The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor

All things

• For tn/w rrju/i litre, it is obviously neiessaiy to read rrrpcrijf.

BOOk III.]

TlNLT.rs OP PLATO.

therefore, says ho, air* all, anil each is one according to essence, hut all tilings according to participation. And this is what the in a certain respect is in intellii

Again. tin* In nr it subsists, is there according to the differences of participations. For many things participate differently of the same jicculiarity. Tims for instance, permanency paiticipatcs of sammess, and motion also participates of it, yet not after the same manner, hut the former more, and the latter less. In the orders of forms likewise, intelligible* participate in one way o (the one, or of essence, hut intellectuals in another w ay, and of these some differently from others, according to the measures of the essence of each. Hence the how it subsists is there. Hut the xchen i> there, either according to the operations of intelligible* on sublunary natures ; for these sometimes participate of them, and they become sometimes parlicipahle by certain things; or it is there, according to the intellections them¬ selves of the soul. For the soul applying itself at different times to different forms, at one time, intellectually perceives these, hut at another those. And eternal being sometimes accedes to it, in the same manner as sometimes the intel¬ ligible. Each thing likewise i- there, r nth rcjcrcncc to each, so far as all things are in ear h other, and proceed through each other, and all things are allied ami adapt¬ ed to all ; or so far as they are suspended from a certain one, or so far as one is cause, hut another the thing caused ; or so far as in some wav or other they sul>- sist dilli rently. Ami to suffer is there, so far as they are filled from each other, and all things impart to all their own peculiarities. For Plato frerpientlv mani¬ fest spartii ipation by the word suffering, as we may learn in the Snphista. For he there says, that uhole is the sufficing one [or that which is passive to the om], hut is not the one itself, Irecause it participates of the one. These things therefore, are in intelligible* and in sensible*, because both in the latter and m the former, it happens that each exists and suffers with reference to each. Plato therefore, [as I have said,] is accustomed to indicate participations by sufficing, and as we have said, to call every thing which participates, that which suffers the thing' of which it participates.

Plato therefore, [as I have said,] is accustomed to indicate participations by sufficing, and as we have said, to call every thing which participates, that which suffers the thing' of which it participates.

In short, the soul of the universe speaks through the whole of itself according to one knowledge, both of generated natures, and of those which possess an eter¬ nal sameness of being, and asserts of each what that is with which it is the same, ami from which it is different, and how each subsists according to existence, or ac¬ tion, or passion. For both among real beings, and generated natures, one tiling in a greater degree suffers from another, and one thing in a greater degree acts on

* For miw litre, it it rcijuiMte to rcavl »ti»ov.

p. 104

PROCEUS ON THE

[BOOK III.

another; all which the soul intellectually perceiving, asserts some indeed through the circle of the same, but others through the circle of the different, Tor it ante¬ cedently comprehends all sensibles, anil their actions and passions. For since the universe is one animal, it is copassive with itself, so that all generated natures are parts of the life of the universe, as of one drama. Just as if a tragic poet should compose a drama, in which the gods and heroes, and other persons, are introduced, and in which also he assigns to su< li of the players as are willing the utterance of heroic or certain other speeches ; the poet himself in the meantime comprehending the one cause of all that is said. It is requisite therefore, to con¬ ceive a thing ot this kind in the whole soul of the universe. For giving subsistence to all the life of the world, which is one and v arious, like a many headed animal speakingwith all its heads, and uttering partly (irecian and partly Barbaric lan¬ guage, this soul comprehends the causes ot all generated natures; and knows particulais by universals, accidents by essences, and parts by wholes. But it knows all things simply according to its divine part. For a (Jod so tar as a(»od knows things partial, and preternatural, and in short all things, even though you should adduce matter itself. For every thing, whatever it may lie is one, so fur as it is h um the one. The knowledge therefore of all things simply and immedi¬ ately, is div ine.

“ Hut reason becoming true according to same, and also being conver¬ sant with different, and revolving about same without speech and sound, m that which is moved by it."

The knowledge therefore of all things simply and immedi¬ ately, is div ine.

“ Hut reason becoming true according to same, and also being conver¬ sant with different, and revolving about same without speech and sound, m that which is moved by it."

Atticus by raison here, understands the attentive power of the soul; but Por¬ phyry, the cliarioti-er, moving the twofold horses; and lamblichus the whole soul. For the soul movesthe whole of itself, and through the whole of itself is the reason of beings. And all the interpretations indeed, appear to exhibit the meaning of Plato, but that of Porphyry i-' mon concordant, both with what is here and else¬ where said. For this reason which is now assumed, is neither that which is essential, nor that which subsists in energy, but that which is as d>** one power of the essence of souls, according to which also the soul is one, just as it is Informed according to sameness and dillcrence. Or why were there not three circles, one according to each of the elements which are three, lint two only, unless there is one essence in both } 'Flic power therefore of this one essence, is ibis reason, which is neither i ssence itself, nor the energy from essence having the third order. Hence this reason Ix-ing one, knows according to the same. I pV it does not sometimes know the intelligible, and sometimes the sensible, like our reason, winch is not able to apprehend both according to the same. This reason hook in.] TIM.IX'S OF PLATO. 105