The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor

This word which is used here by Plato, signifies both the Goddess of justice, and lawful,p. 334 with himself. For being himself most excellent, he very properly causes the world to be most beautiful ; because the first and intelligible beauty itself is suspended from, and is in goodness. Hence the world likewise, being most beautiful, is suspended from the Demiurgus, who is the best [of fabricative causes]. And because the good is the cause of beauty, on this account also the best of fathers gives subsistence to the most beautiful offSpring. Farther still, as ‘Themis is the guardian of the divine laws, but they make the generations of secondary from first natures to proceed in an orderly series, and preserve the connexion of divine beings, and the similitudes of things second to such as are first ;—on this account also, the Demiurgus, energizing with Themis, renders the universe most beautiful, being himself most excellent. For if Socrates, being a man, says that itis not lawful for him to concede any thing that is false, or to obliterate the truth, how is it possible we should say that the demiurgic intellect effects any thing else than what is beautiful, and that he does not exterminate deformity, being united to Themis, who is likewise always present with bim? And thus much concerning this particular.

But the words, “it neither was nor is,” are very appropriately assumed with that which ts best: for before this, he had called the Demiurgus good, and then also the term zas, was added. For Timeus says; he was good. For the simplicity which is above intellect, and the peculiarity itself of deity, are more adapted to the term twas, as being super-eternal, and better than all intellectual perception, Now! however he calls him the most excellent, as being a deified intellect. For that which participates [of deity] is most excellent. The terms also was and is, are adapted to the Demiurgus ; as to a God indeed, the term was ; but as to an intellect, the term ἐς, in order that at one and the same time his divine union and eternal hypostasis may be rendered manifest.

“ By a reasoning process, therefore, he found that among the things which are naturally visible, no whole work destitute of intellect: would ever be more beautiful than a whole work which possesses intellect.”

Amelius in a wonderful manner endeavours to prove that Plato knew the different demiurgic causes, and continually passes in a silent way from one of these causes to another; exhibiting, on account of their connexion, no one of the

* Novy 1s erroneously printed here for νυν.

p. 335

p. 335

divine causes themselves, but discoursing about them as if they were one and the same, through the union of the demiurgi with each other. For all of them are one, and oneis all. Since now also he who wills is one Deimiureus, he who reasons is another, and he who assumes or receives is another. And the first, indeed, makes by his wilt alone, the second by intelligence and intellectual perception, but the third by [as it were] manual operation, For they placed intellect in soul, but soul in body, and thus together fabricated ' the universe. The divine lamblichus however reprobates all such interpretations, as very superfluously devised. But he defines Ἀογίσμος, OF a reasoning process, to be that which causally precedes beings, Which is fabricative of essence itself, and which is according to energy invariably the same; from which all reasonings are connected, and have their existence.

We indeed have already observed, that Timieus discourses about one and the same Demiurgus, and shall now remind the reader that this must be admitted. Por if there isa multitude in the demiurgi, (i.e. if there are many demiurgi,] it is necessary to arrange aimonad prior to the multitude. Moreorer, we think it fit that the divine Lambiichus should consider, whether the one and whole Demiurgus, being an intellectual world, is not multipotent, and does not by different powers fabricate diferent things, in addition to his being the father of all things ? Por let the same Demiurgus, so far as he is good, and so far as he is a God, be the producing cause of all things; yet since he comprehends in himself the cause of all fabrications, and produces in one way the whole, but in another the parts ; the former indeed collectively and totally, but the latter in’ a distributed manner, ceiving subsistence to each thing, according to its proper cause; hence by one intellectual perception, he adorns the whole, and generates it, collectively 5 accordinz to which also, the world is one animal. But by a reasoning process, he produces the parts in the world, and these as wholes; because he is the Demiurgus of total naturcs, fabricating total intellect, and total soul, and all the bulk of body. Hence, as composing parts, he is said to make them by a reasoning process. For λογισμὸς isa distributed or divided evolution of parts, and a distinctive cause of things. For it does not pertain to one who doubts; since neither does art, nor science doubt; but artists and scientific men then doubt when they are indigent of the habits by which the former become artists, and the latter men of science. If however these do not doubt, ng reason can be assigned why intellect should

' For ovvecrecverac in this place, it is necessary to read ovvrecraiveras,

p. 336

If however these do not doubt, ng reason can be assigned why intellect should

' For ovvecrecverac in this place, it is necessary to read ovvrecraiveras,p. 336 doubt. Hence this λογισμὸς is not through the want of that which is fit taking place. But the Demiurgus produces the whole world by intelligence. For intelligence is collective of multitude into one; just as λογισμὸς is distributive of the one into multitude. Such therefore is the meaning of “ by a reasoning process.”

With respect however to the things which are naturally visible, to say that they are sensibles is perfectly absurd. For these are not yet arranged in the discourse of Timeus, and it is among the number of things impossible, that the Demiurgus should be converted to them. For how can he verge to that which 15 less excellent, or what kind of representation can he receive of material things, to which it is not fortunate even for a partial soul to incline? Itis better therefore, as the divine Tamblichus interprets the words, to think that things of this kind are intelligibles. For that these are visible is evident from the things which ‘Timwus shortly after says the Demiurgus perceives. For his words are, “ As many therefore, and such tdeas, as intellect perceived to be inherent in that which ts animal, &c.” That they are also naturally visible, will be evident if we consider, that some things are visible with relation to us, but others according to nature. And the things indeed which are visible with relation to us, are in their own nature dark and immanifest; but those which are naturally visible are truly known, and are resplendent with divine light. But intelligibles are things of this kind. Perhaps too, as he had ealled that which is moved in a confused and disorderly manner visible, and which subsists preternaturally as with reference to fabrication, he now calls the intelligible paradigms of the Demiurgus, naturally visible. Hence, in the introduction he inquires, whether an eternal or a generated paradigm of the universe must be admitted; these two things existing prior to the generation of the universe, being and generation. And where else can the Demiurgus find the causes of generated natures, than in intelligibles? Por invention with him is not a fortuitous thing, nor a syllogistic process 3 since this pertains to partial souls; but a union with the intelligible causes of the parts of the universe, and a survey and plenitude from thence derived. For all things exist paradigmatically in the natures prior to him, both such as are the objects of intellection, and suchas are deprived of intelligence ;' since truly existing being comprehends uniformly the cause of intellectual natures, and of those that do not participate of intellect. And the intellectual beings which are there, are

Yor vonrwy here, it is necessary to read asonruy.

p. 337