The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor

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BOOK 11.] TIMAUS OF PLATO, 321

Plutarch of Cherona and his followers, and also Atticus, understand what is here said literally, as testifying for them the generation of the world froma certain time. They also say that unadorned matter existed prior to the generation of the universe, and likewise a malevolent soul, which moved this matter. For, [they add,] whence was the motion except from soul; and if the motion was disorderly it was froma disorderly soul? It is said therefore, in the Laws, that a beneficent soul instructs in an upright and prudent manner, but that a malevolent soul is moved disorderly, and that what is governed by it is conducted confusedly and inelegantly. They farther add, that when the fabrication of the world by the Demiurgus commenced, matter was brought into a state adapted to the composition of the world, and that the malevolent soul participating of intellect, was rendered prudent, and produced an orderly motion. For the participation of form, and the presence of intellect, brought it into order. Porphyry however, and Tamblichus, and their followers, reprobate this opinion, as admitting in wholes, that which is without, prior to that which has arrangement, the imperfect prior to the perfect, and that which is without intelligence, prior to that which is intellectual. And [they add], that Plutarch and Atticus are not only guilty of > impiety towards the Demiurgus, but likewise, either entirely subvert his beneficent will, or his prolific power. For both these concurring, it is also necessary that the world should be perpetually fabricated by him. They likewise say, that Plato wishing to indicate the providence proceeding from the Demiurgus into the universe, and also the supply of intellect, and the presence of soul, and the numerous and mighty goods of which they are the causes to the world, previously surveys how the whole corporeal-formed composition is when considered itself by itself, disorderly and confused. And that he does this, in order that by perceiving by itself the arrangement derived from soul, and the demiurgic orderly distribution of things, we may be able to determine what the nature is of the corporealformed essence by itself, and what order it is allotted from fabrication ; the world indeed, always existing, but language dividing that which is generated from its maker, and producing according to time things which are con-subsistent at once, because every thing which is generated is a composite.

We may also observe, in addition to what is here rightly asserted, that since the demiurgic production is twofold, the one being corporeal,’ but the other decora-

Ϊ } Ϊ tive, Plato beginning from the latter, supposes with the greatest propriety, that //

* For Lwxparcns here, it is necessary to read cwparins.

Tim. Plat. Vou. I. 2s

ὙΠ τ ὐπαντανα.. ἢ

p. 322

Tim. Plat. Vou. I. 2s

ὙΠ τ ὐπαντανα.. ἢp. 322 every thing corporeal is moved in a way perfectly confused and disorderly. For its motion is such, so far as pertains to itself, when it is surveyed as not yet participating of intellect, and animated by an intellectual soul. For when the universe becomes a thing of this kind, then it participates of supernatural powers. But if itis moved, as he says, neither by intellect, nor by a prudent soul, from which order is derived, its motion will be disorderly. A little after this however, Plato delivers to us the demiurgic providence about the fabrication of bodies. For then the Demiurgus is represented as fashioning the whule of a corporeal nature, which Plato now says he assumed 5 the Demiurgus being the maker, the adorner, the artist, and the manual artificer. If therefore, he produces the first bodies, it is evident that the generation of body is a part of his fabrication, the visible nature receiving certain vestiges of forms, which are the forerunners of their distinct subsistence ; each thing when this distinction takes place, being perfectly adorned, and obtaining an appropriate position and order in the universe, And there is no occasion indeed, to say much about that which is moved in a confused and = disorderly manner. For Plato clearly says, that the Demiurgus fashioned the whole of the corporeal nature within soul. With respect to soul however, itis evident that one thing pertaining to it was not a subject funproduced by the Demiurgus), and that he alone produced its orderly distribution, For he first: constitutes its essence, and the same and the different; of which as elements it consists. Hence, if he produced the elements of soul, and the mixture of these, he produced the whole of it. So that he did not assume one part of it as already existing, and add another. And of soul indeed, which is incorporeal, this is trae. But with respect to body, we have shown how divinity is the cause of the first forms. Concerning matter itself, however, some one may enquire whether it is unbegotten, not being generated by a cause, as Plutarch and Atticus say, or whether it was generated, and if so from what cause. Vor Aristotle indeed, in another way demonstrates that it ts unbegotten, as not being a composite, nor consisting of another matter, nor again, being analyzed into another. The present discussion however, says that it is perpetual, but investigates whether itis unbegotten and not generated by a cause, and whether according to Plato, two principles of wholes are to be admitted, matter and God, neither God producing matter, nor matter God ; in order that the one may be entirely perpetual, and without God, but the other entirely immaterial and simple. This thing therefore, is among the number of those which are very much investigated, and has been considered by us elsewhere. Now, however, it is requisite to exhibit to these men, what the

This thing therefore, is among the number of those which are very much investigated, and has been considered by us elsewhere. Now, however, it is requisite to exhibit to these men, what the

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BOOK 11.} TIMAMUS OF PLATO. 323

conception of Plato is on this subject. For that the Demiurgus is mot the first’

who gave subsistence to matter, is evident from what Plato says further on, viz. that these three things preceded the generation of the world, being, place, and generation; and that eeneration is an ofispring, but place a mother. He appears there-

\ Ὶ | | fore through these things to divide matter oppositely as it were to the Demiurgus, ἡ according to the maternal and paternal peculiarity, but to produce generation from the Demiurgus and matter. Does he not therefore give subsistence to matter from another order, which has an arrangement prior to the Demiurgus? Iu the Philebus therefore, he clearly writes, “11 say that God" exhibited the bound, and also the infinity of beings, from which bodies andall beings derive their composition.” Hence, if bodies are from bound and infinity, what is the bound in them, and what the infinity? It is evident indeed, that we Say matter is infinity, but form bound. If therefore, as we have said, God gives subsistence to all infinity, he \\ likewise gives subsistence to matter, which is the last infinity. And this indeed, /)

is the first and ineffable cause of matter. But since every where sensibles are analogous to intelligible causes, and Plato constitutes the former from the latter ; as for instance, the equal which is here, from the equal itself, the similar, from similitude itself, and after the same manner all sublunary animals and plants,—it is evident, that he hkewise produces the infinity which is here, from the first infinity, Just as he produces the bound which is here from the bound which is there. It has however, been demonstrated by us elsewhere, that he establishes the first infinity which is prior to things that are mingled in thesummitof intelligibles, and from thence extends its illumination as far as tothe last of things ; so that according to him, mat- \ ter proceeds from the one and being, or if you are willing, from the one being also, [or ) | being characterized by theone|so far as it is being in power. Hence likewise, it is in 1}

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