The Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor

The addition also of whether the universe aleays was, having no beginning of generation, or whether it was generated,” shows that what is said is asserted more generally of ihe universe. For with reference to the world, it is demonstrated that it has ap. 228 beginning of generation, and that it is visible and tangible, but not with reference to the universe. This, therefore, is manifest. But since it is also necessary to discover in the first place the mundane form, whether itis to be arranged among eternal, or among generated natures, let us see what arguments the philosopher employs, and follow him in his demonstrations whether it always was, having no beginning of generation, or was generated from a certain principle ; for we shall find that he uses all the dialectic! methods in the hypotheses, "Thus he divides being from that which 1s generated, and definitively and also analytically assigns what each of them is. For he recurs from generated natures 10. the demiurgic and paradigmatic causes of them, Moreover, having indicated to us the truth concerning ineffable and effable names, in perfect conformity to the doctrine of Pythagoras, who said that number was the wisest of things, but that he was the next in wisdom who gave names to things,—he afterw ards converts himself to the demonstrations of the problems concerning the world. And in the first: place, he endeavours to find the form of it, and whether it: must be admitted to bea portion of perpetual being, or ofa venerated nature. And on this account he Inquires whether it has a certain principle of generation, or has none, not asking whether it belongs to eternal beings, or to generated natures 5 for he might have said that it was a mediom between both these, in the same manner as soul. But he asks whether it always was, having no principle whatever of generation, or whether it was in some way or other generated, in order that he might apprehend the medium between both these to be that which has a certain principle of generation, and yet always is. Afterwards having shown that the world is alone generated according to its body, he grants it according to a certain other thing to be unbegotten, according to which also itis ἃ God, as will be evident as we proceed,

Such therefore being the inquiry, Plutarch, Atticus, and many other of the Platonists, conceiving the generation here mentioned to be temporal, say that the inquiry is, whether the world is unbegotten or cenerated according to time, Por they assert that prior to the fabneation of the world, there was a disorderly motion, But time entirely subsists together with motion ; so that there was time prior to the universe, Time, however, was also generated together with the

* As the dialectic of Plato is perfectly scientific, as we have shown in the notes on the Parmenides, and employs the dividing, defining, analysing, and demonstrative methods, it is evident that instead of διαλογιίκαις μεθοδοιν in this place, we should read διαλεκτίκαις μεθυδοι». This is also evident from what follows,p. 233 universe, being the number of the motion of the universe; so that the former time was prior to the fabrication of the world, being the number of a disorderly motion. But the interpreters of Plato that follow Crantor, say that the world is said to be generated, as being produced by another cause, and not being self-begotten, nor self-subsistent. And Plotinus, and the philosophers afler Plotinus, viz. Porphyry and Tamblichus, say that the composite nature is here called that which is cenerated, and that with this,’ generation from another cause is con-subsistent. We however say, that all these assertions are most true; and that the world is gencrated, both as a composite, and as being indigent of other causes to its existence. For every thing which has interval is a thing of this kind, and that which is sensible, is allotted such a nature as this. We think it fit however, that these philosophers should look to other generated natures, I mean time and soul, survey what is common in them, and extend it to these significations, and say, that [real] being indeed is that, which eternally possesses a stable essence, power

~and energy. But that which is simply, or absolutely generated, is that which receives all these according to time. And that which is in a certain respect generated, possesses its energy In motion and extension. For it has been before observed by us, that Plato defined the extremes to be, that which 15. simply perpetual being, and that which is simply generated. But in what is here said, he comprehends the media. Hence, that which does not possess at once, the whole of its essence, or energy established in unity, is denominated gencrated. A thing of this kind also, entirely subsists through generation, and its existence is generated, or becoming to be, but is not [real] being. This sensible world likewise, time among things that are moved, and the transitive intelligence of souls, are things of this kind. But it is manifest that all motion subsists according to a part, and that the whole of it is not at once.

If, however, the essence of the world has generation, and the perpetuity of it subsists according to temporal infinity, some one by considering this may syllogize as follows: First, that it is necessary between things that are eternally per petual, and things which are generated in a part of time, the medium should be an hypostasis which is generated infinitely. And that this should be two-fold, either having the whole perpetual, through the whole of time, but the parts in the parts

And that this should be two-fold, either having the whole perpetual, through the whole of time, but the parts in the parts

‘of time, as is the case with these elements, or having both the whole and the parts co-extended with the perpetuity of the whole of time, as is the case with the celestial

' For revro here, it is necessary to read rovry.

Tim. Plat. Vai, 7... 2G

|p. 234 bodies. For there is not the same perpetuity according to eternity and the whole of time; since neither is there the same infinity of time and eternity, because eternity and time are not the same. In the second place, that what is measured by eternity, and exists in eternity, 1s necessarily impartible. For how can that which is partible be fixed, and haye its essence established in the impartible? In the third place, that soul energizes according to time, and that body subsists entirely in time. For the energy of soul is nearer to eternal natures, than the essence of body. What is it then, by which we may infer that the essence of the celestial bodies is thus perpetual according to time? Itis this, that it cannot be separated from the cause that adorns it. For this makes it evident that it is allotted a renovated perpetuity, and is always generated from a source external to itself. For if it received the whole of its proper essence from itself, it would be sufficient to itself, sepajrate from that which makes it, and imparts to it essence.. The intention indeed lof Plato is to show, that the world is simply generated, as having its essence, power, and energy, and also its perpetuity co-extended with the whole of time. But he inquires from the first, whether it is eternal being, or belongs to things which are perfected by time. For the expression always was, signifies with Plato the intelligible, as we have before observed. If, however, he says further on, that

| the term was is not adapted to eternal natures, but the term ἐσ, we must not be disturbed. For prior to a distinct evolution, he follows the accustomed mode of speaking. Hence also, when celebrating the Demurgus he says, “he was good,” though the Demiurgus ranks among eternal natures. And speaking of the paradigm, he collects both these together at once: for he says, “Zhe nature of animal itself therefore was being eternal ;” together with αἰώνιος, ovra being eternal, assuming τὸ eruyyave was. And in addition to all that has been said, because the power of every finite body is not infinite, as Aristotle has demonstrated, but eternity is an infinite power, hence every finite body is incapable of receiving eternity. It is necessary therefore that it should not always Je, but should always be generated, or becoming to be, receiving as much as possible a flowing existence.