The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor

They differ therefore, by something eise, and not by the unbegotten. Hence, that by which they differ from each other, will

| * Instead of καθολον here, it is necessary to read ov καθ᾽ ολον. { wt ervgeut 2 a AWA A,

͵ - t } ! " vberwnctp. 329 not be unbegotten. It will therefore be generated. It is impossible, however, that things without generation, should differ by the generated. In the next place, what is the cause to them of their difference, and which makes the one to be preservative, but the other corruptive? For it is absurd to say, that it is the unbegotten; (for either every thing unbegotten is preservative, or every thing unbegotten is corruptive;) if the unbegotten nature of God makes God to be preservative, or the unbegotten nature of matter makes matter to be corruptive. But ifsomething else is the cause of their difference, whether is that something else unbegotten or generated? For if it is generated, it is absurd that it snould be the cause of things unbegotten; or if unbegotten,' that it should be the cause of unbegotten natures. So that again, we must investigate something else prior to these, as the cause of their difference, and the ascent will be ad infinitum. For if there will be no cause of difference to things that differ, so as to render the one preservative, but the other corruptive, the casual will have dominion over the principles ; for cause being subverted, the concurrence of such-like principles will be irrational, and without a cause. :

Farther still, it is absurd to make evil eternal, in the same manner as the good. Por that which is without God, is not similarly honorable with that which is divine; nor is it equally unbegotten, nor, in short, is it to be contrarily divided. Vor why is the one more suflicient to itself, or more immutable, or indestructible, than the other, if each of them is from eternity, and neither is in want of the other? Again, if one of them is adapted to be adorned, but the other to adorn, whence is their aptitude derived? For it is necessary there should be something which connects both, and makes them commensurate to each other. For these principles being divulsed from, and subsisting contrary to.each other, cannot render themselves adapted to coalition. Unless they say, that this also arises from chance. Nor in thus speaking do they attend to the Athenian guest, who says, that this is the fountain of stupid opinion, to assert that the irrational is prior to reason, and that chance has dominion prior to intellectual art. Nor to Socrates in the Republic, who says, that it is not proper to remain in multitude, but to recur from the many to their common monads. . Farther still, it is necessary to characterize the highest principle not by this alone, that it has not another principle ; for this does not yet demonstrate its dignity * [but that it is the prin-

. Farther still, it is necessary to characterize the highest principle not by this alone, that it has not another principle ; for this does not yet demonstrate its dignity * [but that it is the prin-

! It is necessary here to supply ἀγένητον των; and therefore instead of reading, as in the original, aire αγενητων ὑντων, We Must read, cire ayernroy των ayeyntwY OVTwY.

* For αταξιαν here, it is necessary to read αξιαν.

Tim. Plat. Voi. L ; oy

p. 330

ciple of all principles). But if this be the case, there will not be more [independent) principles than one. For if there were, God will not be the cause of all things, but only of certain things. But if he also rules over matter, there is one principle, and not many principles. Farther still, if the existence of principle consists in this, that it is the principle of certain things, and that it adorns that which is disorderly, it will be simultaneous with the things that proceed from it, and the principle will be no less subverted from things posterior to it not existing,

} than things posterior tu it when the principle is subverted... But this will be the

Α μ᾽ Ἵ

+ ‘ease, since they frequently say, that the principle has its existence in fabricating.

“If however this be true, itis not possible for the principle to exist, the world not”

‘lexisting, | But again, asserting differently from what they did before, they say, — that God exists without fabricating. ‘They assert this however, not* knowing

‘that true powers energize by their very being, and that the augmentative and nu-

| tritive powers, by their very being, increase and nourish the body. Thus also the soul by its very existence animates, vivifies, and moves its instrament [the body], For the body does not perceive or palpitate in consequence of our pre-deliberation 5 “but the presence of soul alone accomplishes these energies. ) Again, every thing which is always naturally adapted to a certain thing, essentially possesses the power of effecting it; but that which is changed differently at different times, Is adscititious, ΠΟ therefore God always fabricates, he will have a connascent demiurgic power ; but if he does not, lis power will be adscititious. Hlow therefore, from being imperfect, does he become perfect, and from not being artificial, an artificer?

Hlow therefore, from being imperfect, does he become perfect, and from not being artificial, an artificer?

The second head therefore after this, is that which shows that Plato refers all things to one principle. And this is evident from the Republic, where he asserts that the sun is the cause of visible, but the good of intelligible natures. Again also, he calls the sun the offspring of the good. ‘This is hkewise evident from his Epistles, in which he says that all things are about the king of all, and that all things are for his sake. For if all things are converted to him, and subsist about him, he is the principle of all, and not only of certain things ; since whatever you may assume will be derived from thence. “This too is manifest from the Philebus, in which dialogue he ciearly says, that all things are from bound and

“ Instead of καὶ order μαλλὸν arnpnpern τῆς ἀρχὴν, ἐκ πκοδων ra per αὐτήν, ἐκ τοντων μὴ οντω), αναιρειται ἡ ἀρχῇ, Ll read, καὶ ονδεν μαλλον ανὴηρημενὴς τὴς ἀρχὴν, €« ποδων τα μετ᾽ αὐτὴν ἡ εκ τύντων, κ. Me

Ὁ Οὐχ is omitted here in the original.

p. 331

infinity, but that of these principles themselves there is one pre-existent cause, which is God. Hence, there is one principle and many principles ; but these are perfected by the one principle. Prom what is said also in the Philebus this is evident, in which dialogue he confutes those who assert that beings are [alone] many, and likewise those who admit the principle to be being itself. For he de- Monstrates, that itis neither proper to begin from the multitude of beings, nor from the one being, but from the one itself, :