The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor

“ The former of these, indeed, is comprehended by intelligence in cone junction with reason, since it always subsists with invariable sameness, But the latter is perceived by opinion, in conjunction with irrational sense, since it is generated and corrupted, and never truly is.”

“#9? To theseit happens, that they err in tiany otherrespects, and that they coimprehend in the definitions the things defined. Por what perpetual being is, which the first definition assumes is explained, and is said to be that which always subsists with Invariable sameness; and this the second definition assumes, saying it is that which is generated and corrupted, but never truly is. This, however, ix to accuse both themselves and Plato of unskilfulness in) dialectic. But others dividing the sentence, show that imeach of the colons there are definition, and the thing defined. For in’ the former colon, the words, “ ¢hat which is (0))}}- prehended by intelligence in conjunction wth reason, are ἃ deimition ; but) the words, “ since it always subsists with invartable sameness,’ are the thine defined. And in the second colon, the words ‘is perceived by opanion in conjunction with irrational sense,” are given as adetinition; but the remaiming part ofthe sentence, is the thing defined. To these men it will be found our preceptor vas well replied. For by a little transposition of the words, the whole will be immediately apparent as follows: That which aleays subsists with. invariable sanieness, is comprehended by intelligence in conjunction with reason: but that which is generated and cor-

Me Porcuy ore τὸ μὲν ον ἐστιν, i this place, itis requisite to read οὐχ ore τὸ μὴ ov ἐστιν.

The beginning of this commentary, ts unfortunately wanting.

p. 203

The beginning of this commentary, ts unfortunately wanting.

p. 203

rupted, and never truly is, is perceived by opinion, in conjunction with irrational sense. For these things are consequent to what was before said, “what is that which ts always being but is without generation,” and “ what is that which is generated, but is never [real] being 3” that which always subsists with invariable SAMENCSS, signifying the same thing as, that which is without generation ; and that which is gencrated, but is never (reall, being, having the same signification as, that which never truly is, though they are more obscurely announced. And through the addition of ¢ru/y Plato indieates that so far indeed as it is generated, it is not; but that so far as it brings with it an image of being, so far it is not generated. For in the definitions, he renders the things defined more clear through the additions. Thus, one of the definitions says, “which is aleays being,” in order that by the term akeays we may not understand temporal perpetuity, but the elernal. For this is all at once, and subsists with invariable sameness. But temporal perpetuity, is co-extended with the infinity of time. Thus, too, the other definition has, “ that which is generated,” and together with it also says, “and is corrupted,” in order that we may not understand by generations simp/y progressions, which are also aseribed to the Gods who are beyond being, but progressions which are co-ordinate with destruction. The assigned definitions, therefore, are such as. follow: Perpetual being, is that which is comprehended by intelligence in conjunction with reason, That which is gencrated is perceived by opinion in conjunction with irrational sense.

Por these detinitions, however, it is usual to accuse Plato, in the first place, indeed, that he does not assume genus, as the rules of definitions require. In the next place, that he does not manifest what the nature is of the things defined, but It is necessary, however, prior to this distinguishes them by our knowledge. But [in defence of Plato]

habitude, to consider things themselves by themselves. we shall demonstrate the very contrary, viz. that those who are accustomed thus to doubt perfectly err. For what kind of genus has a place in being, which comprehends every intelligible essence? For if essence has no genus prior to itself, nor definition, since it is most generic, what can you say respecting being which is comprehensive of every essence, and of all powers and energics? Neither, a fore, is being the genus of eternal being: for if it was, it would not be simply | being, but a certain being. Nor is non-being the genus of eternal being lest we / should ignorantly make eternal non-being. For every where genera are predicated of species. Hence, there is not a gents of being. Besides, is not a definition derived from knowledge adapted to theory, and to the proposed definitions? For if,

Nor is non-being the genus of eternal being lest we / should ignorantly make eternal non-being. For every where genera are predicated of species. Hence, there is not a gents of being. Besides, is not a definition derived from knowledge adapted to theory, and to the proposed definitions? For if,p. 204 as we said before, Plato wished to use these axioms and hypotheses in the demonstrations which he intended to make, it was necessary that they should be known and manifest to us. If, indeed, he had exhorted us to mvestigate the nature of things, itselfin itself, he would have ignorantly filled the whole of his doctrine definitions with obscurity. But as he wished to make known through definitions being and that which is gencrated, he produced the demonstri ions through things that are known, and clearly represents to us the peculiarity of them, in order that being excited and perfected, we may more manife stly survey what each of them is. Forsince every thing gnostte, is either the thing known itself, or perceives, or possesses the thing known ; for intellect, indeed, is the intelligible, but sense perceives what is sensible, and dianoia possesses in itself the dianoetic object ; aud as we are not naturally adapted to become the intelligible, but know itthrough the power im us which is conjoined with it; this being the case, we require this power, and through this the nature of being ts macs ntous. After this manner, therefore, we answer the doubts. ᾿