is generative of light, it is impossible for darkness to approach, but it is excluded from itat a great distance, about the cavities of the earth; after the same manner, it is impossible for envy to approach toa divine nature. For what kind of indigence can there be in such transcendent abundance? What imbecility is there in almighty deity?) What participation in the